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 How do we account for foreign firms that are successful in politically “risky” 
countries? While traditional political risk indices may tell us why a country is considered a 
difficult operating environment, they tell us very little about why some foreign firms are 
nevertheless able to operate successfully in such countries over long periods of time. In 
fact, risk indices by their very nature make “success” almost impossible to capture due to 
their sole focus on “host country” behavior. Rather, as this thesis argues, the political risk is 
in the relationship between the firm and a series of stakeholders within a given country, not 
the country itself.  
 This is a thesis of deviant cases: it holds the “successful relationship” between a 
foreign firm and its stakeholders as the constant dependent variable in the “significantly 
risky” country of Kazakhstan. Success is defined as the ability of each actor to pursue its 
own goals to a self-satisfactory degree, with the resources an actor mobilizes to achieve 
those goals and the constraints that restrict those resources as the independent variables. 
Three self-contained cases of “successful” foreign mining firms operating in Kazakhstan 
are analyzed here to determine the distinct causal pathways that led each firm to seeming 
“success”; the thesis then pivots to a between-subjects examination aimed at drawing out 
the common themes among the three different foreign firms. Within international relations 
theory, the relationship between the foreign firm and its stakeholders is considered here as a 
window into the intersection of the international political economy and the domestic 
political economy of a country in transition, but critically, allotting agents and structures 




understanding of social behavior – here, co-existence – within the context of the agent-
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research funding, the Honeyman Foundation for funding my field research, and the Dr. 
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formal MLitt postgraduate study. The Ransome Trust along with the Department of 
Defense allowed me the financial freedom to study and travel across Kazakhstan back 
when that short paper (that would later become this thesis) was initially written, and it is 
more than fair to say that without their early encouragement, I would not be in the position 
I am today. Finally, my loving thanks to my family, particularly to my wife Gabriela for her 
patience and support over the last several years – and her willingness to take our little 





Note on Transliteration 
Throughout this thesis I have used the Library of Congress system of transliteration, 
although with a series of exceptions made either because of familiarity in English or in the 
case of personal nouns, if the individual or institution of interest has transliterated his, her 
or its own name from Russian into English following a system other than that which would 




Introduction: Coming in from the cold: foreign investment in politically 
“risky” Kazakhstan 
Introduction 
 On a particularly cold night in Ust-Kamenogorsk, a city in eastern Kazakhstan not 
150 miles from the Chinese border, I found myself walking back to my apartment after a 
heated interview with the city akim (the Western equivalent of a mayor).
1
 The meeting had 
ended abruptly, with some sharp words from the akim following a discussion on water 
security in the region, at which point his staffers took my documents to photocopy and 
made inquiries into a local business that had been helping me set up meetings in the region. 
I was unaware at the time of on-going negotiations between a US-based multinational and 
the akim on a nearby hydroelectric plant. Later I would find out that due to the friction 
between the company and the government, US embassy personnel had been disinvited from 
visiting the local government that very same week in which I was there.  
 I recall asking myself in the deep snow and a temperature of minus 20 Fahrenheit 
(minus 29 Celsius) if I had just been kicked out of the city, and when the owner of the same 
small business called me later that night to cancel our contract, apologizing but hoping that 
I understood, he answered that question for me in recommending that I leave Ust-
Kamenogorsk immediately the next morning. “Do not show up for your meeting tomorrow 
[with another government official],” he said to me. “We have secret police here, like the 
KGB. They might be waiting there for you.”
2
  
                                                             
1 Source-42 (2011), Feb. 24. See Appendix I for source numbers and corresponding source descriptions, 
interview dates and locations. 
2 Source-35 (2011), Feb. 24. 
12 
 
 In my experience in post-Soviet states, limited as it may be, the KGB threat was 
tossed around quite loosely, and so more importantly, I wondered, were those his words? 
Or was he delivering a message from the akim’s staffers, with whom he had just come off 
the phone? It was tough to tell, but I would be lying if I said I slept easily that night. I had 
been in Kazakhstan for just two weeks, researching the political risks associated with 
mining companies in the region and Ust-Kamenogorsk had been mining lead and zinc since 
the days of the Russian Empire (in fact Ust-Kamenogorsk roughly translates from Russian 
into “mouth of stone”). Now the lead and zinc mines are run by Kazzinc, a company 
majority-owned by the famously secretive Glencore, a Switzerland-based metals trading 
firm that until recently was one of the largest privately owned companies in the world 
(Glencore went public on the London and Hong Kong stock exchanges in May 2011).
3
 I 
had planned on Kazzinc playing a large role in my thesis, but now that seemed unlikely. 
That next morning I had to make a decision: do I leave or do I stay?  
 In hindsight, what I decided to do turned to be the most important single choice I 
made over the course of my trip, but to understand why, I need to start from the beginning. 
The Question 
 A few weeks after President Ben Ali fled Tunisia, and right around when events in 
Egypt began to heat up in what would later become known as the Arab Spring, President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev
4
 of Kazakhstan called a snap election for April 3, 2011, almost two 
years earlier than expected. It was difficult for political analysts not to wonder aloud if the 
events were related – if Nazarbayev was trying to get ahead of any anticipated latent 
                                                             
3 Ferreira-Marques, C. and MacLellan, K. (2011) ‘Glencore’s record IPO makes muted debut’, Reuters, May 
19. 
4 All spellings of non-English names in this thesis are based on the preferred spelling of the specific 
individual. For instance, in the English version of President Nazarbayev’s official website, his last name is 
spelled Nazarbayev, and so that is how it is presented here. 
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political unrest by holding elections – but the truth is that at the time the situation in 
Kazakhstan was very different, in fact the exact opposite of what was happening in other 
parts of the world. Analysts tend to agree and independent polling shows that most people 
in Kazakhstan support Nazarbayev – his approval rating has moved between 80 and 90-
percent from 2008 to 2011.
5
 They support him so much that in one region, which happened 
to be where I was in East Kazakhstan, villagers allegedly began collecting signatures in late 
December 2010 to have a referendum on extending his presidency until 2020. By mid-
January, supposedly 5 million people in the country had signed the petition (which equals 
over half the eligible voting population in the whole country signing the document in three 
weeks – an unlikely and thus suspicious feat).
6
 
 Explanations vary in identifying the impetus for the referendum – from the 
movement being wholly grassroots to the more cynical suggestion that the entire process 
was staged by Nazarbayev and his staff – though publicly the president distanced himself 
from the proposal. The international community also frowned upon the initiative, 
particularly in the wake of legislation passed in 2010 that named Nazarbayev “Leader of 
the Nation,” granting him immunity from prosecution for life and deeming falsification by 
others of his biography a criminal offense.
7
 After his veto of the referendum was 
overridden by the parliament, Nazarbayev put it all to an end by calling an early election. 
International community response? Then US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley: 
                                                             
5 See, for example, (2011) ‘Kazakhstan national opinion poll’, International Republican Institute. Survey 
conducted between Feb. 17-28; further, Source-56 (2011), Mar. 16. 
6 Foster, H. (2011) ‘Nazarvayev move could block election referendum’, Central Asia Newswire, Jan. 11, 
available at: http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/viewstory.aspx?id=2958; (2011) ‘Kazakhstan: 
Nazarbayev President Till 2020?’, ZeiTGeiST Asia, February edition; (2011) ‘Kazakhstan’s benevolent father: 
Long like the khan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, very nearly eternal’, The Economist, Jan. 6. 




“It appears to us that Kazakhstan has decided not to pursue a national referendum and we 
think that’s the right decision.”
8
 
 Representatives of foreign governments in Kazakhstan walk a fine line with the 
“Leader of the Nation.” Despite Nazarbayev’s popularity in the polls, the country is no 
beacon of democracy – not a single election here has been credited by international 
observers as free and fair, and there is one dominant political party, the “party of power,” 
Nur Otan, of which the president is party chairman and until recently, all parliamentarians 
were members.
9
 But Kazakhstan is rich in mineral resources, which is often the “other” 
reason the country makes it into the newspapers (albeit on the business page). The 
country’s Kashagan oil field, for instance, is believed to be the largest single oil deposit 
outside of the Middle East, and certainly one of the most significant finds in decades (if not 
the most significant find).
10
 There is great financial opportunity here, which puts diplomats 
in the awkward position of political finger-pointer cum business match-maker. 
 At around the same time Nazarbayev announced the election, I was preparing to 
begin the bulk of my field research for this thesis. In mid-February 2011 I would leave for 
Almaty, the biggest city in the country and former capital, to study the business climate 
beyond oil and gas, specifically within the metals mining sector. Oil and gas in Kazakhstan 
receive the majority of attention, but the country is also rich in uranium, copper, chromium, 
zinc, lead, magnesium, gold and iron ore. Despite the fact that the country is considered 
“significantly risky” by political risk advisory firms such as IHS Global Insight,
11
 there are 
several success stories – such as the aforementioned Glencore, which is listed on the 
                                                             
8 (2011) ‘World applauds Kazakh election decision’, UPI, 1 Jun., retrieved via Nexis. 
9 (2011) ‘Nazarbayev named presidential candidate by Nur Otan’, Kazakhstan Today, Feb. 11. 
10 Gizitdinov, N. (2011) ‘Biggest oil find in decades becomes US$29B cautionary tale’, Bloomberg News, 
Nov. 17. 
11 (2010) ‘Country Risk Ratings: Kazakhstan’, IHS Global Insight. 
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London’s FTSE 100 Index (the 100 most capitalized companies on the London Stock 
Exchange) and has a virtual monopoly on lead production in a country that ranks among the 
top in lead reserves worldwide.
12
 
  I wanted to explore this divide. What does it take to be successful in Kazakhstan? 
What does a multinational enterprise need to know? And as a student of international 
relations, what does that tell us about a post-Soviet state’s experience with integrating into 
the international market economy? If Kazakhstan is a “significantly risky” country, 
according to political risk indices, why are some firms able to operate successfully here? 
Put together, this thesis asks a rather straightforward question: how do we account for firms 
that are successful in countries in which we would expect them to fail? 
Why Kazakhstan? 
 To the outside world, Kazakhstan is known (if at all) for the country’s oil and gas, 
ranking around 11
th
 in oil reserves and 15
th
 in gas reserves worldwide.
13
 The country is 
landlocked, located south of Russia and west of China, and is a former Soviet Republic, 
which in sum presented a challenge for the country with independence in 1991 as the only 
pipelines out of Kazakhstan went through Russia (as was often the case with Soviet-era 
linear infrastructure). This allowed Russia to play gatekeeper to Kazakh gas exports, for 
instance, paying half market price for Kazakh gas until it announced in 2007 that by 2009 it 
would begin to pay full market prices for Central Asian gas, a nod to the increasing 
                                                             
12 Ferreira-Marques, C. and MacLellan, K. (2011) ‘Glencore’s record IPO makes muted debut’, Reuters, May 
19; (2010) ‘Kazakhstan – Not Just Another “Stan”’, Engineering and Mining Journal, Dec. 6. 
13 There is not total agreement on worldwide rankings in proven oil and gas reserves. According to BP, 
Kazakhstan ranks 8th in oil and 17th in natural gas; according to the CIA World Factbook, Kazakhstan ranks 
11th in oil and 15th in natural gas. See (2011) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, available at 
www.bp.com/statisticalreview; (2011) ‘Country Comparison – Oil – Proved Reserves’, CIA World Factbook, 
available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html; and NA 




competition from China and the country’s associated pipeline developments, providing a 
country like Kazakhstan with the ability to charge market prices for its gas for the first time 
since the country gained independence.
14
  
 But there is much more to Kazakhstan than oil and gas. It is the ninth largest 
country in the world and rich in many other minerals, as previously mentioned and as 
identified in global rankings in Table 1. During the Soviet era, for instance, 95-percent of 
the chromium for the USSR came from Kazakhstan
15
 (chrome is predominately used as a 
hardener in steel) and in 2009 Kazakhstan eclipsed Canada as the number one uranium 
producer in the world.
16
 Being that China’s demand for metals essentially serves as the 
benchmark for international market prices and that Kazakhstan shares a 950 mile border 
with the Chinese, the country is in a good position for mining development. 
Table 1.1: Estimated Mineral Reserves in Kazakhstan Beyond Oil and Gas
17
 
Mineral Reserves (est.) 
Global 
Rank (est.) 
Zinc 30 million mt Top 5 
Lead 10 million mt Top 10 
Uranium 1.6 million mt Top 3 
Chromium 300 million mt Top 3 
Manganese 600 million mt Top 5 
Copper 40 million mt Top 5 
Iron Ore 17 billion mt Top 10 
Coal 34 billion mt Top 10 
Gold 1900 mt Top 10 
 
                                                             
14 Whitmore, B. (2007) ‘Russia, China vie for Central Asia’s energy resources’, The Times of Central Asia, 
Mar. 28, retrieved via Nexis. 
15 Peck, Anne (2004) Economic Development in Kazakhstan, London: Routledge. 
16 (2011) ‘World Uranium Mining’, World Nuclear Association. Available at: http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf23.html 
17 NOTE: reserve estimates vary by source and both estimates and rankings should be treated only as 
approximations. See: (2011) ‘Mining Industry’, Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United States, 
available at: http://www.kazakhembus.com/index.php?page=mining-industry; Jones, A., Tarta, R. and Yukin, 
E. (2010) ‘Kazakhstan Mining’, a report from Global Business Reports for Engineering and Mining Journal, 
December issue (estimates noted in here are most ambitious)  
17 
 
 All of this is not to say that Kazakhstan is the perfect place for investment. The 
country is considered a frontier market by financial analysts – a subset, second-tier of 
“emerging market,” defined as a country that does not meet the criteria required to be 
considered an emerging market yet demonstrates an openness to foreign investment and is 
not currently experiencing extreme political or economic instability (notably Kazakhstan is 
the only Central Asian state to be considered a frontier market).
18
 And according to 
business intelligence firms like IHS Global Insight, Kazakhstan is still a “significantly 
risky” place to invest: the country ranks 108 on Global Insight’s country risk rating, placing 
it just behind Russia (#107) but well before the other Central Asian states (Turkmenistan – 
#160, Kyrgyzstan – #165, Uzbekistan – #167, and Tajikistan –#183).
19
 The least risky 
country in the world according to this ranking is Singapore and the most risky is Somalia 
(#204). The United States is at #14.
20
  
 Global Insight is not alone in its rankings. Control Risks, a London-based business 
intelligence firm, places the country in a similar spot – right around Russia but ahead of the 
other Central Asian states.
21
 Looking specifically at the mining industry (outside of oil and 
gas), the mineral industry advisory firm Behre Dolbear Group ranks Kazakhstan at #18 
(between the Philippines and Zambia) on a list of 25 key mining states, where #1 
                                                             
18 (2012) ‘MSCI Global Investable Market Indices Methodology’, MSCI, Jan. 
19 (2011) ‘Country Risk Ratings’, IHS Global Insight, Dec. 2. 
20 IHS Global Insight (2011) 
21 (2010) ‘RiskMap 2010’, Control Risks, available by request at www.control-risks.com; Note: the ranking 
within the RiskMap is not ordinal; rather, the firm assigns a level of political risk and security risk to each 
country (insignificant, low, medium, high, and extreme) Kazakhstan scored medium on political and low on 
security risk in 2010; Russia scored medium / medium; Turkmenistan medium / medium; Uzbekistan high / 
medium; Kyrgyzstan high / high; and Tajikistan high / high. 
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(Australia) is the least risky place to invest and #25 (Bolivia) is the most risky (the US 
comes in at #5).
22
  
 So why is Kazakhstan such a risky place to invest? This question becomes even 
more difficult to answer when looking at the mining giants of the country – Kazakhmys 
(copper), ENRC (chromium, iron ore, alumina and bauxite), ArcelorMittal (iron ore and 
coal) and Kazzinc (lead, zinc and gold). Each of these companies has an overwhelming 
share, if not virtual monopoly, on mining and production of its respective mineral (or 
minerals). Kazakhmys, ENRC and Glencore (Kazzinc’s majority owner) are listed on 
London’s FTSE 100 and Arcelor Mittal is the largest steel manufacturer in the world.
23
 Is 
Kazakhstan as risky as the business intelligence industry portrays it to be? What do these 
mining companies know that others do not? 
 In the initial stages of my investigation, I found that access to key individuals in 
Almaty (the unofficial business capital of Kazakhstan) for interviews was surprisingly easy, 
particularly because I was interested in learning more about foreign direct investment to the 
country outside of oil and gas. This is a theme I would continue to experience in my travels 
across the country, particularly within the Kazakh government in which the next generation 
of the country’s leaders seemed very keen to re-brand the country beyond its petro-state 
status. 
 I put the question to these business professionals and government officials: is 
Kazakhstan a risky place to do business?  
                                                             
22 (2010) 2010 Ranking of Countries for Mining Investment. Behre Dolbear Group Inc. Available at: 
www.dolbear.com. 
23 (2009) 'Councils, sittings, meetings - President Nursultan Nazarbayev Receives CEO of Glencore 
International AG Willy Strothotte and Ivan Glasenberg', Kazakhstan Government News, Jun. 24, retrieved via 
Nexis.; (2010) 'Glencore plans Kazzinc IPO', Daily Deal/The Deal, Aug. 27, retrieved via Nexis.; Ferreira-
Marques, C. and MacLellan, K. (2011) ‘Glencore’s record IPO makes muted debut’, Reuters, May 19. 
19 
 
 The responses were varied – absolutely, not at all, sort of – with no clear correlation 
between response and nationality or occupation. Some would brush the question off 
immediately, others would dive in head first: as one Kazakh businessman argued, “Without 
a strong political roof, you have no chance to do business here.”
24
 Needing a krisha, or 
roof, was a phrase I heard over and again, and one I will return to later in this thesis. 
 To one Western partner for a multinational tax advisory company,
25
 I asked what 
was different about Kazakhstan as opposed to the other countries where he had worked. 
 He noted the corruption (“less than I thought,” though the financial police were 
known on occasion to raid his offices in search of client documents), the Soviet legacy of a 
thick bureaucracy (on account of the volume of papers he is required to sign, his signature 
has shortened over the years to just initials), the “Big Village” feeling where personal 
relationships are key, and perhaps most interestingly, how young everyone is. 
 “I haven’t met a chairman of a public company yet that is actually over 40,” he 
explained. It was a slight exaggeration, but an important point. Kazakhstan may be the 
ninth largest country by landmass, but by population it is 64th at around 16 million, and 71-
percent of that population is between the ages of 15 and 64, with a median age of 30.
26
 
With the country’s oil riches as well as government-funded scholarship programs like 
Bolashak (Kazakh for “the future”),
27
 many of the more fortunate Kazakhs send their 
children abroad for university for a degree or at least language training – to the UK or the 
                                                             
24 Source-6 (2011), Feb. 18. 
25 Source-4 (2011), Feb. 15. 
26 (2011) ‘Kazakhstan’, CIA World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/kz.html. 
27 (2011) ‘“BOLASHAK” translates from Kazakh to English as “FUTURE”’, The Embassy of the Republic of 




US – and while similar programs exist in other countries, with a population as small as 
Kazakhstan’s, over the years this experience begins to add up.  
 “Would you consider this a risky place to do business?” I asked him.  
 “Well there are so many types of risk,” he reminded me. “It depends on what you 
mean.” 
  He was right. What exactly is political risk? What did I mean? 
Political Risk Analysis 
  Since the 1970s, political risk analysis as a discipline has held a single overarching 
priority: the identification of those non-technical factors in a given country that impact the 
firm’s ability to operate.
28
 “Non-technical” here is juxtaposed against the technical factors 
associated with a given operation, such as engineering challenges, which is why miners 
often refer to political risks as “above ground” problems, which we broadly define here as 
social, legal, regime, labor and tax risks. By “non-technical” we exclude purely financial 
risks – for instance, the possibility of sudden changes in the tax regime would be 
considered a political risk, because such a change would ultimately rely on the will of the 
ruling government, whereas the international market price for copper is considered a 
financial risk and beyond the scope of this thesis. The initial concept of political risks as 
directly related to those factors that “impact” the firm is key, and I will refer to such 
research throughout the thesis as “impact-focused” political risk analysis because the focus 
on “impact” has significant epistemological and ontological implications (which we will 
discuss), manifested most prominently in political risk research through the several indices 
                                                             
28 Kobrin, Steven (1979) ‘Political Risk: A Review and Reconsideration’, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 10 (1), p. 67-80; Henisz, W. (2000) ‘The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment’, 
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16 (2), pp. 334-364; and Jarvis, D.S.L. and Griffiths, M. 
(2007) ‘Learning to fly: the evolution of political risk analysis’, Global Society, 21(1), p. 5-21.  
21 
 
that aggregate the various proposed impacting political factors within a country into a 
single country score. The index serves as the foundation for the political risk industry: 
Eurasia Group has the Global Political Risk Index, Control Risks has the RiskMap, and IHS 
Global Insight has the Country Risk Ratings. Generally, a political risk index identifies 
qualitative variables believed to be significant (e.g. corruption, or religious radicalism, or 
military involvement in a country), assigns a score to that variable (often via subject-matter 
expert surveys or in-house research), and sums all the various scores to determine an 
overall score that places the country on a risk spectrum among other countries. 
Multinationals and financial institutions then leverage these indices in making decisions 
about global investment strategies. 
 In this way the political risk index can be understood as a rank ordering of “where 
not to go” – where, ceteris paribus, if a firm has a choice of investing in country A or 
country B, it should defer to the less risky. This is captured perfectly in the Behre Dolbear 
Group’s (2010) annual Ranking of Countries for Mining Investment – what the mining 
advisory firm short hands as a ranking of where “not to invest.”
29
 
 Considerable advances have been made in identifying and measuring those political 
variables that impact a firm’s ability to operate, which I will explore in the following 
chapter,
30
 but an unintended consequence of impact-focused political risk research (which I 
will also explore in the following chapter) has been its avoidance of the curious 
phenomenon that is at the heart of this thesis: why some firms are able to operate 
successfully in these so-called “risky” countries – that is, the exceptions to the “rules.” 
From a practical standpoint, research in this vein is important because many firms are not 
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30 Henisz (2000); for a literature review, see Jarvis & Griffiths (2007). 
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faced with the simplicity of the “country A or country B” choice, and for those firms 
already located in such a country, or with the intention to do so, the compelling question is 
one of political risk management: how to manage the non-technical risks (i.e. the political, 
social and cultural) that face the firm every day? 
 But such an inquiry is about much more than determining best practices for a 
particular company, especially as this thesis is set within the discipline of international 
relations. Where the multinational enterprise meets the host country, we see “the nodal 
point of and interface between two realms: that of the internationalization in global 
structures, and that of the embeddedness in the domestic structures of national/regional 
political economies.”
31
 In other words, the multinational enterprise can be understood as 
globalization’s first contact with the domestic economy of a developing country.
32
 Political 
risk indices may tell us quite a bit about the failure of that first contact, but it is in the 
exceptions that we begin to learn about what works – how different actors, often with 
conflicting goals, manage to co-exist. That is, how different actors are able to find and 
maintain order among themselves, “one of the oldest and most discussed topics in political 
enquiry,” defined in this thesis as the ability for different actors to pursue their own goals to 




 Why are some firms able to operate successfully in “risky” countries? Phrased more 
broadly, what is happening between the foreign firm and its host country that the political 
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32 Sally (1994) 
33 Rengger, N. J. (2000) International relations, political theory and the problem of order: beyond 
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risk index fails to capture? In this thesis, I argue that the epistemology and ontology 
embraced by the political risk index seriously misinform our understanding of why a firm 
may or may not be successful in a given country.  
 First and foremost, the index advocates an approach to understanding political risk 
wholly through the country’s actions; the consequence of such an epistemology is that we 
fail to recognize the agency inherent in the firm. To briefly use an example that will be 
further covered in later chapters, in 1997 the Kazakh government expropriated a uranium 
mine owned by the Canadian firm World Wide Minerals. As the political risk index is 
structured, such an event would be reflected in an upgrade in Kazakhstan’s risk score. 
However, if we dig beneath the headline, we learn that at the time, World Wide Minerals 
was in violation of the performance conditions outlined in the subsoil license agreed upon 
between the firm and the Kazakh Republic. The company was negotiating with the 
government for increased international marketing rights, and as a show of force, decided to 
shutdown all operations until the Kazakh government agreed to accept its new position – a 
clear violation of the subsoil license that both parties previously agreed to. In other words, 
World Wide Minerals’ own actions (in part) led directly to the expropriation of the 
company’s uranium mine, and yet according to the political risk index, Kazakhstan is the 
perpetrator and the firm the victim. Perhaps not surprisingly, when the case went to 
international arbitration, the decision sided significantly with the Kazakh Republic, further 
reaffirming the company’s own hand in its failure.
34
  
 But there is also an ontological aspect to the political risk index that oversimplifies 
the way in which a firm actually operates in a given country. Specifically, the concept of 
                                                             




the “host country” is a myth: there is no “host country” that a CEO rings up on the phone in 
order to negotiate or re-negotiate a license or permit. Every country is unique in how power 
is dispersed – to whom and to what degree – and equally unique in its social and cultural 
norms. In Central Asia in particular, Gül Berna Özcan argues convincingly for embracing 
an approach to the region that recognizes each state as an “historical construct shaped by a 
set of competing actors and institutions,”
35
 and we see this play out in Kazakhstan today on 
a variety of levels. On a very practical level, for instance, the regional government controls 
almost all permitting issues while the central government controls all subsoil licenses and 
this has significant implications, as I will later demonstrate, for how a particular firm must 
deal with each actor and how corruption manifests itself within the government. On a 
broader level, Kazakhstan may be a post-Soviet state but many of the values inculcated 
during the Soviet era remain important today – to return to Glencore’s Kazzinc, the firm 
funds several schools, health and sport centers, the local hockey team, orphanages and 
nursing homes in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
36
 This is not considered philanthropy in Kazakhstan; 
it is an obligation that dates back to a time when the mine was considered the life and blood 
of the community in all respects, and as we will see, is significantly different from 
traditional understandings of the obligations of firms within the concept of corporate social 
responsibility.  
 All in all, this thesis argues that the solution for overcoming these issues within 
political risk analysis is to shift our approach from focusing on host country impact to 
instead taking as the unit of interest the relationship that exists between the firm and a 
variety of stakeholders within (and outside of) a given country. The risks are in the 
                                                             
35 Özcan, Gül Berna (2010) Building States and Markets, Enterprise Development in Central Asia 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 12. 
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relationships, I propose, not the country. And so while this thesis embraces a broad 
definition of political risk – “the activities of governments (and or its agencies) whose 
decisions, policies, edicts and rulings create outcomes that distort, impact, change or 
adversely effect (sic) the interests of stakeholders (economic and non-economic actors),” 
recognizing that “change in any political parameter that has ramifications for stakeholders 
in the affected policy area” is a political risk
37
 – we remain acutely aware of the likelihood 
that government “activities” do not exist in a vacuum and are often largely influenced by 
the various non-government actors in the area of interest, such as the “affected” foreign 
firm. 
The Bargain 
 Where to turn for a theoretical framework concerned with relationships? For several 
years, the obsolescing bargaining theory outlined in Raymond Vernon’s Sovereignty at Bay 
(1971) stood as the “accepted paradigm of Host Country-MNC [multinational corporation] 
relations in international political economy,”
38
 characterizing the relationship between the 
multinational and the nation state it enters as one of a “bargain,” which Vernon interpreted 
as the interface of the goals, resources, and constraints of both actors.
39
 A country may have 
a resource (e.g. uranium) but lacks the technological capacity to mine the resource (which 
the multinational possesses), both actors may have the shared goal of benefiting, 
economically, from the resource, but there may be some constraints that stand in the way 
(e.g. the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act may prevent the mining company from fulfilling 
the financial demands of the prospective country’s leadership). Vernon believed the bargain 
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38 Kobrin in Eden, L. (1991) ‘Bringing the firm back in: multinational in international political economy’, 
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 20 (2), p. 197-224 (p. 200). 
39 Vernon, Raymond (1971) Sovereignty at Bay, New York: Basic Books. 
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“obsolesced” because as the multinational became more entrenched in the host country (e.g. 
with its associated infrastructure), bargaining power shifted away from the multinational 
and toward the host country. Put quite frankly, once the country receives the technological 
investment from the multinational, so went the line of thinking, why not boot the company 
out and retain full ownership? 
 In the years following the publication of Sovereignty at Bay, Vernon seemed 
justified in his view on multinational-host country relations as waves of nationalism in 
developing countries across the world led to a series of nationalizations (or 
renationalizations) of key industries. But over time the obsolescing bargaining theory lost 
much of its predictive power, piece by piece: researchers found that there was no single 
decision-maker known as the “host-country,”
40
 that there was an overemphasis on hard 
power at the cost of recognizing how a company participates (or fails to participate) in the 
“promotion of certain social norms and values,”
41
 and perhaps most damning, the fact that 
many subsequent researchers were finding toward the turn of the century that the bargain 




 Lorraine Eden, Stefanie Lenway and Douglas A. Schuler gather many of these 
observations together and propose a revised bargaining framework, what they call the 
“political bargaining model,” (PBM) as an answer to the shortcomings of the obsolescing 
                                                             
40 Moran, Theodore H. (1974) Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence, Princeton: 
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Revisited’ JIBS, 32(1), pp. 23-39. 
41 Dahan, Nicolas, Doh, Jonathan and Guay, Terrence (2006) 'The role of multinational corporations in 
transnational institution building: A policy network perspective', Human Relations, 59(11): 1571–1600 (p. 
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42 For example, Ramamurti (2001) and Luo (2001)  
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bargain while at the same time maintaining that the fundamental epistemology of the 
bargain – focusing on relationships – is sound (note: Eden et al.’s PBM is not to be 
confused with larger political science work in political bargaining models – the “political 
bargain” here is a direct reference to Vernon’s “obsolescing bargain”).
43
 The PBM drops 
the idea that the bargain necessarily obsolesces; problemitizes the “host country” as the 
primitive unit, instead recognizing the bargain as existing between the multinational and 
many stakeholders; and finally, recognizes that the multinational is able to actively 
influence its stakeholder relationships.
44
  
 It is under Eden et al.’s PBM that I offer three propositions for understanding the 
success of companies like Glencore in the politically “risky” country of Kazakhstan. In line 
with my epistemological and ontological concerns with the political risk index, I propose 
the following propositions to examine in Kazakhstan: 
The Stakeholder Proposition: there is no “host country”; the successful 
multinational recognizes that its ability to operate in a given location depends on its 
relationships with those groups or individuals that can impact the firm’s operations 
(stakeholders); 
The Agent Proposition: multinationals are agents – “purposeful actors whose 
actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live”;
45
 successful 
multinationals embrace this agency and are proactive in their maintenance of 
                                                             
43 Eden, L., Lenway, S., & Schuler, D. A. (2004) ‘From the obsolescing bargain to the political bargaining 
model’, Bush School Working Paper #403, Jan.; also available in: (2005) ‘From the obsolescing bargain to 
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44 Eden et al. (2004) 
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stakeholder relationships, regardless of whether or not such maintenance is required 
explicitly by formal governance structures (i.e. the state); and 
The Structure Proposition: “Society is made up of social relationships,” which 
structure the interactions between multinationals and other actors;
46
 successful 
multinationals respond to the unique social structures within a given country, 
shaped over time by its stakeholders.  
 For students of business ethics or development and sustainability familiar with the 
concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the stakeholder proposition will come as 
little surprise. Proper identification and management of stakeholder interests, it is argued, 
allot the firm its “social license to operate.”
47
 Stakeholder theory within CSR was born out 
of the simple fact that multinationals navigating the “turbulent” environment of 
globalization learned very quickly that there is no single point of contact for obtaining this 
“social license” (especially from some sort of mythical “host country”) and as such argues 
that a more helpful unit of analysis is focusing on those groups and individuals who have a 
direct stake in the firm’s progress.
48
  
 The agent and structure propositions are equally unsurprising to those familiar with 
the “agent-structure” debate within social scientific inquiry, captured neatly (and famously) 
by Alexander Wendt who points out that individuals (and their organizations) are actors, 
capable of transforming society, while at the same time society as a structure is capable of 
shaping the actions of these same individuals.
49
 To Wendt, it is impossible to study an 
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actor’s behavior without an implicit nod to the social relationships in which the behavior is 
set; equally true to Wendt is the idea that the analysis of social structures must include 
some deference to the individual actors whose behavior contributes to these structures. In 
this sense, Wendt argues “that the properties of agents and those of social structures are 
both relevant to explanations of social behavior.”
50
 As a post-Soviet state with a high 
degree of foreign direct investment, Kazakhstan is uniquely positioned for studying the 
interaction of market-based economic forces with an historical state structure based on a 
command economy with significant social welfare expectations. 
 To some, the fact that these concepts have been developed to some degree within 
their respective disciplines may lead to a “so what?” response, but the fact equally remains 
that despite the development of concepts like stakeholder management or the recognition 
that social behavior draws on the interaction of agents and structures with one another,
51
 or 
even Eden et al.’s PBM, we fail to see such concepts fully developed within political risk 
analysis. In focusing on country-level scores, the political risk index fails to appreciate the 
stakeholders that exist within (and outside of) a given country; by relying on actions like 
expropriation to a calculate a country’s risk score, the index fails to consider the fact that 
maybe the multinational’s own behavior contributed to such a result; and finally, when 
countries are normalized across one another within an index to ease comparison, we lose 
the unique history and social values of a country that may make it more or less particularly 
suited for a specific company.  
 Therefore the approach that follows is at its heart interdisciplinary, and as is often 
the case in advocating for and relying on an interdisciplinary approach to solving a 
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common problem, I have found that most of the elements behind adjusting the PBM for 
political risk analysis already exist in some other form in some other discipline for a closely 
related but separate purpose. I see this as a strength of the research design within this thesis, 
not a weakness, and in support of this claim I submit the interdisciplinary call from the 
Journal of International Business Studies (2009) to escape the “externally defined silos of 
narrow theoretical and empirical legitimacy” and in so doing recognize the need to avoid 
“replication of such silos.”
52
 Instrumentally, CEOs or investment bankers making 
misinformed decisions about the political risks within a particularly country is a serious 
problem with serious implications for the ability of a country to attract foreign direct 
investment. Philosophically, particularly for scholars of international relations, such a 
situation is an example of unrealized co-existence, and as such a failure of the 
commitments that serve as the founding principles of our discipline. 
Method and the Outline of this Thesis 
 This thesis focuses wholly on successful firms operating in a country in which we 
would expect them to fail. “Success,” is the dependent variable, to be defined in-depth in 
the chapter that follows, and we hold this dependent variable constant as we look at three 
separate cases of three respective foreign firms in the metals mining sector, all of which 
maintain successful operations in the country of Kazakhstan, a “significantly risky” 
operating environment according to IHS Global Insight’s country risk ratings (an industry 
standard, to be further detailed in the next chapter). In this sense, this thesis is a thesis of 
deviant cases – a deliberate selection of the least representative cases in the country – and 
one that seeks to explore the possibility of equifinality among cases, or the idea that distinct 
                                                             
52 Cheng, Joseph L. C., Henisz, W. J, Roth, Kendall and Swaminathan, Anand (2009) 'EDITORIAL: From the 
Editors: Advancing interdisciplinary research in the field of international business: Prospects, issues and 
challenges', Journal of International Business Studies (2009) 40, 1070–1074 (p. 1072). 
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causal pathways in each case can ultimately lead to the same outcome (i.e. success). In 
terms of theoretical development, the aim is to make progress in typological theory-
building: a combination of theory testing and heuristic development under the umbrella of 
typological theorizing. Theory testing case studies “assess the validity and scope conditions 
of a single or competing theory,” whereas heuristic case studies “inductively identify new 
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms and causal paths.”
53
 Typological theorizing 
focuses on, as one would expect, identifying “types” within particular theories, or more 
formally, “the development of contingent generalizations about combinations or 
configurations of variables that constitute theoretical types.”
54
 Because of its focus on 
drawing out “types,” typological theorizing is a common approach within research designs 




 Overall, however, the approach here is grounded, by which I mean the aim is to 
leverage mainly qualitative data sources and rely on both inductive and deductive reasoning 
to build toward hypotheses, as opposed to beginning with a set of explicitly defined 
hypotheses (hence our propositions). The approach is inductive in that the objective in each 
case is to draw out the causal pathways that bring us to understand the firm as successful 
(i.e. heuristic development); the approach is deductive in that we begin with a 
methodological framework, the PBM, which though itself is largely undeveloped, is 
nevertheless set within a larger body of scholarship that maintains its own theoretical 
                                                             
53 George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge: MIT Press (p. 75). 
54 George & Bennett (2005), p. 233 
55 George & Bennett (2005), p. 235 
32 
 
expectations on a firm’s success in a given country, and thus our examination will begin 
with a series of propositions (i.e. theory testing).  
 The primary sources that inform the three cases are company documents from the 
mining firms of interest, government documents from a variety of ministries within the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and the provincial (oblast) governments; archival research of 
primary source reporting as well as secondary source analyses of Kazakhstan in Russian 
during the Soviet Union and in English from before the Soviet Union; a series of semi-
structured interviews conducted in Kazakhstan over the course of 2011 with representatives 
from several mining multinationals, government officials, local NGOs, and the consultants, 
accountants, auditors, lawyers, trade union representatives, and foreign government trade 
officials associated with the mining industry (totaling close to 100 interviews ranging from 
1 to 2 hours in length); and finally site visits to the various cities, towns and villages 




 Chapter Two begins with a more thorough critique of the political risk index as it 
has developed both within industry and academia since the 1970s. Behind this history is a 
broader intellectual history on the study of the multinational enterprise within the 
disciplines of international business studies (IB) and international political economy (IPE), 
with the former establishing itself over time as the intellectual home for studying 
multinational-host country relations. At the core of this history is the concept of the 
bargain: under the tutelage of its initial author, Raymond Vernon, IBS and IPE were more 
or less one in the same, initially growing together in research institutes of both business and 
international affairs with significant interdisciplinary collaboration. But when the second 
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generation of contemporary researchers concerned with multinational-host country relations 
famously called for “bringing the firm back in” to the study of international politics, as 
Lorraine Eden did in 1991,
57
 she answered the challenge herself by taking up the role of 
editor at the Journal for International Business Studies, effectively ensuring, as I will show, 
that our understanding of the firm in a given country and larger political risk analysis would 
develop within the discipline of business studies, not international relations.  
 I believe, however, that Eden’s recent call (along with her co-authors) for now 
bringing the “political” back into Vernon’s bargaining model through the creation of the 
PBM is itself an implicit admission that the discipline of international relations has 
something to contribute in understanding multinational-host country relations that the IB 
community has failed to fully grasp. As such, I see this thesis as a small step in bringing the 
IB and IR/IPE community back together again, and as will be reflected in the chapters that 
follow, I leverage heavily the existing IR literature on Kazakhstan and Central Asia to 
underscore the gravity of the ontological and epistemological shortcomings within 
contemporary political risk analysis.  
 Chapter Three details the history of mining in Kazakhstan in the context of the 
existing scholarship on the country and the greater Central Asia region of which 
Kazakhstan is a part. Here I argue that existing researchers have inappropriately lumped 
traditional mining together with oil and gas development as part of a larger natural 
resources scholarship rooted mainly within the resource curse or rentier state literature. 
While it is true that oil and gas represent the overwhelming share of Kazakhstan’s export-
driven economy (in terms of monetary value), it equally remains the case that traditional 
mining – that is, mining outside of oil and gas – has a much deeper role in the country’s 
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socio-economic development that stretches back to the early twentieth century. Oil 
production in Kazakhstan is limited almost entirely to the Caspian coast of the country 
(with some exceptions); traditional mining, alternately, occurs across Kazakhstan and in 
fact many of the largest cities in the country were initially formed and founded for their 
mineral wealth and subsequent mining development.  
 In the chapters that follow (Chapters Four, Five and Six) I test and develop my 
propositions as outlined in Chapter Two against three foreign metals mining firms in 
Kazakhstan. I figured that there were two ways I could have done this – the first being to 
take each proposition (and its associated independent variables, as explicitly developed in 
Chapter Two) as a separate chapter and investigate each proposition across these three 
firms; the second approach being to take the firms separately and within each chapter 
examine all three propositions. I have opted for the latter approach for two reasons, one 
practical and the other theoretical. Practically speaking, taking each firm in step saves me 
from having to re-familiarize the reader in every chapter with a particular company’s 
operating history in Kazakhstan. In initial drafts, I found myself having to rewrite over and 
again passages on a multinational’s initial entry strategy, joint-venture structure, or the 
local political situation in which the company is established. Theoretically, there is such 
great variance in the types of mining companies within the metals mining industry 
(admittedly unbeknownst to me when I started this project), which appear to have 
significant implications for the independent variables of interest, that I felt it necessary to 
approach each firm “type” individually (detailed below) and slowly build across chapters to 
develop a richer understanding of the independent variables that will then be drawn 
together in the penultimate chapter (Chapter Seven). In other words, this thesis is structured 
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via the conditions under which we will examine the independent variables, not by the 
independent variables themselves. Each case, therefore, remains a self-contained study of 
firm success in a risky country under the framework of the PBM, but this within-case 
design is then flipped into a between-cases study in the penultimate chapter, drawing 
parallels and distinctions among the different pathways (or possible theoretical “types”) as 
observed in the three cases. 
 The cases that this thesis is based upon were selected for a combination of reasons. 
First and foremost, as our interest is in seemingly successful foreign firms, initial research 
was conducted to identify those mining firms that have been present in Kazakhstan for a 
lengthy period of time. These firms were then filtered by the diversity of conditions they 
represented, with the forethought that this would allow us to draw out any possible 
similarities and/or differences between cases. Practically speaking and in the interest of full 
disclosure, the cases were then limited by those mining firms that provided the necessary 
level of access to staff members and internal documents. Both Glencore and Kazakhmys, 
for instance, were initially considered as possible cases but had to be dropped during my 
field research because of either lack of cooperation or evidence of a clear intent to limit 
access. Finally, some initially proposed cases were dropped simply due to space limitations. 
Both ENRC and Uranium One, for instance, were very cooperative, along with a series of 
smaller mining firms such as Sunkar Resources, but incorporating these firms into the 
thesis itself with the level of detail desired quickly became impossible. 
 The first case study (Chapter Four) focuses on the mining giant ArcelorMittal, the 
largest steel manufacturing multinational in the world, with operations in close to 60 
countries. In Kazakhstan, ArcelorMittal employs an overwhelming proportion of the 
36 
 
Kazakh work force – approximately 50,000 people – and operates almost entirely within 
legacy Soviet mines and facilities that the firm bought from the Kazakh government in 
1995. The company is publically traded on stock exchanges in New York, Paris, 
Luxembourg, Madrid and Amsterdam, and was formed when Mittal Steel merged with 
Arcelor. The CEO today continues to be the company’s founder, Indian billionaire Lakshmi 
Mittal,
 
and as one might expect, many managers within the firm’s Kazakhstan headquarters 
in the city of Termitau are Indian nationals.
58
  
 Our second case study (Chapter Five) focuses on the uranium mining industry in 
Kazakhstan, specifically the largest publically traded, non-state owned uranium producer in 
the world, the Canadian-headquartered company Cameco. Uranium mining has its own set 
of unique attributes, particularly in Kazakhstan, that warrant separate consideration. 
Specifically, the extraction method used by Cameco is in-situ leaching, which is a 
complicated, high-technology method of mining uranium that requires the employment of 
very few individuals (unlike, for instance, the steel operations of ArcelorMittal which 
require significant manual labor in the iron ore and coal mines of the country). 
Additionally, the mining “footprint” of in-situ leaching (that is, its visibility to the outside 
world) is very small: from the surface, an in-situ field is nothing more than a series of pipes 
going underground connected to a processing station (compare this to the gigantic craters 
left behind by open pit mines across the country).
59
 Unlike ArcelorMittal, Cameco operates 
in only four countries – Canada, the United States, Australia and Kazakhstan – with 
Kazakhstan the clear outlier in terms of political risk levels. Further, Cameco’s operations 
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in Kazakhstan are through a joint venture with the Kazakh government, whereas 
ArcelorMittal owns its Kazakh operations outright. 
 The final case study (Chapter Six) moves away from the community of well-
established mining multinationals to cover a unique but critical component of the greater 
mining industry: what are known as mining “juniors.” Mining as an industry operates on a 
model wherein prospecting (that is, the discovery of new or undeveloped mining deposits) 
is left mainly to the smaller mining companies (known as “juniors”) for a variety of 
reasons, with technical risk (geology) being the most significant – only a handful of 
discovered deposits are actually financially feasible given the geological challenges. Once a 
mining junior discovers such a deposit, the company will often develop the mine just far 
enough to prove its feasibility and then sell it off to one of the mining industry giants (like 
ArcelorMittal). Our final case study looks at one of these juniors, Frontier Mining, which is 
listed on the London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and is in the 
early stages of developing gold and copper mines in Kazakhstan.
60
 See Table 1.2 for a 
summary of the case studies elected and their different attributes. 
Table 1.2: Case Summary 
Case ArcelorMittal Cameco Frontier 
Mining Activity 
iron ore & coal; steel 
production 
uranium gold & copper 
Local Location Temirtau (city) 
near Taikonur  
(remote village) 
various, all remote 
Global Presence 60+ countries 
Canada, USA, 
Australia, Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan w/ occasional 





200-500 people Approx. 500 people 
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Employees (global) Approx. 245,000 Approx. 3300 Approx. 500 people 
 
 As noted, before ending with a short conclusion, the penultimate chapter (Chapter 
Seven) brings the various propositions as applied to these three cases back together to 
return to our initial question: why are some firms able to operate successfully in so-called 
politically “risky” countries? Here we also assess the strength of using the PBM as a 
framework for answering this question, and touch on the implications of the PBM and our 
cases toward the larger philosophical debate within the social sciences on the competing 
influences of structure and agency. Finally, and most importantly, I rely on the conclusions 
drawn out of these investigations to offer a greater commentary on the significance of my 
research to the study of international relations, specifically the possibility of finding and 
maintain co-existence at the intersection of the “globalized” foreign firm and the domestic 
political economy of a post-Soviet state.  
* * * 
 To finish where we began: at some point on that cold night in Ust-Kamenogorsk, 
lying in my bed that seconded as a sofa, I fell asleep. Perhaps the neat way for the story to 
end would be if I caught a plane that next morning and off I went to Astana, the capital of 
Kazakhstan, never to return to Ust-Kamenogorsk again and escaping the “KGB” trap that 
apparently awaited me at my 10am meeting. But that is not the way it played out. When I 
awoke the next day and realized, happily, that I was still alive, I had a renewed sense of 
confidence, feeling almost silly with how concerned I had been the night before. I arrived at 
the regional government’s main building to find no Kazakh KGB (actually known as the 
National Security Committee) and no suspicious glances from security when they wrote 
down the details of my passport and supporting documents. Instead I was met by a young, 
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late 20s or early 30something specialist in the East Kazakhstan oblast’s Department of 
Foreign Relations, as scheduled, and we had a frank discussion about the local investment 
climate, issues within the legislature that, in the opinion of the interviewee, needed to be 
fixed, and some advice on how companies in the region could forge successful relationships 
with the local communities.  
 As we parted ways and I suited up into my winter weather gear for the outdoor trek 
to my next appointment, the fact that Kazakhstan continues to be a country in transition 
could not have been clearer. The night before, the akim who was raised under the banner of 
the USSR, and who cut his teeth as the director of a state-run farm, had me all but 
completely convinced that beneath the veneer of today’s Republic of Kazakhstan remained 
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan, with all the trappings of a closed society. But 
that next morning, sitting across from the younger civil servant in this remote city who, like 
myself, likely remembers only bits and pieces of the bi-polar Cold War that ended before 
we became teenagers, I genuinely felt as if Ust-Kamenogorsk was committed to embracing 
the international system of the market economy, albeit certainly on its own terms. I would 
feel this back and forth for the duration of my time in Kazakhstan, in populous cities and 
remote villages alike and across generations, and on a personal level, this thesis is about 
unfolding those mixed experiences in order to more fully understand where the country has 
been, where it is today, and where it will be going in the future, and how the multinational 
enterprise – the international market economy incarnate – has both complemented and 




Chapter Two: The theoretical foundations of political risk analysis 
Introduction 
 The Economist describes the political risk consultancy Eurasia Group as “an 
inspiration for any academic with a seemingly useless degree in political science,”
61
 which 
while sure to get a few laughs (and certainly the attention of students on the eve of 
graduating), highlights inadvertently a less than obvious irony to general perceptions on the 
discipline of political risk analysis: an almost insignificant degree of scholarly research on 
political risk has actually developed from within political science, or for that matter, 
international relations. To highlight, take the following definition of political risk, as quoted 
in 1979 in a journal I will reveal in a moment, followed by a passage from an article in the 
inaugural issue of the Review of International Political Economy (RIPE) in 1994: 
(1)  “[P]olitical risks arise from the actions of national governments which interfere with or prevent 
business transactions, or change the terms of agreements, or cause the confiscation of wholly or 
partially foreign owned business property.”
62
 
(2) “[C]onsider the [multinational enterprise] as the nodal point of and interface between two 
realms: that of internationalization in global structures, and that of embeddedness in the 
domestic structures of national/regional political economies.”
63
 
 My reading of the second quote, which is to be understood in the context of a 
greater call from the editors of RIPE for maintaining the study of multinational-host 
country relations as a tenant of IPE (to be explored, they anticipated, in RIPE), is that the 
study of political risk as defined in the first quote would have found a natural home in this 
(at the time) newly formed journal. But a search for “political risk” within the annals of 
                                                             
61 (2003) 'Political-risk analysis: The new bull market', Economist, May 22. 
62 Weston, V. Fred and Sorge, Bart W. (1972) International Managerial Finance. Homewood, IL: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc. (p. 60), as cited in Kobrin (1979). 
63 Sally (1994) 
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RIPE almost twenty years later returns only a few results
64
 and, in fact, it appears as if very 
few took up Razeen Sally’s call for studying MNE-host country relations in the journal.
65
 
So where is that first quote from? And where did our understanding of the multinational 
enterprise develop? 
 The answer to both questions is international business, or more specifically in the 
former, the Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS), and in the later, the disciple of 
international business studies (IB), traditionally understood to have become a formal area 
of academic study with the founding of the Academy of International Business in 1959. In 
fact, Sally himself was fully aware of this fact when making a call for the study of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) in IPE, recognizing not only that this was at the “heart of 
IB scholarship” but also that one of the ways in which this focus manifested itself in IB was 
through political risk research.
66
 Sally felt compelled to wrestle the study of MNE-host 
country relations into IPE (and from IB). Why? He believed that IB was missing the full 
picture on the implications of the MNE within international relations, and that IPE could 
fill in this gap.  
 So what did Sally believe was missing? And why does it appear as if no one took up 
his call? We will return to these questions explicitly in a moment, but first a bit of 
background. In truth, it is not exactly fair to claim that Sally was trying to wrestle the MNE 
                                                             
64 Since the journal’s inception in 1994, only 7 articles have referenced the research regime of “political risk” 
analysis (as of November 23, 2011) Of those 7, only 3 are truly focused on political risk: Haftel (2010), who 
looks at the relationship between FDI, bilateral trade agreements, and domestic institution strength, using a 
political risk index as the proxy measurement of the latter; Egan (2011), who finds a positive correlation 
between labor rights violations and political risk; and Lusztig (1998), who argues that increasing trade 
liberalization results in increased political risk as domestic-level rent seekers become disenfranchised. See: 
Haftel, Y. Z. (2010) ‘Ratification counts: US investment treaties and FDI flows into developing countries’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 17(2), pp. 348-377; Egan, P. J. W. (2011) ‘Is worker repression 
risky? Foreign direct investment, labour rights and assessments of risk in developing countries’, Review of 
International Political Economy; and Lusztig, M. (1998) ‘The limits of rent seeking: why protectionists 
become free traders’, Review of International Political Economy, 5(1), pp. 38-63. 
65 No articles in RIPE cite this article.  
66 Sally (1994), p. 162 and 166, respectively. 
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away from IB and toward IPE. A more accurate statement would be to say that Sally was 
trying to mark the discipline of IPE as an interdisciplinary home for the study of the MNE – 
a home that would bring IB perspectives on the MNE together with political science 
perspectives (and others) to realize fully the significance of the MNE to international and 
domestic political economies (so was the hope). Not to discount their importance, nor 
Sally’s article, but calls for interdisciplinary studies are frequent, while finding research 
that specifically answers such calls is not as easy. Eden (the same Lorraine Eden who 
developed the PBM, the framework of this thesis) made a similar call a few years before 
Sally in the Millennium Journal of International Studies for “bringing the firm back in” to 
the study of IPE
67
 and most recently the editors of JIBS (to bring the “interdisciplinary call” 
full circle and back to Sally) released a “call to arms” in 2009 to the IB field to maintain 
relevance by increasing interdisciplinary research. In other words, whereas in 1994 Sally 
was calling for IB study to be brought into IPE, in 2009 the editors of JIBS were calling for 
IPE study (along with other disciplines) to be brought into IB.  
 Why does all this matter? This chapter begins with an overview of the political risk 
index as a prerequisite for understanding specific epistemological and ontological issues 
within the index that I argue prevent us from accounting for successful MNEs in risky 
countries. But while unfolding these issues, I show how all of these challenges have been 
investigated to some degree within either IB or IR or both, though often without reference 
to one another. It is that last part – “often without reference to one another” – that compels 
the researcher (or journal editor) to publish these calls for interdisciplinary study, like Sally 
did in the inaugural issue of RIPE. They find, from the semi-omniscient perspective of the 
editor, as I have wholeheartedly found in pursuing this thesis, that researchers address 
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many of the same issues, and face many of the same challenges, in focusing on the same 
phenomena, and yet painfully do so in parallel and yet without referencing one another – 
that is, without learning from one another (a tragedy certainly not unique to political risk 
analysis). 
 A second element to the frustration is the fact that the more one reads – and the 
more one discovers these research silos existing in parallel and without interaction, often 
between disciplines and sometimes even within disciplines – the more one becomes 
discouraged that their particular line of analysis is not novel, and as such, fails to 
contribute. But here I believe, as the JIBS editors rightfully note, that the stringing together 
of alternate understandings of a similar phenomena is one of those neat instances in which 
the “sum is greater than the parts.”
68
 In other words, this in itself is novel and stands as a 
contribution because it succeeds in doing what others have failed to do: applying now “the 
sum” to a particular problem in order to reveal a fuller understanding that until now had 
been understood only in piecemeal, or in isolation, and therefore, one could argue, 
misunderstood. This chapter brings those pieces together and creates that “sum” as a 
precondition for understanding why some firms are successful in politically risky countries 
– for understanding how Sally’s two realms, the international and the domestic, can 
seemingly co-exist with one another.  
The political risk index and its variants 
We begin with the political risk index, the core contemporary product of political 
risk analysis both in industry and in scholarly research. Robin L. Diamonte, John M. Liew 
and Ross L. Stevens’ study on political risk in emerging markets serves as an apt 
representative sample of typical approaches to the political risk index, which I will recount 
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here before getting into the variants of this sort of index-focused research.
69
 They use the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG, produced by the Political Risk Services Group) 
political risk index to measure political risk and the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
fund (MSCI, now produced by MSCI Inc.) to measure market performance. The ICRG is a 
monthly report that analyzes 130 countries across 13 political risk variables on an overall 
risk scale of 0-100 (100 = lowest possible risk), with such examples (all of which are 
outlined in Table 2.1) including “corruption in government” (10-percent of the final score) 
and “law and order tradition” (6-percent of the final score), while the MSCI is an index of 
stock performance in developed and emerging markets. 




Economic Expectations versus 
Reality 
Measures the perceived gap between 
popular aspirations for higher standards of 
living and the ability or willingness of the 
government to deliver improvements in 
income and welfare 
12-percent 
Economic Planning Failures 
Measures business support for the current 
government and the ability of the 
government to adopt a suitable and 
successful economic strategy 
12-percent 
Political Leadership 
Assess the viability of the current 
government based on the degree of stability 
of the regime and its leader, the probability 
of the effective survival of the government 
and the continuation of its policies if the 
current leader dies or is replaced 
12-percent 
External Conflict 
Measures conflict based on the probability 
of external invasion, border threats, 
geopolitical disputes, and full-scale war 
10-percent 
                                                             
69 Diamonte, R.L., Liew, J.M. & Stevens, R.L. (1996) 'Political Risk in Emerging and Developed Markets', 
Financial Analysts Journal, 52(3), pp. 71-76. 
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Corruption in Government 
Assesses corruption risk by looking at how 
long a government has been in continuous 
power, whether a large number of officials 
are appointed or elected, and the frequency 




Military in Politics 
Reflects the likelihood of military takeover 
and the degree of military control over 
government and governmental policies 
6-percent 
Law and Order Tradition 
Reflects the degree to which citizens of a 
country are willing to accept the established 
institutions to make and implement laws, the 
strength of the court system, and provisions 
for an orderly succession of power 
6-percent 
Racial and Nationality Tensions 
Measures the degree of tension within a 
country that is attributable to racial, 
nationality, or language divisions and the 
extent that opposing groups are intolerant or 
unwilling to compromise 
6-percent 
Organized Religion in Politics 
Measures the degree to which religious 




Measures the extent to which dissidence is 
expressed through political terrorism, such 
as armed attacks, guerrilla activity, or 
attempt assassinations 
6-percent 
Civil War Risks 
Measures the probability that terrorist 
opposition to a government or to its policies 
will turn into a violent internal political 
conflict 
6-percent 
Political Party Development 
Measures broad-based political participation 
in the determination of changes in 
governments and in the formulation of 
government policies 
6-percent 
Quality of Bureaucracy 
Measures institutional strength, the quality 
of the bureaucracy, and the expertise to 
govern without drastic changes and policy 
interruptions in government services 
6-percent 
 
Table 1: Diamonte et al. (1996) use the ICRG in their study on political risk-market performance 
correlations. The ICRG consists of 13 different variables, or what they call “components,” with varying 
degrees of strength within the overall country score.
71
 
                                                             
70 Diamonte et al. (1996) indicate that the “corruption in government” weight is 10-percent while in Erb, C.B., 
Harvey, C. and Viskanta, T.E. (1996) 'Political Risk, Economic Risk, and Financial Risk', Financial Analysts 
Journal, 52(6), pp. 29-46, they publish a weight of 6-percent; if the former is to be accepted, the total sum of 
all weights equals to 104-percent and as such I present Erb et al.’s (1996) figure here, assuming Diamonte et 
al.’s figure is a typological error.  
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The primary finding in Diamonte et al.’s research is that the ICRG political risk 
index correlates strongly with the MSCI in emerging markets, and less so in developed 
markets, which leads them to argue that the ability to forecast changes in political risk in 
emerging countries will allow one to predict stock performance in such countries. In other 
words, as a country becomes more risky, financial performance in the country decreases – a 
conclusion that, on the face of it, achieves the ultimate goal of the political risk index: to 
identify those political variables that predict financial performance. There are several 
studies that follow this same track, such as the work by Patrick J.W. Egan, who sees a 
relationship between ICRG’s political risk index and labour rights violations (which he 
interprets as a determinant of FDI),
72
 and that of Gour Gobinda Goswami and Saima Khan, 
who find that political risk, as measured through the ICRG, has a significant impact on the 
real exchange rate in a given country.
73
 However, for every study that reveals a similar 
correlation,
74
 there is another that finds the opposite is true. For instance, Claude B. Erb, 
Campbell R. Harvey and Tadas E. Viskanta look at all of the ICRG’s indices (along with a 
political index, the guide also publishes a financial index, an economic index, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
71 NOTE: the component descriptions within this table are copied verbatim from Diamonte et al. (1996) – 
aside from footnote 70, this is an exact replication. 
72 Egan, P. J. W. (2011) ‘Is worker repression risky? Foreign direct investment, labour rights and assessments 
of risk in developing countries’, Review of International Political Economy, 
DOI:10.1080/09692290.2011.592117. 
73 Goswami, G.G. and Khan, S. (2005) ‘Does Political Risk Lead to Purchasing Power Disparity? A Panel 
Disaggregated Approach’, The Bangladesh Development Studies, 31(1/2), pp. 25-55. 
74 For example, results from Bagheri & Habibi (1998) indicate a negative correlation between political risk 
and the independence of central banks in developing countries; Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1997) argue that 
population demographics in a given country predict risk exposure tolerance; Humphreys and Bates (2005) use 
ICRG measures to show that increasing electoral competition in a given country increases policy performance 
(where in positive policy performance is understood to be synonymous with lower political risk levels); and 
Neumayer (2004) finds a negative correlation between political risk and tourism. See: Egan, P. J. W. (2011); 
Goswami, G.G. and Khan, S. (2005); Bagheri, F.M. and Habibi, N. (1998) ‘Political Institutions and Central 
Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis’, Public Choice, 96(1/2), pp. 187-204; Erb, C.B., Harvey, 
C.R. and Viskanta, T. E. (1997) ‘Institute Demographics and International Investments’, Financial Analysts 
Journal, 53(4), pp. 14-28; Humphreys, M. and Bates, R. (2005) ‘Political Institutions and Economic Policies: 
Lessons from Africa’, British Journal of Political Science, 35(3), pp. 403-428; and Neumayer, E. (2004) 
‘Impact of Political Violence on Tourism: Dynamic Cross-National Estimation Author’, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 48(2), pp. 259-281. 
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composite index of all three) and find the political index to be the least powerful in 
predicting portfolio performance.
75
 Jean-Claude Cosset and Jean Roy find that simple 
economic indicators are often a far better predictor of financial performance within a 
country than risk indices.
76
 And both Yoram Z. Haftel and Reid W. Click see no evidence 
of the political risk index influencing FDI flows at all.
77
  
This controversy behind the prediction power of the index has been the locus of 
debate within political risk research, with study after study providing evidence of a new, 
previously unaccounted for political variable that increases predictive power, followed by 
study after study that then debunks such findings. Theoretically, this back and forth 
manifests itself within an on-going debate in political risk research circles on the 
differences between political risk and political instability – a debate that is as old as the 
discipline itself. Darryl S. L. Jarvis and Martin Griffiths, in one of the more detailed 
reviews of political risk research to date, point to one of political risk’s founding fathers, 
Stephan Robock, as initially instigating this dispute. Frustrated by studies overly focused 
on political instability in a given country, Robock argues back in the 1970s for increased 
focus on those political activities in a country that impact a firm’s ability to operate, as 
opposed to general observations about the country’s instability.
78
 For instance, the level of 
religious radicalism in a country may point to its possible instability, but religious 
radicalism by itself may not necessarily imply a more difficult operating environment for 
foreign firms. And so in line with Robock, “impact” became the keyword, and successive 
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77 Haftel, Y.Z. (2010) ‘Ratification counts: US investment treaties and FDI flows into developing countries’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 17(2), pp. 348-377; Click, R.W. (2005) ‘Financial and Political 
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reviews on political risk research would continually try to shepherd the political risk 
community back toward variables that specifically impact a firm’s ability to operate and 
away from variables that simply measure political instability.
79
  
Thomas L. Brewer’s work on policy instability (as opposed to political instability) 
embraces this guidance for impact-focused political risk research. He argues that a policy 
instability index should serve as a better measure of firm impact because changes in a 
government’s policy are oft the primary drivers of subsequent changes that impact a firm. 
When his policy instability index is compared to traditional political risk indices, he finds 
no significant correlation between the two and understands this as evidence of his index 
capturing something different about a country – something he believes to be more relevant 
– as it pertains to risk.
80
  
Others have further developed this concept of policy as commensurate with impact, 
such as Nathan Jensen who creates an index of political constraints in light of his view that 
traditional risk index and financial performance correlation studies are “far from a direct 
test of the causal link between politics and risk.” He finds that the greater the political 
constraints within a country (defined as individuals or institutions with veto powers), the 
lower the risk in currency transfer (Jensen’s concern is the insurance side of political risk 
analysis, which has a sub-focus on the risk surrounding a firm’s ability to transfer host 
country currency into its currency of choice).
81
 
                                                             
79 See, for example, Kobrin (1979), Fitzpatrick (1983), and Jarvis and Griffiths (2007)  
80 Brewer, T. (1983) 'The Instability of Governments and the Instability of Controls on Funds Transfers by 
Multinational Enterprises: Implications for Political Risk Analysis', Journal of International Business Studies, 
14(3), pp. 147-157. 
81 Jensen, N. (2006) 'Measuring Risk: Political Risk Insurance Premiums and Domestic Political Institutions' 
(working paper), p. 17, footnote 31. 
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Witold J. Henisz (2000) similarly pursues this track in developing an index aimed at 
measuring institutional commitment to upholding private property rights. Similar to Jensen, 
he sees constraints as a net positive for the MNE, looking for veto points that prevent the 
executive branch of a given government from interfering with a firm’s operations – 
aggregating variables like the strengths of the judiciary and the lower and upper houses of 




 A key turn in political risk research can be seen in the works of individuals like 
Charlie Dannreuther and Rohit Lekhi or James H. Davis and John A. Ruhe, who 
conceptualize “risk” as being in many ways synonymous with “different.” In other words, 
that the risk is inseparable from the perspective of the hypothetical firm of interest: the 
more different the operating environment is for the firm, the riskier it is. This is a key 
insight, and parallels a research track within IB that we will reference throughout this 
thesis: the institutional-based model of strategic management. Specifically, the 
institutional-based model sees conformity to the institutional environment (government 
agencies, laws, courts, etc.) as a “survival value” for the MNE and argues for following 
national (or local) rules and norms.
83
 For instance, Oliver finds that MNEs tend to seek 
legitimacy within a country for the purposes of “demonstrating social worthiness.” 
Conforming to the social norms in a given country, he argues, can increase the MNE’s 
domestic prestige which itself can lead to operating stability. Eventually this may mean that 
previously thought constraints (e.g. government regulatory agencies) will perceive the 
                                                             
82 Henisz, W. (2000) 'The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth', Economics and Politics, 12(1), p. 
1-31. 
83 Oliver, C. (1991) 'Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes', The Academy of Management Review, 
16(1), Jan., pp. 145-179 (p. 148). 
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MNE as “one of us.” As such, an MNE may decide upon a strategy of acquiescing to social 
norms if in so doing the firm can achieve a certain degree of domestic legitimacy.
84
 
 Dannreuther and Lekhi and Davis and Rue develop the idea of a “cultural” distance 
existing between the firm and the operating country of interest. Dannreuther and Lekhi, for 
instance, argue that risk is a socially constructed concept – that its very definition relies on 
a set of culturally embedded beliefs in a society. “Rationality,” in this sense, is whatever a 
particular group understands it to be (e.g. the foreign firm or one of its stakeholders), what 
they claim is based on group-specific tradition and not, “the formal rules of statistical 
science or cost benefit analysis.”
85
 Davis and Rue generate a series of hypotheses on risk 
revised to incorporate its cultural dimensions. They test four components of culture to see if 
there is an impact on perceptions of country corruption:
86
 
Power distance: the level of acceptance by a society of the unequal distribution of power in 
institutions (hypothesis: countries with higher power distance will have higher corruption). 
Uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which people in a society feel threatened by ambiguous 
situations (hypothesis: countries with high uncertainty avoidance will have higher perceived national 
corruption). 
Masculinity / Femininity: wherein a highly masculine society has clearly distinguished gender 
roles, male assertiveness and dominance, work takes priority over family, and advancement, success 
and money are more important (hypothesis: countries with high masculinity will have higher 
perceived national corruption). 
Individual / Collectivism: the relationship between the individual and the group in which he/she 
belongs (hypothesis: countries with high individualism will have lower perceived national 
corruption). 
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51 
 
They then score each country on these various cultural dimensions and look for correlations 
in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), finding significant 
correlations between corruption scores and levels of power distance, masculinity, and 
individualism in a society, seeming to indicate that perspective does in fact play a role and 
that typical risk indices appear to be aimed at a particular audience with a particular 
understanding of risk. In this sense, the political risk index (and its many variants) seems to 
be outlining for the hypothetical firm a series of structural factors that can be perceived as 
challenges, with the degree of difficulty in overcoming those challenges based on how 
“foreign” those factors appear to be from the perspective of the firm.  
Setting our propositions within their theoretical silos 
Structure and nuance 
Henisz’s admission within his research on POLCON serves as an apt starting point 
for beginning to understand why these indices have trouble in accounting for successful 
MNEs in politically “risky” environments – mainly, because it is not their concern. 
Specifically (and admirably) he admits that the POLCON index rests on a series of 
assumptions, one of the greatest being its simplification of various institutions within states 
to make them comparable, defending this standardization by claiming that the 
“incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and preference distributions 
presents severe complications for analytic tractability.”
87
 In other words, if we want to 
compare Country A with Country B, or better yet – if we want to compare dozens of 
countries – we have to strip away some of the structural nuance within each country – a 
standard challenge in any comparative exercise. 
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This thesis, however, is not bound by these same design challenges. In fact it is 
specifically constructed to avoid them. If we are to picture a dataset of foreign firms 
mapped against countries, research in the vein of the index is interested in that cluster and 
its corresponding r-value. But not here. Our concerns are those dots that refuse to bundle 
together with the pack – the outliers, the deviant cases that appear to be very “different” 
from the countries in which they equally appear to be successful. So while Henisz and 
others focus on fitting the structural elements of countries into a neat set of comparative 
factors, this thesis moves in the opposite direction – moving down the “ladder of 
abstraction,” with less concern for parsimony and generalizability and more concern for the 




Of course, there is no deficit of unique social values within Kazakhstan, no lack of 
structural nuance. The country is a former Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), having spent 
the majority of the last one hundred years as one cog among many in a larger Soviet Union-
wide command economy: the Russian imperial presence in what we today consider 
Kazakhstan dates back to at least 1680; by 1920 the majority of the country was controlled 
by the Bolsheviks; in 1936 the Kazakh SSR became official and would remain a part of the 
Soviet Union until the 1991 collapse that created by default the independent Republic of 
Kazakhstan.
89
 There are great debates surrounding the impact of the Russian and then the 
Soviet empire on the country (with the idea that the Soviet Union was an “empire” equally 
contested
90
), with significant Russian influence remaining in the country to this day 
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(Russian remains the official language of business; in 1970 the country was 43-percent 
ethnic Russian and 32-percent ethnic Kazakh; today the split is around 24/63).
91
 
Kazakhstan has a deep ethnographic history associated with both nomadism and 
sedentarism that some have interpreted as having a profound impact today on the informal 
power networks that maintain a group of ruling elites within the government (to be 
expanded on in-depth throughout our cases).
92
And Kazakhstan’s natural resource wealth 
rapidly exposed the country, post-independence, to the expectations embedded within the 
structures of the international market economy (to be covered in depth in the following 
chapter). All of these factors and more contribute in some way to what makes Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan – and not, for instance, Thailand, Samoa or Algeria (despite the fact that these 
three states, from a comparative perspective, are closer in their political risk scores to 
Kazakhstan than any of the other Central Asian states).
93
 
 So does this mean that only “Russian-esque” MNEs (or post-Soviet MNEs) can be 
successful in Kazakhstan? The IB concept of institutional distance, which we will examine 
in depth in a moment, predicts that MNE success in a given country is a reflection of the 
distance between the MNE’s home country and that of its host (or operating) country. 
ArcelorMittal, however, operates in 60 different countries and is the amalgamation of a 
series of mergers; Cameco is a Canadian multinational; Frontier Mining was founded by an 
American and trades on the London Stock Exchange. How do we account for their success? 
I offer the first proposition of this thesis: 
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The Structure Proposition: successful MNEs respond to the unique social 
structures within a given country. 
Agency and perspective 
 Recall the World Wide Minerals case, in which the company ceased operations at 
its uranium mine in Kazakhstan and the government consequently expropriated the mine. 
Sure, we could interpret this case as one that proves Kazakhstan is a politically risky 
country, or we could provide an alternate, though by no means necessarily opposing, way 
to interpret the incident: when CEO Paul Carroll made the decision to cease operations, he 
did so by his own volition. He had a choice, and he chose to shut down the mine in 
retaliation to marketing negotiations at the time. This brings us back to the debate on 
political instability versus political risk (bare with me for a moment), which remember 
prompted Roback to call for impact-focused political risk analysis – that is, for researchers 
to focus on those political activities that specifically impact a firm’s ability to operate. 
Jarvis interprets this move as Robock’s attempt to “capture political risk as an analytical 
category and set of processes exclusive to foreign investors,” (emphasis added) and his 




…the false dichotomy Robock constructs between the intellectual interests and concerns of 
international business practitioners and those of political scientists, seems disingenuous and 
ultimately destructive to the emergence of integrated theory able to analyze risk not just in terms of 
how it impacts end users (firms), but the drivers and causal variables from which it originates and its 
possible future trajectories for a whole rostrum of end users and stakeholders. 
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Focusing on how political events impact the firm has had the (unintended?) consequence of 
neglecting the fact that the “drivers and causal variables” of such political events may in 
fact originate with the MNE itself. In other words, Carroll’s decisions as the CEO of World 
Wide Minerals likely played a strong causal role in the Kazakh government actions that 
followed. This is a second major shortcoming of the political risk index: it fails to 
acknowledge MNE agency. 
 It is important to realize that this specific critique of the political risk index is 
actually a broader critique of IB as a discipline, and it is here where we see the 
epistemological thread to those “research silos” we discussed earlier that fail to collaborate. 
Sally believed that bringing the disciplines of business and political economy together 
would expose the shortcomings of existing, isolated approaches dealing with the firm and 
as such improve our “theoretical understanding as well as empirical evaluation of the 
MNE.”
95
 I mentioned briefly before that this call was actually preceded by a similar appeal 
made by Lorraine Eden in 1991 in an article aptly titled, “Bringing the firm back in: the 
multinational in international political economy.” Eden points out in her critique of IB that 
most studies tend to be “exercises in problem solving and little attempt is made to examine 
MNEs from a critical perspective.”
96
 Pit this argument against the words of IR/IPE scholar 
Mark Rupert and we begin to see why Sally wanted IB, IR and IPE to come together in 
RIPE. Similarly self-criticizing, Rupert claims that the contemporary study of IR (which he 
also extends to IPE), “has interpreted the world from the perspective of states and 
statesmen.” And just as Eden condemns IB to a best practices literature for businesspersons 
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(which was exactly what Robock wanted for political risk analysis and promoted back in 
the 1970s), Rupert equally classifies IR/IPE as cast “in the role of advisor to the prince.”
97
  
 The consequence of embracing a single perspective, be it that of the firm or the 
nation state, is the failure to introspect – the failure to see the agency inherent in either the 
firm or the state as it looks outward. Subsequent warnings both in IB and IPE continue to 
remind researchers of this mono-perspective snare. Hildy Teegen, Jonathan P. Doh, and 
Sushil Vachani, in their examination of the role of NGOs in global governance (published 
in JIBS), see their work as questioning the status quo acceptance of “the firm as the global 
organization of interest within the field of IBS”
98
 and Louise Amoore, Richard Dodgson, 
Randall D. Germain, Barry K. Gills, Paul Langley and Iain Watson warn within RIPE to 
“resist the urge to assume rather than account for the centrality of key actors (whether 
firms, states, classes or institutions)” within IPE research.
99
 Yongqiang Gao affirms this 
warning when he notes that in traditional political risk analyses the MNE is treated as 
“passive” wherein reality political risks are often directly related to the behaviors of the 
MNE.
100
 Taken together, this leads me to the second proposition within this thesis:  
The Agent Proposition: Multinationals are agents; successful multinationals 
embrace their agency, recognizing that their very presence in a given country will 
affect the structure of that country and the behaviors of actors within it. 
 How exactly does a firm “embrace” its agency? There are pockets of research 
within IB that have investigated this very idea (after all, Eden claimed only that most 
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studies within IB fail to be critical of the MNE). Here we turn to the resource-based school 
of strategic management, which focuses on MNE reaction to environmental uncertainty 
and, importantly, advocates for an active management style (the previously discussed 
institution-based school and here the resource-based school are considered to be on 
opposite ends on the spectrum of strategic management). Thomas A. Poynter offers the 
simple observation that not all MNEs experience the same degree of political intervention 
in the same country, and even MNEs from the same industry in the same country 
experience different levels of “discrimination.”
101
 Researchers in this field understand 
politics as a resource, not a constraint: government officials can provide (or deny) 
“permission to trade and invest, protection against sovereign risk, competitive advantages 
against rivals” and more in return for “various economic and noneconomic 
contributions.”
102
 In other words, it is not just about adapting to what already exists. 
 The second part to the above proposition is a bit more loaded (and leading for those 
familiar with debates within social scientific inquiry) – restated, “the very presence in a 
given country of an MNE will affect the structure of that country.” What do I mean by this? 
Building off the first proposition (structure matters), together these two propositions are an 
implicit reference to the agent-structure debate within IR as captured by Wendt. As he 
explains, we tend to understand the world in two ways:
103
  
(1) [H]uman beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or 
transform the society in which they live;  
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(2) [S]ociety is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these 
purposeful actors; 
Wendt’s work is meant to be a critique of neorealism and world-systems theory, and so 
many of his arguments behind the agent-structure “problem” are responses to issues within 
these specific approaches, which I will touch upon in the conclusion. But what is important 
for us as we press forward with our investigation into the successful MNE is to recognize, 
as Wendt does, that it is possible (in fact necessary) to understand agents and structures as 
co-determined, mutually constituted entities. For us this means the following: the MNE is 
an agent that both responds to and influences the host country structure in which it 
operates; equally so, the host country influences and responds to the actions of the MNE. 
As it relates to my propositions, this is nothing more than a reminder that those same 
“social structures” in the first proposition that the successful MNE responds to can in 
themselves be influenced by the MNE. That is, structure is not static.  
Stakeholders, not host countries 
 Understanding now that the MNE and the host country structure are mutually 
constituted, and that, by the very nature of the political risk index, it cannot account for this 
relationship (recall that the index focuses only on country structure – not MNE agency – 
and further, homogenizes this structure to make it comparative), I want to return to the 
research of Amoore et al. and Teegen et al. to emphasize a related deficiency within the 
political risk index from which my third (and final) proposition is derived. Amoore et al. 
warn us to “resist the urge to assume rather than account for the centrality of key actors,”
104
 
while Teegen et al. argue that in the case of IB, this is exactly what has happened with the 
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MNE (noting in their own work the unexamined significance of the NGO).
105
 We seem to 
be guilty of falling into this trap as well if we’re to claim that host country structure both 
influences and is influenced by the MNE – not because of what we claim, but because of 
what we fail to claim. Specifically, reducing the units of analysis within our puzzle on the 
successful MNE to just the MNE and the host country is a gross oversimplification of the 
situation as it actually exists. The reality is that there is no host country, but rather a series 
of actors both within and outside of the country, each with varying levels of relevance to 
the MNE and each that influences and is influenced by sub- and supra-state structures. 
 Such a finding is no surprise to researchers concerned with integrative theories of 
stakeholder management within the discipline of CSR that focus on how an MNE develops 
within the community of interest groups, local, provincial and national governments, 
indigenous peoples, and international governmental and non-governmental organizations in 
which it must operate. These groups, known within CSR as stakeholders, are defined by the 
fact that they can either influence or are influenced by the firm’s ability to operate in a 
given location.
106
 Whereas the traditional political risk index aggregates impacting factors 
into a single host country score, CSR research identifies the actors behind those impacting 
factors and proposes that they should be analyzed and managed as distinct units.  
 As I warned earlier (with respect to finding answers that exist in one form or 
another within or between disciplines), an alternative to the “host country” ontology is not 
totally alien to political risk analysis (but it is severely undeveloped and unincorporated 
with the existing “silo” of CSR research). For instance, a case study by Jeffrey D. Simon on 
political risk in South Africa identifies “flows of risk” as emanating from home and host 
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governments, home and host societies, the home and host business and legal communities, 
the home and host media, regional organizations, international activist groups, and global 
organizations.
107
 And more recently, Gao points out that traditional political risk analysis 
takes the “political environment as given and exogenous” when in fact the interests of 
different actors as they pertain to the MNE should be considered separately. He identifies a 
series of interest groups very similar to those of Simon, and explicitly calls for relying on 
CSR theories to develop this further, though he himself does not (Gao self-identifies as a 
researcher within CSR, not political risk).
108
 
 This leads us to my third and final proposition, which I state below and follow with 
the other two propositions though now revised to dismiss the concept of the host country, 
embrace the idea of the stakeholder and recognize the significance of the agent-structure 
debate:  
The Stakeholder Proposition: There is no “host country”; the successful MNE 
recognizes that its ability to operate in a given location depends on its relationships 
with its stakeholders. 
The Agent Proposition: MNEs are agents; successful MNEs embrace this agency 
and are proactive in their maintenance of stakeholder relationships, regardless of 
whether or not such maintenance is required by formal governance structures (i.e. 
the state). 
The Structure Proposition: MNEs are reagents; successful MNEs respond to the 
unique social structures within a given country, shaped over time by its 
stakeholders, including the MNE itself.  
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The Framework for Analysis 
 It is one thing to show how an existing framework for analyzing political risk – the 
index – fails to account for the successful firm in the so-called risky country. But how now 
to approach our propositions? Under what alternative framework can we investigate the 
MNE’s active maintenance of stakeholder relationships within a set of social structures 
influencing and influenced by the MNE and these same stakeholders? 
 Let us first briefly recap the ontological and epistemological assumptions we took 
issue with in the political risk index before moving forward, in an effort to avoid repeating 
the same mistakes as we look to adopt a new analytical framework. Recall that the political 
risk index’s approach to understanding is through the country and from the perspective of 
the MNE; this, we found, was preventing us from recognizing the agency in the MNE and 
how as an actor the MNE both shapes and is shaped by the structures within which it 
operates. Ontologically, we understand through the extant research on CSR that the concept 
of the “host country,” which is the primary unit of analysis within the political risk index, 
does not appear to exist in practice. As noted comically but truthfully in the introduction, 
CEO’s do not ring up the “host country” to broker a deal. So whereas ontologically we 
want to disaggregate the host country into the actors an MNE actually establishes a 
relationship with, epistemologically we want to approach the situation from an angle that 
does not rely on a single perspective (be it the MNE, the prince, the NGO, or any other 
stakeholder). See Table 2.2 for a summary of our epistemological and ontological critiques. 
Table 2.2: Epistemological and Ontological Challenges in Political Risk Analysis 
Issue Critique Type Solution 
Concept of "host 
country" 
Firms do not interact 








Focus on "firm 
impact" 
"host country" 
behavior used to 
explain all events; no 
recognition of firm 
agency or role of 
other stakeholders 
epistemological 
Focus on the relationship 
between the firm and 
various stakeholders 
 
 In this sense, we can say that whereas existing political risk research places the 
“question mark” on the country, with all eyes on the country, I argue that in order to 
understand the successful MNE in the politically risky country, we need to shift the 
“question mark” onto the relationship that exists between the MNE and its stakeholders, 
looking both at and through each of these players. In other words, the risk is in the 
relationship, not the country, and by embracing an epistemology focused on relationships 
we are allowed access to the multiple perspectives that constitute those relationships.  
 The bargain, focused on multinational-host country relations, is the major 
theoretical contribution of scholar Raymond Vernon, initially outlined in his book 
Sovereignty At Bay, a sort of IB equivalent to Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. 
Because the analytical framework outlined by Vernon in Sovereignty At Bay will play such 
a large role in this thesis, and because his research is often widely misinterpreted,
109
 let us 
take a moment and recount the core arguments of his book (as they relate to our study) 
before getting into how his framework has been modified over the years by subsequent 
researchers (it is the most recent and comprehensive iteration of his framework – that also 
happens to be largely untested – which this thesis will adopt). Vernon’s story also provides 
an added context to our on-going sidebar on the intellectual history between IB and IPE/IR, 
showing just how closely intertwined these disciplines used to be and possibly showing us 
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exactly why the break was made between embracing the perspective of businessperson or 
that of the prince.  
 Sovereignty At Bay grew out of a larger project at Harvard University during the 
1960s, the Multinational Enterprise Project, aimed at understanding the significance of the 
rapid growth of US MNEs in foreign countries. “Suddenly, it seems,” Vernon begins the 
book, “the sovereign states are feeling naked,” and as the titled suggests, Vernon was 
particularly interested in examining the ways in which an MNE affected the sovereignty of 
a nation state and then how that nation state would respond.
110
 Later in the book he would 
formalize this concept into a framework he called “the bargain,” which became the 
foundation for investigating MNE-host country relations for decades. I will return to the 
bargain in a moment, but first a bit more context on Vernon – who was he? Why does it 
matter?  
 The historiography behind Sovereignty At Bay predates the silos of IB and IPE, and 
as such provides us insight into how researchers understood MNE-host country relations 
before they felt compelled to embrace one of the two perspectives (i.e. the business person 
or the prince). That historiography begins with the author, and by Vernon’s own admission, 
he “stumbled into the field” of IB back in 1959 (recall that the Academy of International 
Business was founded in the same year; Benjamin Cohen, in his history of IPE, places 
IPE’s founding much later, in 1970).
111
 As Vernon once recounted: 
One of my first tasks, it seemed to me, was to get some sense of the territory over which I 
was expected to preside [in the international business curriculum at Harvard Business 
School]. In retrospect, my innocence and my ignorance served as a kind of shield. If there 
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were territorial limits, my rudimentary sense of smell proved incapable of detecting them. 
As nearly as I could tell, my fellow faculty members seemed to be saying that anything that 
fell outside the United States was eligible for the "international" label.
112
 
Vernon had served in a variety of positions, both in the private sector and the government, 
before coming to Harvard. He was an analyst at the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (an oversight body for the US-based stock exchanges), wrote civil affairs 
guides for the US Army during World War II, detailing in these guides the capital markets 
in Germany and Japan in anticipation of US occupation of those countries, then later he 
would serve as an administrator of the Marshall Plan under the State Department, playing a 
significant role in the implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and he even held a short stint before Harvard as a director at Forest Mars, maker 
of the M & M.  
 The point is that Vernon’s experiences would move back and forth between advisor 
to the businessperson and the prince, and he would take that equal interest in business 
administration and government administration to Harvard, sharing his time between the 
university’s business school and its Center for International Affairs (where he would 
eventually serve as director). And because he did so at a time in which IB was still trying to 
find itself (giving him wide research latitude) and IPE was slowly becoming its own 
discipline, he had equal influence in both of these spheres. One need only look a research 
generation out to see how Sovereignty At Bay would be claimed as a founding text for IB 
and IPE. Later IB researchers would clue in on the entry strategies that Vernon provided for 
MNEs in foreign countries while IPE researchers like Robert Gilpin would be drawn to 
systemic theories on how to reconcile the MNE with the nation state as a level of analysis. 
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Gilpin, along with other established contemporary IPE researchers today such as Robert 
Keohane, explicitly acknowledges the influence of Vernon on his early IPE research. 
Keohane for that matter believes that some of the earliest conferences and texts on topics 




 Both of these threads within Sovereignty At Bay – the MNE’s entry into a domestic 
economy (IB) and the larger implications of this entry for the international system (IPE) – 
are critical to my research, and we will take them in turn.  
 It is within Vernon’s chapter on raw material ventures that he outlines the concept 
of the obsolescing bargain. “When a foreign investor in raw materials takes the plunge into 
the dark and chilly waters of a less-developed country,” he writes,  
the event is generally celebrated by the signing of some sort of contract between the investor and the 
government…Yet, almost from the moment that the signatures have dried on the document, powerful 
forces go to work that quickly render the agreements obsolete in the eyes of the government.114 
Vernon sees the initial terms of agreement between the MNE and the host government as 
the bargain, and argues that it obsolesces because over time the MNE becomes more 
entrenched in the country (e.g. with infrastructure, with local nationals playing an 
increasing role in management) and power shifts from the MNE (who initially provided 
new technologies, marketing practices, and a host of other skills that the country required to 
develop a particular resource) to the host government (as the government becomes literate 
in those skills and believes it can develop the resource on its own).  
 Vernon attributes this determinism to an inescapable tension between the MNE and 
the host government that extends from the opposing goals of each actor: in the case of the 
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host government, its own particular philosophy on how wealth should be distributed within 
the country (e.g. among the elites, among the people, etc.); in the case of the MNE, its 
commitment to maximizing shareholder wealth. As long as the “potential clash of interests” 




 At first glance Vernon’s obsolescing bargain theory is an attractive framework for 
my own study because of its focus on the relationship between the MNE and the host 
country (as opposed to embracing wholly the perspective of a single actor a la the political 
risk index). But of course in all of my other conditions it largely fails. Vernon focuses only 
on a single relationship (maintaining the unit of the host country, which he sees as 
synonymous with a nation’s elites); and behind his characterization of the relationship as 
“obsolescing” is a deep-seated determinism that seems to discount MNE agency.  
 I am not alone in recognizing these frustrations – the bargain as it was revealed in 
the early 1970s is not without its contemporary critics. For instance, the idea of the MNE 
forming a relationship with the host country seems to many an oversimplification today as 
MNEs “develop relationships with a multiplicity of public and private actors” – a critique 
not just of the dyadic relationship but of the units of analysis.
116
 As I noted in the 
introduction, researchers like Suzana B. Rodrigues and Ravi Ramamurti argue that the 
bargain need not necessarily obsolesce,
117
 with others placing greater emphasis on the 
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adherence to social norms and values as a condition of positive MNE-host country 
relations.
118
 Charles E. Stevens points out, for instance, that a core assumption of Vernon’s 
bargaining framework is an inherent distrust between the MNE and the host country, 
whereas researchers such as Teegen et al. have actually found that the so-called “waters” in 
a given country need not be so “dark and chilly” (to borrow from Vernon’s description), if 
the foreign organization of interest can attain a “trusted position”
 
with local stakeholders 




 So has the obsolescing bargain model “outlived its usefulness,” as Eden et al. 
(2005) ask aloud? No, they then answer – the essential elements of Vernon’s bargain 
remain critical in understanding MNE relations in a given country, but that certainly the 
bargain as originally conceptualized should be upgraded to account for what we have 
learned since Harvard’s Multinational Enterprise project back in the late 1960s. 
Specifically, Eden et al. propose that we move away from treating the bargain as a theory of 
MNE-host country behavior and instead see it as a broader framework for understanding 
MNE-stakeholder relations – what they call the political bargaining model (PBM). As one 
would expect given the body of critical scholarship in the wake of the original bargain, the 
PBM drops the idea that the bargain necessarily obsolesces; problemitizes the “host 
country” as the primitive unit and instead recognizes the bargain as existing between the 
MNE and a variety of stakeholders; fully recognizes the MNE’s agency in influencing its 
relationships;
120
 and perhaps most importantly, remains “sufficiently abstract to enable 
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analysis in many different contexts.”
121
 In other words, they develop a framework that 
incorporates all of the “lessons learned” in applying the bargain from its inception in the 
1970s to the present day, and notably, preserve the one concept that remained uncontested 
throughout – the framework’s epistemological underpinnings. That is, all of these critics 
continue to believe in the importance of approaching understanding through relationships, 
not individual actors.  
 How does the PBM work? Eden et al. argue that each stakeholder has its own 
specific goals and behind those goals are a series of resources that the stakeholder 
mobilizes to achieve them. For instance a government may want to increase revenue 
through the development of a mineral deposit (a goal), an MNE may see development of 
the deposit as profitable (a goal), and whereas the government can offer a license to the 
MNE for exploiting the deposit (a resource it mobilizes in order to achieve its goal), the 
MNE has the technology required to develop the deposit (its own resource to be used in 
achieving its goals).  
 There are, of course, a few clarifiers. As it relates to resources, Eden et al. believe 
that some range of complementarities must exist among respective resources if the two 
actors are to achieve their independent goals. Here is where we see the normative bend to 
Eden et al.’s work. “The important point is that there is some range of complementarity or 
overlap so that there is scope for each party to achieve its own goals through 
cooperation,”
122
 they write, unclear if they are aware of the theoretical jump they are 
making in presupposing that the bargain between two actors must be cooperative, a clear 
departure from Vernon’s initial view that the bargain rested on a balance of power between 
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stakeholders. In fact the primary driver behind the idea that the bargain obsolesced was that 
the “you have what I need and you need what I have” system collapsed as the host country 
believed it no longer needed what the multinational had to offer (e.g. investment, 
technology, and marketing). For IR theorists the parallels here between liberalist and realist 
views on order are obvious – the “mutually beneficial exchange” between actors that 
naturally leads to cooperative behavior versus the self-interested rationalism of actors 




 Eden et al.’s belief in the need for resource complementarity stems from the work of 
Yadong Luo, who himself draws on the research of Peter Buckley and Mark Casson and 
John Stopford.
124
 The transition from a bargain based on power to that of one based on 
cooperation is not lost on Luo who describes a dichotomy in perceptions of MNE-host 
country relations as the “conflictual” versus the “cooperative” views (the former starting 
with Vernon’s work in Sovereignty At Bay, the latter the more contemporary view). Luo 
goes so far as to note that the conflictual view embraces a bargain based on the “balance of 
power,” derived from goal or resource incongruities, while the cooperative view rests on 
interdependence. “MNCs and governments are interdependent on each other for critical 
resources in today's world economy,” he notes, and again we see the clear parallels to IR 
and IPE theories of order
125
 (this is even clearer in Stopford’s work, which is a prescriptive, 
policy oriented paper that presses governments and multinationals to move from a zero-sum 
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to a positive sum game of policy coordination).
126
 Empirically, Luo hypothesizes that 
multinational managers will perceive their relations with the host country government to be 
stronger in cases with high resource complementarity, a hypothesis he confirms through 
survey work with managers operating in China.  
 There is a second dimension to the concept of resource complementarity that is 
equally important, what Eden et al. call “resource valuation,” an acknowledgement that 
behind the “I have what you need” maxim is the assumption that the opposing stakeholder 
also sees it this way – in other words, perception matters. A stakeholder may believe it 
brings a particularly desired skill to the proverbial “bargaining table” but if an opposing 
stakeholder does not value that resource as significant, it will have little effect on the 
bargain. For example, if several MNEs have the necessary technological capacity to exploit 
a resource, then that capacity in itself is of little interest to the host government (because 
there are so many firms to choose from) – so what other qualities will the MNE bring to the 
country that makes it more worthy of the subsoil license? Alternately, if a natural resource 
is widely available across the world, what is the host government able to offer that other 
governments cannot? 
 Beyond resource complementarity, the PBM stresses that each stakeholder operates 
under its own set of constraints that are not always shared by the other stakeholders. For 
instance, the MNE is answerable not only to the laws of the country in which it operates, 
but to the laws in the country in which it is listed as a publically traded company. An 
obvious example is the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which severely limits the ability 
of an MNE to exercise possible resources (e.g. cash payments to a government official) to 
achieve its goals (e.g. a subsoil license). NGOs and governments have their own constraints 
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– perhaps as a condition of receiving popular or elite support – and constraints can come 
from within as well, such as from the firm’s internal policies on workplace ethics, a 
reflection of shareholder demands.  
 Empirically, the interaction of opposing actor constraints fits squarely within the 
previously discussed institution-based model of strategic management that led us to our 
proposition on structure and how conformity to the institutional environment of a given 
country is often perceived as a “survival value” for the MNE. Eden et al. point to Tatiana 
Kostova and Srilata Zaheer’s work in this regard, who define the concept of institutional 
distance as “the difference or similarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
institutional environments of the home and the host countries of an MNE.” They 
hypothesize that the greater the institutional distance, the “more difficult it will be for the 
MNE to understand the host environment,” and critically, they believe that institutionally 
distant firms will need to bridge this divide (i.e. “survive”) by adapting their own 
organizational practices to host country requirements.
127
 Others such as Stevens have noted 
that there is a direct link between this concept of foreignness and Vernon’s characterization 
of MNE-host country relations as inherently distrustful. According to Vernon, he writes, 
the “host government is fundamentally antagonistic towards foreign firms, due to distrust 
relating to their ‘foreignness.’”
128
 
 It probably comes as no surprise then that research to date leveraging elements of 
the PBM framework has found it a refreshing alternative to the original bargain for 
understanding the role of the MNE as it enters the domestic political economy of a given 
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country. Dan Haglund, in an examination of Chinese copper mining in Zambia, finds that 
the firm has “the capacity to shape” the rules and agendas of local decisionmakers, 
highlighting the PBM’s recognition of MNE agency.
129
 James Nebus and Carlos Rufin 
build off the PBM to incorporate bargains between multiple actors (what they call “network 
bargaining power”) in the privatization of utilities in the Dominican Republic.
130
 Rudiger 
Ahrend and William Tompson’s study of the political economy of Caspian oil leverages the 
PBM framework to show how the bargain does not always obsolesce
131
 (see also Paul 
Alexander Haslam’s study on mining in Argentina and Chile in the late 1990s).
132
 And both 
Seung-Hyun Lee, Kyeungrae Oh and Eden and Lez Rayman-Bacchus and Silvia 
Chowdhury find in incorporating components of the PBM into their approach that the 
“adversarial framework” of the bargain “seems to have given way to a focus on a more 




 Advances aside, there are two important shortcomings of existing PBM-influenced 
research that this thesis intends to develop. First, the existing research is just that – PBM-
influenced. None of the above studies fully embrace the PBM framework, rather they 
leverage Eden et al.’s existing critique of traditional bargaining research as a preamble to 
their own approaches, noting occasional similarities but remaining largely independent of 
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the PBM framework as prescribed for future researchers. Second, and perhaps most 
bizarrely, while Eden et al. clearly state in their outline of the PBM the need to disaggregate 
the “host country” into stakeholders (and in so doing rely on the existing body of research 
on stakeholder management), they ignore this component in their own applications of the 
PBM. In a 2004 presentation to the Academy of International Business titled, “From the 
Obsolescing Bargain to the Political Bargaining Model,” they continue to use the unit of the 
“host country” as they shift from Vernon’s work to their own. In a presentation to the 
International Studies Association in 2006, Eden references the significance of stakeholders 
but then goes on to explore the PBM between the MNE and the national government – not 
all that different from Vernon’s original conception of the “host country.”
 134
  
 Taken together, because the fact remains that no one to date has fully applied the 
framework of the PBM to understanding an MNE’s relations within its country of operation 
(including the model’s initial authors), we can equally say that to date the PBM has yet to 
be fully assessed as a valid theoretical framework. What are the scope conditions under 
which the framework will apply? In which will it not? How plausible is the concept of 
examining several bargains between multiple stakeholders under the prescribed framework 
of goals, resources and constraints? These unanswered questions justify the theory testing 
case study methodology that this thesis embraces. 
 All that aside, at least as described, Eden et al.’s goals, resources and constraints – 
considered across a variety of stakeholders and coming together in a series of dynamic 
bargains (i.e. on-going, constantly renegotiated formal and informal agreements) – the 
necessary epistemological and ontological conditions appear to be satisfied as we explore 
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our stakeholder, agency and structure propositions. In how a stakeholder determines which 
resources it will mobilize to achieve its goals, I see the recognition of stakeholder agency 
(and the room, notably, to explore developments in resource-based theories of strategic 
management), while in examining how stakeholders react (or fail to react) to different 
constraints, I see the space to explore structure and how agents and structures are mutually 
constituted (equally drawing on institution-based theories of strategic management). This 
thesis, therefore, attempts to answer our question on the successful MNE in the risky 
country through the analytical framework of the PBM, fully embraced.  
 But as is also the case for Eden et al., Luo, and many others referenced thus far, to 
Vernon Sovereignty At Bay was concerned with bigger questions than simply the practical 
concerns of a given MNE in a developing country, and rightly so (though often 
overlooked). In the final chapter (which Vernon clearly believes few people read, judging 
from his later reflections on the book)
135
 he concludes that the bigger source of tension here 
is the idea that an inherent asymmetry exists between the MNE and the state system in that 
the MNE can shift economic activities from one country to another while the state is 
anchored to what lies within it. This situation, he warns, “may be tolerable up to a point [to 
the host-government], but beyond that point there is a need to re-establish balance.” What 
exactly does he mean here? Who needs to re-establish balance? And a balance of what? 
 It is these questions – and how Vernon develops them throughout Sovereignty At 
Bay – that lead us to our larger questions on order, what we understand in international 
relations theory as “the minimum conditions for co-existence.”
136
 Sure, Vernon is interested 
in operational issues, as I am – after all, my research begins with the question of accounting 
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for successful MNEs in politically risky countries, and looks to the Sovereignty At Bay-
inspired PBM as a framework for doing so. “But this is not where the real problem lies,” 
Vernon reminds us.
137
 Rather, it is the unavoidable threat that the MNE, he argues, though 
having “something to offer that the host countries badly want,”
138
 nevertheless equally 
represents a challenge for “government leaders bent on control, for local businessmen who 
aspire to compete, and for intellectuals who are hoping to challenge the status quo.”
139
 This 
tension creates an imbalance in power that, if not corrected, will result in the realization of 
(at the time) “apocalyptic projections” on the future of the MNE – and with almost 
Nostradamus-like talent (that Vernon himself humbly denies), the years immediately 
following the publication of Sovereignty at Bay were marked with a series of expropriations 
and nationalizations. 
  As has already been loosely referenced, Vernon’s characterization of MNE-nation 
state asymmetry as requiring the reestablishment of “balance”
140
 might lead one to believe 
that he ascribes to more realist notions of order as we understand them today within IR and 
IPE. Certainly Gilpin, who claimed to be influenced by Vernon’s work, takes this route, 
believing that liberal notions of interdependence as a source of order are impossible 
because of the likely asymmetry between actors that will in turn lead to conflict.
141
 It is 
hard not to see the similarities here with Vernon’s realized apocalyptic projections. Vernon 
also admits in Sovereignty At Bay that although the strength of an MNE’s affiliation to its 
home country is debatable – “[m]easured by equity ownership, [US MNEs] are 90-percent 
or more American; by sources of funds, perhaps 25-percent American; by the identity of 
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employees, less than one-percent American; and by the identity of the governments that 
receive their taxes, practically 100-percent foreign”
142
 – a US MNE nevertheless 
experiences more tension in a given country because it is perceived as an extension of the 
US, a tenant of realist theories on the role of the MNE.
143
  
 But it is how Vernon formulates an answer to this imbalance that leads us to a 
different interpretation on order. Vernon notes, as I have already transcribed, that the 
asymmetry between the MNE and the nation state is “tolerable up to a point,” but when that 
point comes, he hypothesizes “the response is bound to have some of the elements of the 
world corporation concept.” World corporation? To Vernon, the “world corporation” was 
rooted in his idea that MNE interests would never coincide perfectly with nation state 
interests because the former’s were global (and would affect many nation states) while the 
latter’s were national, aimed at a single country. Vernon therefore proposes that only a 
“global government” could provide symmetry, what he refers to as the world corporation. 
In this world corporation (which could be a component of the UN, he notes), when the 
interests of a nation state conflict with the interests of the global authority, the global 
authority’s interests would always trump, an idea that to him, in 1971, may one day “seem 
plausible, but not at present.” 
 The idea that institutions induce order is of course a very liberal way of 
understanding the international political economy. Here Keohane, equally appreciative of 
Vernon’s influence on his research, would point out that the MNE and the nation state 
actually have more interests in common than Vernon may give them credit for, but without 
this sort of “world corporation,” miscommunication leads to misunderstanding which leads 
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to the perception of conflicting interests. And whereas Gilpin might argue that 
interdependence, because it is oft asymmetric, leads to conflict, Keohane (along with Nye) 
sees interdependence as a source of co-existence, which follows the same philosophical 
thread behind contemporary IB work in MNE-host country cooperation.
144
  
 So who is correct? My investigation into metals mining MNEs in Kazakhstan 
allows us not only to examine the operational issues behind MNE-stakeholder bargaining in 
a post-Soviet state, but to address this broader question on order as well – just as Sally 
envisioned the study of MNE-host country relations within the discipline of IPE. The world 
has changed – perhaps – since Vernon noted that the concept of a global authority did not 
seem plausible in his era. Today international “authorities” such as the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) or the Equator Principles have a significant influence on the 
way a mining company operates in any country – Kazakhstan or otherwise. Who are these 
authorities? Do they matter? Does an asymmetry in interests persist? Is there order? These 
are some of the larger questions we will explore as we press on and into our case studies.  
Grounded theory: building forward our propositions 
 In light of our understanding of the “bargain” as an approach to MNE relations in a 
given country – from the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project of the 1960s to the many 
critiques over the decades since and now to Eden et al.’s PBM – we can now better define 
both our dependent and independent variables, and further, augment our initial propositions 
toward the successful MNE by incorporating the wide body of scholarship that the 
bargaining approach and its variants clearly draw upon. 
 Remember that at the heart of our multiple case studies is the dependent variable – 
the successful MNE – which, critically, is kept constant. In other words, this thesis 
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presupposes that the MNE in each case study is successful. The obvious follow-on question 
is to define exactly what I mean by “success,” and while the specific details behind each 
MNE’s achievements in Kazakhstan will be addressed in the individual cases, broadly 
speaking “success” is understood here as synonymous with order: the co-existence of the 
MNE with the stakeholders in the MNE’s area of operation. In this sense the bargain is 
synonymous with the establishment of order among the stakeholders, an order which is 
dynamic – from the MNE’s entry to its current status. Recall that we narrowly define the 
“stakeholder” to be any individual or group that can impact the firm’s ability to operate, 
and by co-existence we mean that each stakeholder is able to pursue its own interests to a 
self-satisfactory degree in the context of the stakeholder’s relationship with the MNE. The 
same goes for the MNE – it too must be able to pursue its own interests to a self-
satisfactory degree. The burden is of course on me to illustrate in each case how this is in 
fact the situation.  
 Taken together, by holding the dependent variable constant, this thesis is less 
concerned with outcomes (since all outcomes are assumed to be the same) and more 
concerned with how MNEs have come to establish this outcome over time – an embrace of 
equifinality, or the idea that the causal pathway that leads each MNE to success may be 
different. That said, as this is a case study intent on theory testing and heuristic 
development, it may very well become obvious that the assumption of a “successful MNE” 
is overly parsimonious (that is, that our assumption is in error). In this sense, while there 
will likely exist a typology of “successful MNEs” as marked by the interaction of the 
various independent variables between cases, there may in fact be variance within the 
dependent variable itself between each case.  
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 As it regards the independent variables within the cases, to some extent we can say 
that the conditions of “industry” and “country” are held constant – mining in Kazakhstan 
beyond oil and gas. To the non-specialist these two conditions may already seem to be quite 
precise, but within the country of Kazakhstan and within the industry of mining outside of 
oil and gas there is significant variance, as I have well-learned over the course of my 
fieldwork. The stakeholders, for instance, are not constant – those individuals and 
organizations that can impact the firm’s ability to operate are unique to both the operating 
area and the sub-industry of the firm. How our independent variables – the resources and 
constraints of each stakeholder – interact under these conditions is the empirical focus of 
the thesis.  
 With a grasp of the variables of interest in the wake of our understanding of the 
PBM, we now return, in the spirit of the grounded nature of this research design, to our 
earlier propositions – generated, as you will recall, from our epistemological and 
ontological criticisms of existing political risk scholarship – in order to build forward our 
expectations of MNE success in a so-called risky country. The agent proposition, which 
emphasizes the importance of firm agency in actively managing stakeholder relationships, 
can be folded into the concept of resource complementarity. Whereas the traditional 
resource complementarity hypothesis states that firms with resources more compatible with 
stakeholder resources will be more successful, because we hold success constant, this thesis 
expects the following: 
The Agent/Resource Proposition: successful firms actively manage and adapt 
their resources to be more compatible with stakeholder resources. 
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In other words, in the absence of initial resource complementarity between the MNE and a 
particular stakeholder, we expect the MNE to reconfigure its own resources to be 
complementary to the stakeholder’s resources. 
 Our proposition on structure is an apt fit with the PBM’s recognition that the MNE 
and its stakeholders operate under a series of constraints – from physical constraints to 
cognitive constraints – and the more these constraints are different, the more difficult it is 
for each actor to work together. Known as institutional difference, the traditional hypothesis 
here is that the shorter the institutional difference between the MNE’s home country and 
operating country, the more successful the MNE will be. Modified for this study, I submit 
the following: 
The Structure/Constraints Proposition: successful firms bridge potential 
institutional distance by conforming to the operating constraints of the stakeholder. 
Finally, our stakeholder proposition is a clear reinforcement of Eden et al.’s similar call to 
disaggregate the “host country” into a series of individuals or groups that can impact that 
firm’s ability to operate, the conventional hypothesis being that firms that are accurately 
able to identify their stakeholders and their potential impact will be more successful, 
restated here as follows: 
The Stakeholder Proposition: successful firms accurately identify and manage 
those individuals or groups that can affect the firm’s ability to operate in a given 
location. 
Conclusion 
 To sum what we have learned thus far, in looking to explain MNE success in 
politically risky countries, we found specific epistemological and ontological issues with 
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the classic measure for political risk analysis, the political risk index. The index’s focus on 
the country as the unit of analysis (a) prevents us from determining the significance of 
MNE agency in the occurrence of a “risk event” in the given country and (b) misleadingly 
aggregates the country’s various stakeholders – groups and individuals that the MNE 
actually interacts with – into a “host country.” Further, because the index is by its very 
nature comparative, the standardization of variables across countries washes out the 
structural nuance to a single country, which we propose is significant for understanding 
MNE success.  
 Recognizing the need to embrace a framework that allows us to examine MNE 
agency and country structure in MNE-stakeholder interactions, we turned to the literature 
on MNE-host country relations and found the concept of the bargain, modified over the 
years from Vernon’s original “obsolescing bargain” to Eden et al.’s “political bargain” to 
be an apt approach as it embraces an epistemology focused on relationships (not the 
country) and an ontology that disaggregates the “host country” into stakeholders, each with 
their own respective resources and operating constraints which they must mobilize and 
navigate in order to achieve proximate and ultimate goals. We therefore decided to keep 
our outcome of MNE “success” – defined as MNE-stakeholder co-existence – as the 
constant dependent variable, looking instead at how our independent variables of MNE and 
stakeholder resources and constraints lead to this outcome under three general conditions in 
Kazakhstan: ArcelorMittal, a large mining MNE operating off of the country’s legacy 
Soviet-era mines and plants; Cameco, a high technology uranium miner; and Frontier 




Chapter Three: Mining in Kazakhstan: Beyond Oil and Gas 
Introduction 
 To read a contemporary text on Kazakhstan since independence is to follow the 
parallel narratives of the county’s economic and political development, what Charles M. 
Becker et al. accurately describe as the “double transition” of the country as it was exposed 
simultaneously to the international market economy and the challenges of becoming a 
politically independent state with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
145
 But within 
the double transition narrative an association has been reinforced in successive publications 
over the years between the country’s economic and political development and foreign direct 
investment in the oil and gas sector. While oil and gas no doubt play a very strong role in 
the country’s contemporary history, the focus on oil and gas has come at the expense of 
other critical narratives, of specific interest here metallurgical and coal mining. In Gregory 
Gleason’s Markets and Politics in Central Asia, his section on trade and investment in 
Kazakhstan has but a single paragraph dedicated to mining outside of oil and gas,
146
 while 
in Richard Pomfret’s The Central Asian Economies Since Independence, the author’s 
section on the “Oil, Gas and Mineral Sectors” of Kazakhstan is in fact a section on oil and 
gas development.
147
 Other volumes are wholly dedicated to the intersection of oil and gas 
development and political and economic progress, such as Sally N. Cummings’ Oil, 
Transition and Security in Central Asia, an edited volume which covers Caspian 
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developments in the immediate post-independence period,
148
 and Wojciech Ostrowski’s 
Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan, which in many ways is a follow-up to Cummings’ initial 
work, focusing in on oil’s influence in the country in the 2000s period as prices (and 
revenues) hit historical highs.
149
 The early exceptions to the overly oil and gas focused 
literature are Anne Peck’s Economic Development in Kazakhstan and Yelena 
Kalyuzhnova’s The Kazakstani Economy, two books that give the metallurgical sector is 
due coverage in the early years of independence and both of which are cited throughout this 
thesis for their coverage of the privatization process.
150
 
 Certainly there is a strong historiographical element to this oil and gas trend in the 
literature, as Kazakhstan is home to the most significant oil discoveries in the world in the 
last several decades, along with the larger global narrative on the rise of oil prices – 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union, a barrel of oil bottomed out at around USD 20 
while today the price is closer to USD 100. And factually scholars like Gleason and 
Pomfret (along with a host of others) can find solace in their focus on oil and gas when 
discussing the Kazakh economy as today these products represent the overwhelming share 
of the country’s exports (59-percent in 2011).
151
  
 But this was not always the case, and export share is not the only measure of 
significance (though it is worth noting that in 2011 the metallurgical sector had the second 
largest export share after oil products).
152
 Kazakhstan is not, for instance, Azerbaijan, 
where as far back as Marco Polo there were reports of “gushers” that in an hour produced 
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“a quantity of oil sufficient to load up one hundred vessels,”
153
 and whereby the late 
nineteenth century Baku had become “the centre of the Russian oil industry,” producing 
more oil at the time than was coming out of the United States.
154
 No, in fact when mining 
pioneer Leslie Urquhart arrived by train in East Kazakhstan to the “waving flags and 
cheering” of local workers surrounding the station in 1916, these miners were not 
producing oil and gas, but rather lead and zinc.
155
 On the eve of independence, when oil 
and gas development in the country was still in its nascent stages, for the Soviet Union the 
Kazakh SSR was responsible for 95-percent of chromite production, 60-percent of lead 
mining and 90-percent of lead smelting, 50-percent of zinc mining, over 30-percent of all 
copper mining and refining, and 10-percent of iron ore production. The SSR was also the 
third most important source of coal for the entire union (note: while coal is not a metal, this 
chapter groups coal mining in with our larger discussion on mining outside of oil and gas – 
as we will see in Chapter Four, coal mining is integral to ArcelorMittal’s steel-producing 
operations). Today, the oil-producing regions (e.g. Atyrau) of Kazakhstan have nowhere 
near the populations (508,000 people) of the mining regions like Karaganda (coal, copper, 
manganese; 1.3 million people) or East Kazakhstan (lead, zinc, gold; 1.4 million), Pavlodar 
(coal; 750,000), Aktobe (chromite; 716,000) or Kostanai (iron ore, alumina; 889,000).
156
 
While it is true, of course, that other factors contribute to the populations in these regions 
(for example, the labor-intensive role of agriculture, which is equally undeveloped within 
the scholarship on Central Asian economies), there is no mistaking the fact that the 
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predominately urban areas of these regions are clustered around mining developments, past 
or present. Contemporary narratives may think of Kazakhstan as a petro state, but the 
country’s history with mining is much deeper, much more geographically expansive, and as 
such, with a completely different set of consequences – both positive and negative – for the 
country’s double transition.  
 The intent of this chapter is to set our case studies in an historical context that places 
greater focus on the mining sector’s influence (outside of oil and gas) on the country’s 
economic and political development from the days of the Russian empire up through the 
current period. In the spirit of Özcan’s words – that the state should be recognized as an 
“historical construct shaped by a set of competing institutions and actors”
157
 – it seems fair 
to say that a consequence of research concentrated on oil and gas politics in Kazakhstan has 
perhaps led to a skewed perspective on broader relations between the private sector and 
government and each actor’s influence on the other. Other sectors – and in fact, as in 
Özcan’s case, other classes and other markets – interact with the state in different ways, and 
thus round out and add depth to how we understand the country and the actors and 
institutions within it. The role of agriculture in Kazakhstan is quite different from that of oil 
and gas, for instance, employing more Kazakhs than both the metallurgical/coal and oil and 
gas sectors combined;
158
 equally, an entrepreneur’s experience with the judicial system and 
the various governing ministries is likely to be much different from that of the oil 
executive.
159
 In this thesis, of course, we focus on the history of metallurgical/coal mining 
in the country as pretext for understanding how this history now shapes the actors and 
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institutions associated with the sector in Kazakhstan today. We begin by recounting the pre-
independence exploration and development of the mining sector under imperial Russia and 
then as a Soviet Republic, and then move into the early years of independence and 
privatization, bringing us to the present day. Note that from here on out the term “mining,” 
unless otherwise specified, will refer to mining outside of oil and gas. Further, details on 
the histories of the specific developments behind our case studies will be addressed within 
the cases themselves; this chapter instead covers more general trends in the mining industry 
across the country from the early 1900s to the present.  
 One of the more significant consequences of the conflation of oil and gas with all 
forms of mining under the rubric of “natural resources” has been the latter’s assumed role 
as an accomplice in the resource curse and rentier state literature, but the reality is that oil 
and gas, particularly in Kazakhstan, share few similarities with the metallurgical/coal 
sector. Oil and gas development in the country occurs mostly off-shore in the Caspian – 
mostly out of sight and mind to the average Kazakh – while as previously noted, many of 
the larger cities in the country (outside of Almaty, Astana and the centuries-old trading hub 
of Shymkent) are synonymous with the metallurgical/coal mining sector. In this sense 
mining outside of oil and gas is more socially and environmentally disruptive on the local 
level and plays a greater role in directly influencing (and being influenced by) local and 
regional politics across the country. The profit margins in metallurgical/coal mining are 
also slimmer than in oil and gas, meaning there is less money to spend on salaries and 
social development projects, or to go into government coffers, and as a sector, 





 As a quick example, look at two of the most significant land-based oil 
developments in the early years following independence: Kumkol near Shymkent in the 
south and Tengiz in the northwest along the Caspian shore. Pauline Jones Luong describes 
in one report the initially onerous social burdens of the Canadian company Hurricane 
Hydrocarbons, which was awarded a majority share in Kumkol in the mid-1990s:
161
 
In lieu of taxes, many foreign companies agreed to make huge capital investments in technology and 
infrastructure, as well as to pay back wages, contribute to pension funds, and build roads, schools, 
apartments, and hospitals. Hurricane Hydrocarbons, the company that eventually won the tender for 
Yuzhneftegas, is a case in point. Written into the contract was a provision requiring Hurricane to 
assume all the social obligations and economic costs of the company and surrounding area, including 
US$4 million a month in local salaries for workers (some of whom never actually existed). 
And as it regards Tengiz, she notes how the governor of Atyrau viewed the foreign 
investment as “crucial to the region’s economy,” since it employed at the time “over 3,000 
workers in the region” and provided “more than a quarter of its tax revenues.”
162
 But the 
comparisons here to the mining sector neglect the sizeable differences in scale. Take, for 
instance, ArcelorMittal’s Karmet operation, around which the city of Temirtau (“Iron 
Mountain”) was built (with a population of around 180,000), and which we will detail in 
depth in the following chapter. At the time of its privatization in 1995, Karmet employed 
over 50,000 people including 10,000 people in non-core business activities completely 
unrelated to steel production (i.e. the social obligations Jones Luong mentions above 
though on a much larger level, such as funding kindergartens, the transportation system of 
the city, farms, apartments, heating, hot water, etc.), with these social obligations alone at 
an annual cost of USD 40 million. To put this in perspective, Hurricane Hydrocarbons 
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employed around 5,000 people in total, which added to the 3,000 workers at Tengiz comes 
to 8,000 individuals – less even than the non-core employees at Karmet. And while it is true 
the Hurricane operation is near Shymkent, a major Kazakh city (but certainly not a city 
created because of the Kumkol oil field – Shymkent’s significance dates back to the days of 




 All of these variables and more interact differently with the formal and informal 
structural components of Kazakh society and have significant implications for the country’s 
ability to maintain economic and political stability. It is this history of the sector’s 
interaction with stability that serves as the underlying theme of this chapter, a critical 
pretext to understanding how successful metals mining companies today are able to 
maintain order within their area of operations in this so-called risky country.  
Mining before independence 
 In A. Nursulatov and A. Kirpota’s Gold Along the Irtysh, an early 1990s monograph 
on the history of gold mining in eastern Kazakhstan, the authors provide an apt introductory 
quote from famous Soviet writer Maxim Gorky:  
In each situation one needs to understand the history of the development. If the workers in each 
industry, and better yet, each factory, knew how it originated, how it gradually evolved and 
improved production – workers would work…with a deeper understanding and with great 
enthusiasm toward the cultural and historical significance of their effort.
164
 
 In proposing a strong structural influence on the successful MNE operating in 
Kazakhstan, we too need to understand the history behind the mining developments in the 
country, which in our case stretches back at least to the early 1900s. Perhaps the single 
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most important detail to grasp about the industry’s correlation today with Kazakhstan’s 
high population centers is that mining came first. As one executive described to me, you do 
not normally build a lead smelter with its accompanying air and water pollution at the heart 
of a city’s downtown, as is the case in Ust-Kamenogorsk.
165
 But when the smelter predates 
the city’s now 300,000 citizens, it is difficult to place the blame on the smelter.
166
  
 This concept of the “company town,” where effectively a single enterprise employs 
the entire city,
167
 is evident as early as the 1900s in the memoirs of mining pioneers such as 
John Wilford Wardell, a British metallurgical engineer, and in the papers of the 
aforementioned Leslie Urquhart, whose investment adventures in the country are neatly 
captured in historian K.H. Kennedy’s Mining Tsar. In Wardell’s In the Kirghiz Steppes, for 
instance, he describes the town of Spassky Zavod (located in present day Karaganda) in 
1914 as synonymous with the British mining company Spassky Copper Mine Ltd., noting 
that “the Company’s stores, school and hospital” lay to the east, “while the Company’s 
stables, the bazaar, the creek, and the Russian and Tatar trader’s settlement” lay to the west. 
According to Wardell the town had a population of roughly 3,000 people, two-thirds of 
which were Kazakhs, and “with the exception of a few traders,” all the male Kazakhs were 
employed by the company – around 1,500 individuals.
168
 
 During the Soviet era the one-company town was known more formally as a 
“territorial-production complex,” as V.F. Kosov and B. Ya. Dvoskin describe it, a concept 
they date to being explicitly outlined in the earliest Soviet five year plans. Defined very 
technically as an “interrelated combination of production enterprises and residential places” 
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within a restricted territory, or the “combination of urban settlements” with a “single 
production-administrative center,” the single-enterprise town would grow over the years to 
be not only a center of production but a center of social and cultural development. 
Karaganda, for instance, would become home to “more than 60 clubs and theaters, several 
palaces of culture and sport, four institutions of higher education,” along with several 




 As one can imagine, and as we will see in the section that follows on the mining 
sector in the early years of independence, the risk in tying a single industry (often focused 
on a single commodity) to a population center is in the exposure this places the town’s 
citizens to the commodity’s demand. For this reason Pomfret refers to these Kazakh towns 
in the independence era, which numbered between fifty and sixty, as “sick towns,”
170
 but 
we can see the consequences of such a dependence on the political risk management 
strategies of mining companies as early as the 1900s when Urquhart protested foreign 
investor demands to close down a particular mine site on the present day Russian-Kazakh 
border. Successfully arguing to the London board that such a measure would result in “the 
loss of thousands of jobs on which the estates’ inhabitants depended,” Urquhart’s efforts 
won him “the full respect and loyalty” of the miners, and in Kennedy’s words, “cemented 
his patriarchical authority over the district.”
171
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 Satellite imagery today underscores the significance of the territorial-production 
complex in Kazakhstan’s development – as simplified in Map 3.1, in mapping current 
geological survey data against the country’s rail infrastructure, we see a neat match in 
mining deposits and railroad track. This is, of course, no coincidence. Urquhart recounts the 
building of this original rail (at his own investment) with painstaking slowness, as does 
Wardell who paints a picture of caravans in Spassky “carrying copper ingots from the 
mines to the railway.” Beyond the linking of rail stations to key deposits during the Soviet 
era, Kosov and Dvoskin argue that because of the country’s “intermediate situation” 
between the European “part” of the USSR and the eastern regions, Kazakhstan was a 
favored country for rail development. Just as the oil and gas industry within Central Asia 
would find itself frustratingly dependent on Russia with independence as the Soviet era 
pipeline system wound its way through the center (i.e. Russia), as we will see in the section 
that follows, mining enterprises in Kazakhstan found their own export networks – rail – to 
be equally beholden to Soviet era planning.  





                                                             




 Along with the paired development of the mining enterprise and the town (and its 
associated infrastructure), a second core theme behind the mining sector in Kazakhstan 
during the Soviet era was the emphasis on production. If the literature today on Kazakhstan 
is marked by an overemphasis on oil and gas production, the same could be said for coal 
mining during the times of the Kazakh SSR. According to the 1989 historical monograph 
Karaganda, the Karaganda coal basin was relied upon as early as the 1930s as the “coal 
base” of the Soviet Union after, as legend had it, a local shepherd discovered in a marmot 
burrow “fragments of black, heavy stones glistening in the sun,” upon which being “thrown 
into the fire, they burned with a bright flame.” As the author notes, the “rumor of an 
unusual burning black stone flew across the steppe,”
173
 with output increasing by a factor of 
six from 1940 to 1970.
174
  
 Coal, as would later become oil and gas, was the lifeblood of energy during the 
majority of the Soviet era, with Kazakhstan responsible for fueling coal-fired power 
stations that provided electricity not only to the republic (and its high energy requirements 
for other metallurgical production) but also to neighboring SSRs. Soviet era monographs 
such as Wake Up the Cultural and Technical Level of the Workers of the Coal Industry of 
Kazakhstan (1965) or Coal Riches of Kazakhstan (1971) or The Problem of Increasing the 
Economic Efficiency of the Karaganda Coal Basin or Ways to Improve the Organization of 
Production and Labor in Coal Mines
175
 were all focused on meeting the demands of Soviet 
economic planners which defined “the main task of the economic development” of the 
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Kazakh SSR to be coal production. According to Anne Peck, as independence approached, 
Kazakhstan was the third most important source of coal for the entire USSR, producing the 
lowest-cost coal in the entire union.
176
  
 But the emphasis on mining production went beyond coal, with iron ore producers 
in the northwestern city of Kostanai arguing that their advances in production represented 
“one of the brightest pages of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people,”
177
 and the 
development of the gold sector in the aforementioned Gold Along the Irtysh described as 
going hand in hand with the “revolutionary struggle” of “Soviet power.”
178
 Production was 
patriotic, and Kazakh miners were “often leading patriotic initiative” in their development 
of the metallurgical sector in the SSR.
179
  
 This system of economic development through increased production within the 
framework of a series of single-enterprise cities or towns spread across the country was 
essentially Kazakhstan as it existed when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (and as 
foreign investors would soon after find it). Each enterprise represented the intersection of 
the interests of ministry leadership in Moscow concerned with production targets and those 
of the local Communist Party, which viewed the enterprise as a resource for employment 
and social and cultural development.
180
 According to Yelena Kalyuzhnova, the 
consequence of economic leadership from Moscow was not just a “vertical dependency, but 
also a psychological one, where enterprise managers were unable to make independent 
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 As a social resource, full employment was an expectation despite seemingly 
contradictory efficiency initiatives at production sites, with every local promised a house or 
apartment of their own.
182
 In fact, according to Kalyuzhnova, if we use the metric of gross 
social product as an indicator of quality of life, the mining centers of the Kazakh SSR come 
out as the clear socio-economic winners in the republic: Karaganda in first place, Pavlodar 
and East Kazakhstan in third and fourth, and Kostanai coming in sixth. In terms of per 
capita income as a percentage of the Kazakh SSR average in 1990 (1935 rubles), 
Karaganda scores at roughly 120-percent, with East Kazakhstan and Pavlodar both above 
average as well. Kostanai comes in at 97-percent.
183
 
 Along with the enterprise’s dependence on Moscow leadership and Russia-centric 
export infrastructure, and the local community’s social welfare dependence on the 
enterprise, the territorial-production complex as a concept led to an overall dependence on 
the Soviet command economy, in which stages of production paid little deference to SSR 
borders. In 1987, more than 80-percent of ferrous metals trade for the Kazakh SSR was 
with Russia,
184
 the SSR was so integrated into the USSR that only 27-percent of what it 
produced it could do so on its own,
185
 and roughly 70-percent of all machinery required for 
the coal industry, 80-percent of the machinery for non-ferrous metallurgy and 90-percent of 
the machinery for ferrous metallurgy came from outside of the Kazakh SSR.
186
 In the 
section that follows, we see in the immediate independence period what happens to the one-
company town – and the community dependent on it – when Moscow leadership is 
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removed, Russian customers cannot afford Kazakh exports, and the machinery support 
services in the neighboring SSRs collapse.  
Independence 
 The post-independence literature on mining in Kazakhstan centers on the decade 
immediately following independence in which the majority of state-owned enterprises were 
privatized. Interpretations of this period, not surprisingly, rest largely on perspective. For 
those concerned with transparency and corruption (the political track of the “double 
transition”), the 1990s represent the “most corrupt stage”
 187
 in the country’s history, 
marked by “a sense of casino or crony capitalism”
 188
 that undermined “the institutional 
quality of the economy.”
 189
 For others focused on investment opportunities (i.e. the 
economic track), the narrative is one of “competent management” within government, 
especially the banks, which boosted “foreign investors’ confidence,”
190
 and wherein 




 Broadly defined, to “transit” is to move from one “state” to another, and thus it 
follows that a transition period would end with the arrival at the new “state,” however 
defined. Economists often use GDP as a generic metric for the end of the transitionary 
period – for example, with regard to the Republic of Kazakhstan, when the country reached 
and surpassed its 1991 Kazakh SSR level of GDP.
 
This occurred in 2003, and in a similar 
vein we can point to other critical economic milestones that happened around the same time 
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– such as, for instance, the March 2002 decision by the US Department of Commerce to 
revise Kazakhstan’s status to one of “market economy,” making it the first former Soviet 
Union state to receive such standing.
192
  
 Of course the disparity in the “double transition” interpretations highlights the fact 
that the transition period is significant to different actors in different ways, and depending 
on which metric one chooses to follow, the status of the country’s transition even today 
remains highly variable. We must recognize, however, that while an economist may point 
to March 2002 or 2003 as the end point in the country’s transition, for Kazakhstan’s leader 
the end of the “first trial” in the country’s new history came in 1997, when Nazarbayev 
argued that Kazakhstan had “safely emerged from the abyss of chaos and disorder” of a 
transition period defined not by GDP or corruption but by stability. “At present,” he 
announced to the country in October of 1997 in his now famous speech commonly referred 
to as the 2030 plan, “we pass over to the stage of stabilization.”
193
 To Nazarbayev, the 
dominating narrative of the 1990s was the return to stability, with the end of the first stage 
of the country’s full transition being when life went from getting worse to getting better – 
to him the year 1997, which is roughly the same time at which the privatization period 
ended. It is from this perspective – the return to stability – in which we approach the 
contemporary history of mining in the country, a necessary prerequisite as we later attempt 
to identify and understand in our cases the goals of Kazakh stakeholders today as they 
relate to the mining multinational. 
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 With independence the mining community quickly came to realize the local 
vulnerabilities of the industry’s “complicated connections among enterprises often 
hundreds of miles apart”
194
 paired with the fact that the enterprises themselves were 
unnaturally buoyed by supply and demand curves dictated from a center (i.e. Moscow) that 
no longer existed. Debts to other CIS countries mounted (they would eventually peak at 4 
times that of CIS debts to Kazakhstan),
195
 a higher and higher percentage of machinery and 
equipment operating at double its standard lifecycle became obsolete with no hard currency 
to buy replacements,
196
 and enterprises found themselves to be over employed by as much 
as a factor of two.
197
 By the mid-1990s, production of Kazakhstan’s key minerals had 
declined to a level that was only a fraction of output when the country became independent. 
Recall, for instance, that 95-percent of all the chromite for the Soviet Union came from the 
Kazakh SSR – by 1996, chromite production was at 34-percent of 1992 levels. Copper 
production bottomed in 1995 at 55.7-percent of 1992 levels, refined lead in 1996 at 27-
percent of 1992 levels, refined zinc in 1995 at 65-percent, and iron ore and coal failed to 
recover fully until after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, producing at 48.3-
percent and 56.7-percent of 1992 levels, respectively, in 1999.
198
  
 As one would expect, the quality of life in these one-company towns mirrored 
production decline. The construction of housing, schools and nursery homes “practically 
stopped,”
199
 wage arrears amounted to the point where workers would go for months 
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 and basic services such as heat and electricity became sporadic, particularly 
poignant during the harsh winter months.
201
 Budget resources at the national level in 1993 
were at 50-percent the level in 1991, health care and education deteriorated rapidly,
202
 and 




 Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the state’s actions in the mid-1990s to turn these 
mining enterprises over to foreign investors was initially “greeted with enthusiasm for the 
promise it provided in reviving the local economy,” with newspaper headlines like 
“Privatization Brings Stability” describing the significance of the process.
204
 As 
Nazarbayev would note in his 1997 speech, quoting a Kazakh proverb, “he who knows not 
what tightness is will never rejoice space,” and with the sale of the key mining sectors to 
foreign investors, investment would return and production would begin to rise again, albeit 
faster in some areas than others. Increasing living standards would follow. 
 The dichotomy in the literature describing these years as everything from the 
“stealing” of the state
205
 to the “course towards” stability
206
 is important to address 
explicitly because it underscores the mismatch in perspectives on the condition of 
Kazakhstan in the 1990s. The common criticism of the mining sector privatization process 
is that a handful of largely unknown foreign investors retained monopoly-level ownership 
of the country’s key mining sectors for almost nothing. Importantly, a rebuttal of this view 
rejects none of the presuppositions, but rather their negative connotations. 
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 As Leonid Grigoriev and Asem Nusupova remind us, though Kazakhstan had 
significant mining assets, as a wholly new country to outside investors, without any sort of 
credit history, the necessary level of return on a particular project would need to be 
exceptional to attract investors with an average appetite for risk.
207
 They refer here to a 
more technical aspect of mining investment that we will address briefly because it is 
significant for understanding not only this time period but Kazakhstan today. Under normal 
circumstances, when a mining analyst at an investment bank in say Toronto or London 
evaluates the strength of a mining company, the very basic method is to determine what it 
currently costs to produce, for instance, a pound of copper at the mine site and compare that 
to the current and expected future market price of copper. That margin (assuming there is a 
margin) is then downgraded by a risk premium (X-percent), which is essentially where the 
political risk variable comes into play. In the mid-1990s, copper was trading at between 
USD 0.75 / lbs and 1.25 / lbs, which was considerably low. So at the time of privatization, 
not only was production in Kazakhstan highly inefficient (recall that mining enterprises 
tended to be over employed and with exceptionally out of date machinery), but the country 
had no history from which mining analysts (and by extension, investors) could set a risk 
premium. Add to this the fact that the price of copper was already incredibly low, 
shortening any potential margins that would be further shortened by a large risk premium. 
 Stated bluntly, Kazakhstan in the 1990s was not a viable investment environment 
for the typical institutional investor, and as such, the idea that only largely unknown foreign 
investors would be drawn to the Kazakh market is not all that outrageous – these are the 
investors willing to take on significant risk. As Pomfret notes, even for these risk-taking 
firms, “initial euphoria at making bargain purchases was quickly tempered by operational 
                                                             
207 Grigoriev and Nusupova (2004) 
100 
 
difficulties, hidden commitments, and concern about the state’s ability to recontract.”
208
 
The truth is that the Kazakh government was hardly in a position to set a high purchase 
price for these enterprises, particularly if the government set as a requirement specific 
production and investment quotas (including social investments) – which it did – to ensure 
that these single enterprise towns came back to life. Further complicating the investment 
climate (and the government’s bargaining position) was the unreliable electricity 
production that plagued most of the country.  
 To highlight with a brief example that is not one of our specific cases, electronics 
manufacturer Samsung was invited in 1995 to manage the largest copper producing 
enterprise in the republic, an agreement that over the years would expand into ownership of 
almost all of the copper-based enterprises in the country. Known today as Kazakhmys, the 
firm was required to meet strict production quotas while settling all existing debts 
(hundreds of USD million) and investing over USD 1 billion into the enterprises and their 
associated communities.
209
 At a time when the country was receiving almost no hard 
currency, Kazakhmys was contributing on average USD 100 million per year in taxes to the 
central budget, and according to Anne Peck, the firm was responsible for as much as 40-
percent of the regional budget of Karaganda oblast. In other words, the oblast that back on 
the eve of independence had the highest gross social product and per capita income in all of 
Kazakhstan, was now heavily supported by a South Korean multinational electronics 
manufacturer. Under Kazakhmys, copper production increased rapidly (roughly 56-percent 
of 1992 levels in 1995 compared with 70-percent and then 88-percent in successive years) 
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and at a fraction of the original cost (the multinational had reduced production costs per 
pound of copper by close to 40-percent).
210
 
 Was this process shrouded in corruption? Highly likely. Certainly key elites with 
close ties to Nazarbayev somehow managed to have small but significant minority stakes in 
the agreement (initially Samsung owned a 40-percent stake and the Kazakh government a 
35-percent stake, leaving 25-percent of the company for unidentified individuals; Samsung 
has since sold its controlling share). According to one mining analyst covering the Kazakh 
market, when Kazakhmys chairman Vladimir Kim sold 58.9 million shares of the company 
in 2010 – an 11-percent stake – to Samruk-Kazyna (the state’s sovereign wealth fund), only 
some of that USD 1.3 billion likely went back to him:
211
 
Analyst: Let’s be frank…we know that [the money] was cashed into someone’s pocket. 
Question: So your impression is that the money doesn’t go to Kim, it goes to someone else? 
Analyst: Yes. 
Question: For whom do you think? 
Analyst: For the top person in command [i.e. President Nazarbayev]. Samruk said [to us], “We were 
told to buy this stake. We don’t even know what to do with it.”  
 And further, not all of those required “social investments” are realized in actual 
projects, such as the USD 130 million on a national library in the country’s capital of 
Astana,
212
 announced in 2010 that as of 2012 has yet to be built. As the same mining 
analyst explained, when outside investors asked to see the library (“Look, we spent USD 
130 million on this library – let’s see this library”), the analyst had to explain that there was 
no library, at least so far (although even if a library was eventually built, the analyst 
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wondered aloud to me, “how much does a library cost? 10 [million]?”). “This is the price of 
doing business,” the analyst was forced to admit to the investors.
213
  
 In fact according to the extractive industries watchdog NGO Global Witness, 
Kazakhmys’ entire history is marked with corrupt practices closely associated with Kazakh 
leadership, referring to Kim as a “frontman” for the regime and to others in leadership 
positions as “unofficial” advisors to the President Nazarbayev.
214
 The Kazakhmys rebuttal? 
According to one mining executive familiar with the company’s operations, of course 
Kazakhmys is close to the Kazakh government. In line with Grigoriev and Nusupova’s 
contextual reminder that the Kazakh business environment in the 1990s was incredibly 
risky, as this executive relayed to me, a mining firm as large as Kazakhmys is so exposed to 
the country’s politics that it has no choice other than to become intimately involved with 
leadership. In this vein, as the executive explained, what Global Witness considers to be 
negative (e.g. Nazarbayev’s brother serving on the Kazakhmys board) is in many ways 
what mining management and mining analysts in London or Toronto would consider to be 
clear positives – confirmed in a separate interview with a mining analyst that focuses on 
Kazakhmys, who when asked about the company’s close relationship with the government, 
explained, “it’s the only way to do it.”
215
 
 The question we have to ask, therefore, particularly if our intent here is to determine 
the interests of local stakeholders surrounding a firm like Kazakhmys, is if these 
stakeholders in, for instance, Karaganda, actually care about the corruption? About Kim’s 
USD 1.3 billion cash-in and the Library That Doesn’t Exist? These questions are closely 
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related to the controversy surrounding Nazarbayev’s popularity with the populace despite 
his significant consolidation of power. Critically, for instance, Petrov and Gafarly argue 
that the Kazakh people sincerely voted for the 1995 constitution (which increased 
Nazarbayev’s power at the expense of the parliament) “in the interests of preserving 
stability,” specifically noting strong support for the referendum in the mining communities 
in contrast to resistance from both the parliament and the local akims who were largely 
against Nazarbayev’s privatization strategy (a component of which was the proposed 
constitutional changes).
216
 In line with Nazarbayev, the presidents of these enterprises were 
also supportive of the constitution because they too believed it to be pro-business 
(stemming from a specific clause granting private property rights) and since the workers in 
these one company towns attributed any shred of stability to the enterprise’s leadership, 
they too went along with the new constitution.
217
 Fast forward to today and Kazakhmys 
employs 61,000 people in the country, represents 2-percent of the country’s GDP, provides 
electricity to 20-percent of the Kazakh market for electricity outside of the company’s own 
needs, and in 2010 alone spent USD 70 million on social development projects (if we 
subtract the USD 130 million library).
218
 In a 2008 speech on corporate social 
responsibility, Nazarbayev specifically singled out Kazakhmys for its “development of 
social facilities, including schools, medical and pre-school institutions, rehabilitation 
centers, disabled persons’ rehabilitation centers, as well as culture and sports faculties.”  
 In this light, certainly one could argue that the reignition of the social welfare model 
of the one company town by these foreign investors was a much more compelling interest 
of local stakeholders than specifics on Vladimir Kim’s share in the firm and whether or not 
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his payout went back to the Nazarbayev regime (or the handful of similar instances of 
seemingly corrupt activity). Anecdotally, when I would bring up Nazarbayev’s tenure as 
president in the local pubs or cafes in these mining towns, almost reflexively the patrons 
would cite the harsh period of the 1990s and how Nazarbayev was able to turn their 
particular town around. Whether or not we can extend this anecdote across cases – and 
across stakeholders – is to be examined in this thesis, but clearly the desire for socio-
economic stability appears to be a primary goal of these single mining enterprise 
communities. 
Kazakhstan Today 
 Following Nazarbayev’s 1997 speech – in which variants of the word “stability” 
were mentioned over thirty times – the country would experience a shock to its growingly 
globalized economic system with the advent of the Asian financial crisis, but it weathered 
the incident rather successfully according to most accounts,
219
 and then with the turn of the 
century came the spike in commodity prices (in metals too – not just oil and gas) and 
subsequent GDP growth at roughly 10-percent on average from 2000 to 2008.
220
 In 2003 
alone, 80-percent of all FDI to Central Asia went to Kazakhstan, attracting the most foreign 
investment of any country in the CIS in that year. And between 2001 and 2005, the country 
halved the number of people living under the subsistence level and suffering from hunger 
(achieving Millennium Development Goal Targets 1 and 2).
221
 In response to the most 
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recent financial crisis, in 2008 the country created the previously mentioned Samruk-
Kazyna, the country’s sovereign wealth fund and national investment enterprise, initially 
provided with USD 10 billion to assist in the crisis recovery efforts. Gradually, government 
shares in major enterprises were transferred over to Samruk-Kazyna for management, with 
wholly owned subsidiary Tau-Ken Samruk in charge of most government mining stakes 
outside of oil, gas and uranium (to be discussed at length in Chapter Five, Kazatomprom, 




 As the country’s economic performance has increased, Nazarbayev has continued to 
consolidate his power. Since re-election in 1999 in which he banned the only significant 
competitor from running for office, the president has ruled largely unchallenged, with 
successive elections in 2005 and 2011 in which he won an overwhelming majority of the 
vote (again, none of these contests have been deemed free and fair by outside observers).
223
 
The formal governance structure in Kazakhstan today is highly concentrated in the 
executive from the capital in Astana down to the local districts. The president appoints all 
oblast (province) akims (governors), who in turn appoint district and city/town level 
akims.
224
 And while technically the parliament is tasked with legislative responsibilities, in 
practice almost all legislation originates in the ministries. Of specific significance to the 
mining industry, the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies is responsible for the 
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provision and regulation of all subsoil leases for mining companies outside of oil and 
gas.
225
 The significance of these stakeholders (and others) and their formal and informal 
goals, resources and constraints will be developed throughout our cases.  
Conclusion 
 There are several histories to Kazakhstan, each with its own theme. Within the 
mining sector outside of oil and gas, the organizing principle of the “territorial-production 
complex” or the “one company town” emerges as the clear unit of analysis for studying the 
intersection of political and economic development across Kazakhstan’s history, from its 
status as a frontier of the Russian empire, to a key production SSR during the Soviet Union, 
to the country’s current standing as the independent Republic of Kazakhstan. When we 
propose that “structure matters,” and hypothesize that successful MNEs in Kazakhstan 
bridge the difference “between the regulatory, cognitive and normative institutional 
environments” 
226
 of the MNE’s home country and that of Kazakhstan, we can begin to see 
through the single enterprise town how social stability and economic stability are 
inextricably linked, and as we now progress into our cases, we will see how this emphasis 
on stability manifests itself in the bargains brokered between the MNE and its stakeholders.  
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Chapter Four: Moving Iron Mountains: Maintaining Resource 
Complementarities in Temirtau 
Introduction 
 On July 3, 2000, President Nazarbayev and ArcelorMittal CEO Lakshmi Mittal 
celebrated together the 40
th
 anniversary of the No. 1 blast furnace at the Karaganda 
metallurgical combine (Karmet) in Temirtau, Kazakhstan. Back in 1960 the blast furnace 
marked a key step in Karmet becoming a fully integrated metallurgical enterprise, and 
notably Karmet was also where President Nazarbayev first worked.
227
 With the No. 1 blast 
furnace up and running, the town of Iron Mountain (“Temirtau” in Kazakh) would soon 
become synonymous with steel and coal production across the Soviet Union – at the time of 
independence, Karmet was one of the largest steel mills in the world, representing 10-
percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP.
228
 
 At the 40
th
 anniversary jubilee, Nazarbayev recalled the poor state of Karmet back 
in 1995 when it was sold to ArcelorMittal. “We made no mistake when selecting our 
investor,” he said to the gathered crowd, noting that Karmet was all but bankrupt at the time 
and suffering from serious disrepair. Mittal followed up on Nazarbayev’s words, explaining 
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that since 1995 the multinational had invested USD 650 million into the combine and 
planned an additional USD 600 million over the next five years.
229
  
 True to Nazarbayev’s memory, in 1995 finished steel production in Kazakhstan was 
less than half of 1992 levels,
230
 though by the time of the jubilee, Karmet under 
ArcelorMittal was providing steel to 65 countries worldwide, and in Kazakhstan it was the 
largest consumer of equipment on the domestic market – not to mention the employer of 
55,000 people.
231
 Further, by 2005 Kazakhstan was a top ten coal producer in the world, 
first in the CIS by per capita coal production, and with reserves accounting for 4-percent of 
the world’s total coal reserves. About one-quarter of that 4-percent – that is, 1-percent of 
global reserves – was under the ownership of ArcelorMittal in Kazakhstan, which through a 
series of acquisitions over the years under the continued leadership of CEO Lakshmi Mittal 
would become the largest steel producing multinational in the world.
232
  
 By the Kazakh government’s own measure, ArcelorMittal’s almost two decade long 
presence in Kazakhstan is considered a success. A 2011 brochure published by the Foreign 
Investors’ Council (FIC), a public-private forum chaired and initiated by President 
Nazarbayev “to promote direct dialogue between the Government of Kazakhstan and 
foreign investors,” named ArcelorMittal one of ten “success stories” for foreign investors in 
the country.
233
 That is not to say, however, that success in Kazakhstan came easy for 
ArcelorMittal. This chapter proceeds by examining the bargains formed and managed by 
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the multinational with critical stakeholders during three distinct phases: the privatization of 
Karmet from 1995 to 1997, the commodities boom from the early 2000s up until the global 
financial crisis (2002-2007), and then during the financial crisis itself (2008-2009). In doing 
so, we begin to understand how achieving resource complementarities between 
stakeholders (not the “host country”) leads to multinational success, as expected, but that 
the process is active, subjective and dynamic, shaped by outside constraints, and can at 
times be cooperative and resting on interdependence while at other times be conflictual and 
based on the balance of power. We also begin to see evidence that in some instances, 
adapting to the structural components of the domestic environment can actually increase a 
firm’s exposure to political risks, contrary to what the existing scholarship would suggest.  
Privatization: 1995-1997 
 In unfolding the privatization of Karmet, it becomes clear that a necessary 
component of understanding political risk is firm agency – many of the early so-called 
“failures” of the Karmet privatization process can be attributed at least partially to the 
initial foreign firms’ own actions before the Kazakh government finally found “success” 
with ArcelorMittal. In these failures we also begin to understand how resource 
complementarity is inherently subjective – dependent not only on how stakeholders value 
corresponding, potentially complementary resources (what Eden et al. call resource 
valuation
234
) but also how the stakeholder self-values its own resources. It is not only about 
being attracted to the other stakeholder’s available resources, but about valuing your own 
resources to a degree in which the “trade” is perceived as balanced. In the case of Karmet’s 
privatization, it becomes clear that firms (and their stakeholders) need to work actively to 
find this congruence in resource valuation. 
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Early Failures Followed by Success 
 There are very few secondary source analyses of the failed privatization efforts of 
Karmet in the mid-1990s before the combine was finally awarded to ArcelorMittal. Those 
researchers that do cover these failures tend to place the blame on the host country, 
describing the process as yet another data point in “the list of negative examples of 
transitional governments,” with failure a result of the government’s “mishandling” of the 
situation.
 235
 Others ignore some failures altogether, such as Peck’s brief analysis of the 
process that claims the initial contract was awarded to US Steel, when in fact the first failed 
privatization of Karmet was actually under a joint venture led by an Austrian firm.
236
 In 
review of the details surrounding the experiences of foreign firms prior to ArcelorMittal, 
we see a very different story than simple government “mishandling” of the situation.  
 By 1995, thousands of Karmet employees had gone without pay for months, critical 
infrastructure was in a state of significant decay and the enterprise owed hundreds of 
millions of US dollars to a variety of public and private debtors, including to the cash-
starved Kazakh government’s central budget.
237
 “The benefit of the Soviet plan was that 
when these people were working in the plant, producing 50 million tonnes per year in coal, 
they didn’t have any problems with sales, with the market – no problems with pricing,” and 
of course that all changed with independence, as one director within ArcelorMittal explains. 
In those first few years, “we almost lost Karmet,” he notes. “This is a city-based plant – if 
we lose, the city disappears.”
238
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 The government recognized the need for immediate foreign investment – “to find a 
professional metallurgist company”
239
 – and decided to privatize Karmet under a 
management contract scheme typical in the privatization process of large assets within 
Kazakhstan at the time. The concept of the management contract often involved some sort 
of up-front payment on the part of the foreign firm to settle legacy debts, with a promise to 
reignite stagnant production levels while following a series of scheduled capital 
investments into the enterprise. In return the foreign firm would receive a percentage of any 
profits and retain the option to buy a sizeable share of the enterprise at any moment (if not 
outright ownership). In practice, the management contract was a way for interested foreign 
firms to conduct their own internal audit of the asset in advance of making any larger 
investment decisions,
240
 but of course the reverse was also true – the contract period 
provided a “testing out” phase for the Kazakh government with a potential long-term 
foreign investor. 
 On May 19, 1995, a 5-year management contract for Karmet was awarded to the 
First Alpine JV, a consortium of Voest Alpine Intertrading (an Austrian firm), Butya (a 
Kazakh company), and an unidentified Canadian consulting company. The contract was 
annulled within less than a month, due seemingly to a combination of firm inactivity and a 
government decision to go with a more established (and capable) partner. One of the main 
conditions of the contract was an immediate injection of USD 40 million into Karmet and 
to its debtors (primarily the government), which First Alpine repeatedly failed to pay 
despite a series of warnings.
241
 At the same time, a consortium led by US Steel had been 
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developing its own bid for Karmet, which the government found considerably more 
attractive, and thus when the final First Alpine payment deadline passed without the USD 
40 million transfer, the contract was annulled and a new management deal was struck with 
US Steel – a 10-year management contract with the following conditions:
 242
  
(1) meet a series of production targets;  
(2) settle all direct and indirect debts to the state budget over the course of the year; 
settle all other debts over 2.5 years (approx. USD 286 million);  
(3) implement and execute a 10-year investment plan in industrial improvements worth 
approx. USD 1 billion; and  
(4) maintain all current social obligations of the combine under the previously 
explained “territorial-production complex” or “one company town” structure – an 
estimated 10,000 employees at an annual cost of USD 40 million all in non-core 
business activities, specifically the operation and maintenance of: 
a. 36,000 residential apartments and a series of hotels; 
b. at least 25 kindergartens (some estimates as high as 80); 
c. seven industrial farms; 
d. a garment factory; 
e. a sanitarium and several medical clinics; 
f. a skating rink and stadium; and  
g. the Temirtau bus / tram transportation system  
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 A radio report on the Kazakh Radio First Programme in Almaty that August 
provided a window into why by October of that same year the Karmet contract would be 
annulled yet again. Along with significant production issues, according to the reporter US 
Steel had yet “to resolve the metallurgists’ social problems,” specifically noting that the 
“promise to pay off the workers’ wages” – arrears in the amount of USD 32 million – had 
not been fulfilled.
243
 Just months afterward, Karmet was renationalized by the Kazakh 
government, specifically citing a failure to meet immediate financial obligations 
(apparently investing only USD 5 million of an expected 50 million) and a failure to 
increase production (allegedly after the four month period, production was still 10 to 15-
percent short of mandated targets).
244
  
 Moving very quickly, ArcelorMittal signed a management contract for Karmet that 
same October and by November offered to buy the enterprise outright, “the biggest outright 
sell-off in Kazakhstan since independence in 1991,” according to the law firm hired to 
advise ArcelorMittal on the deal, Baker & McKenzie.
245
 The multinational committed to an 
immediate USD 50 million payment in debts to the Kazakh government and USD 10 
million in wage arrears to the Karmet employees during the short management phase,
246
 
along with a purchase price of approximately USD 450 million and an investment 
guarantee of USD 500 million over five years.
247
 Critically, however, ArcelorMittal was 
able to unload many of the pre-existing social commitments onto the local Kazakh 
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government. “If the company had struck the deal one week earlier,” it was reported at the 
time, it “would have bought a whole city.”
248
  
Explaining Failure (and Success) 
 How do we account for ArcelorMittal’s initial success? And the failure of First 
Alpine and US Steel? And why was ArcelorMittal able to negotiate better terms than US 
Steel in shedding significant non-core assets?  
 The first rather obvious point to understand is that ArcelorMittal paid. First Alpine, 
US Steel and ArcelorMittal all agreed to their own separate debt repayment schedules that 
began with an immediate cash injection to the Kazakh state budget, yet only ArcelorMittal 
made good on that payment. In First Alpine’s case, the JV simply could not get the money 
together – the Austrian banks behind Voest Alpine Intertrading refused to offer credit 
guarantees to the JV in the absence of an in-depth audit; the bankers were also uneasy with 
the system of barter payments that was typical at the time in the former Soviet Union as 
enterprises transitioned out of the command economy,
249
 as in, “we give you coal, you give 
us TV sets,” as described to me by one Karmet director.
250
 US Steel, alternately, seems to 
have actively decided not to pay. Though the multinational remained largely silent as the 
contract was annulled, at the time the firm noted publically that the combine’s actual debts 
were much larger than it had been led on to believe.
251
  
 In both cases the firms had choices (agency) and their decisions clearly influenced 
the behavior of the Kazakh government. The First Alpine JV signed up for a series of 
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financial commitments before it had received sufficient guarantees from creditors – or in 
the words of the same Karmet director who remembers the early privatization attempt, 
“people were showing us foreign papers, that they were rich, and promising that they would 
make [Temirtau] flourish, yet [we found out later] with false guarantees from banks.”
252
 US 
Steel, on the other hand, decided the asset was not worth the investment and decided not to 
pay. ArcelorMittal, alternately, paid immediately, and but a month later offered to buy the 
asset outright under conditions more favorable than past suitors. It seems, therefore, that 
some sort of reputational effect must be considered: whereas the behavior of First Alpine 
and US Steel led to negative government action, the behavior of ArcelorMittal led to 
positive government action.  
 Though First Alpine and US Steel were both unsuccessful in Kazakhstan, there is a 
significant difference between these two firms that calls into question an expectation of 
Eden et al.’s PBM. Unlike US Steel (and for that matter, ArcelorMittal), the First Alpine JV 
included a Kazakh partner: Butya, a company responsible for a series of commercial 
shopping centers in Kazakhstan owned by a Kazakh named Bulat Abilov. According to 
Eden et al., Butya’s presence within the JV should increase First Alpine’s chances of 
success. They argue that when a foreign firm enters into a given country, the multinational 
suffers from a “liability of foreignness,” which causes the government to treat the firm like 
an outsider without legitimate status. Foreign firms can overcome this legitimacy deficit, 
they believe, by developing partnerships with local firms
253
 – in our situation, for example, 
the Kazakh company Butya.  
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 But Butya’s value in the First Alpine JV is highly questionable. Abilov was 
considered a member of the Kazakh elite back in the early 1990s, described in Sally 
Cummings’ Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite as an “influential person with prospects” and 
a leader within an early opposition movement in Kazakhstan known as the Novoe 
Pokolenie (“New Generation”).
254
 Prior to the privatization of large assets like Karmet, 
light industry privatization schemes in Kazakhstan were based off of a vouchers system in 
which Kazakh citizens were granted vouchers by the government that they could then apply 
toward owning shares in enterprises up for privatization. The idea was that ownership of 
the enterprises would be turned over to the people, though as Martha Brill Olcott notes, by 
1994 Bulat Abilov curiously gained 10-percent of all vouchers printed in the country, 
making him “by far the largest single actor in the second stage [i.e. the light industry stage] 
of privatization.”
255
 By December of that year – just 6 months away from Abilov’s JV 
winning the ArcelorMittal management contract – Abilov along with a handful of other 
“investment private fund” leaders (the term Sally Cummings uses to identify those 
individuals that managed to gain an exceptionally high number of vouchers) formed Novoe 
Pokolenie with the demand that the government put up the larger enterprises for tender – in 
fact Cummings herself notes Karmet as an example of such an enterprise raised by the 
opposition group.
256
 Just months later Abilov would get exactly what he wanted in being 
awarded the Karmet management contract as a partner within the First Alpine JV.  
 Domestic legitimacy? Perhaps, but at what cost? Critically, neither Abilov’s Butya 
nor Voest Alpine Trading had any previous experience in coal and iron ore mining or steel 
production. At the very minimum, therefore, it seems clear that Eden et al.’s emphasis on 
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domestic legitimacy, while possibly valuable, did not supersede more pressing concerns in 
Kazakhstan such as the ability to bring up production levels or settle significant 
government debts. But Abilov himself was (and continues to be) a controversial figure 
within Kazakh elite politics, further questioning his ability to provide “legitimacy” to the 
JV. His role in forming Novoe Pokolenie – a direct reaction to Nazarbayev’s handling of 
privatization in the early 1990s – would evolve into a greater role as a leading opposition 
figure in a country that is not known for its plurality. Today Abilov is the chairman of Azat, 
an opposition party in Kazakhstan that he established and one that aligned itself in 2009 
with the All National Social Democratic Party, a “radical opposition party in the sense that 
it opposes the government and the president outright.”
257
 Abilov’s Azat, for instance, 
boycotted the 2011 presidential elections.
258
 Butya’s situation affirms for us the 
significance of nuance – partnering with a local firm is no guarantor of “domestic 
legitimacy,” particularly in a country like Kazakhstan wherein elite associations carry 
significant political liability.  
 The very fact that the First Alpine JV was succeeded by two wholly non-Kazakh 
multinationals also indicates that domestic legitimacy must be reconciled with stakeholder 
goals. The impetus behind the privatization of Karmet was to bring in foreign capital and 
technology in order to transition the combine out of the command economy and integrate it 
into the international market economy. In other words, domestic legitimacy was the 
opposite of what the Kazakh government wanted at the time – Karmet needed foreign 
legitimacy. Again, this underscores the significance of nuance.  
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 ArcelorMittal’s initial success, however, is deeper than simply paying when First 
Alpine and US Steel could not (or would not) or the fact that it provided foreign legitimacy 
(which US Steel also provided). The multinational’s decision to pay immediately is 
representative of the firm’s larger effort to actively find resource complementarities with 
Kazakh stakeholders. Recalling the bargaining framework, each actor enters into a bargain 
that represents the intersection of the actors’ goals, resources and constraints. A significant 
component of success is resource complementarity – “I have what you need, I need what 
you have.” ArcelorMittal’s available resources were not all that different than US Steel’s 
available resources, yet somehow ArcelorMittal was successful: both firms offered capital, 
technology and market entry in return for access, cheap labor and geostrategic position (i.e. 
next door to China, a leading consumer of steel). ArcelorMittal recognized, however, that 
Kazakhstan’s resource deficits (i.e. what the country needed) existed on a spectrum of need. 
As was made clear in the First Alpine case and to a lesser extent with US Steel, settling 
government debts was the government’s clear overriding priority. First Alpine’s contract 
was annulled within a month – hardly enough time to turn around production (even if it was 
clear that this would be difficult given the JV’s lack of experience), but plenty of time to 
settle USD 40 million in debts. US Steel, alternatively, seemingly made the calculation that 
Kazakhstan’s resources were not worth the investment.  
 ArcelorMittal, however, was able to shift the resource calculus altogether. 
According to ArcelorMittal CEO Lakshmi Mittal, before he took over Karmet, Nazarbayev 
“sat down with me and we discussed the steel business for several hours. He wanted to 





 Of specific importance was an agreement not to layoff any workers (aside through 
attrition), settle wage arrears and to ensure suppliers (and budgets) were paid regularly.
260
 
No mention of production and no mention of the significant non-core assets. 
 It seems as if the firm paid particular attention to understanding how its primary 
stakeholder – the Kazakh central government – prioritized its own resource deficits and 
therefore conversely how the government in turn valued ArcelorMittal’s resources. “The 
value of each party’s resources is measured,” Eden et al. explain, “not by its owner’s 
evaluation, but by the other party’s desire for those resources.”
261
 Certainly this seems to be 
the case between ArcelorMittal and the Kazakh government, and it begins to explain why, 
for instance, ArcelorMittal was able to unload many of the combine’s non-core assets. 
Though maintaining the social responsibilities inherent in the concept of the “territorial-
production complex” was important, it was not as important as budget debts or wage 
arrears, and as such ArcelorMittal was able to shift the management and ownership of these 
non-core assets over to the local government in exchange for supporting them financially – 
USD 10.5 million per year under the agreement.
262
 
 That said, we must at least partially attribute ArcelorMittal’s accurate perception of 
Kazakh interests to the hindsight of the failed First Alpine and US Steel deals (both of 
which clearly highlighted the significance of wage arrears and budget debts); equally we 
must recognize that the Kazakh government itself learned from these episodes, lowering its 
own expectations (i.e. its own resource self-valuation) particularly in the wake of the 
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established multinational US Steel’s inability to turn the enterprise around. Perhaps it is not 
surprising, therefore, that as Zhannat Ertlesova explains (then deputy economics minister), 
by the time of the ArcelorMittal deal a considerable “change in the psychology” of the 
Kazakh people had occurred as it regarded social services –an increased appreciation that 
everything comes at a cost despite what may have been considered to be free in the past.
263
 
In other words, the failed privatization attempts increasingly sensitized the country to the 
gravity of the situation for foreign investors. This affirms not only that finding resource 
complementarities between stakeholders is a subjective process, but that it is a dynamic one 
as well – stakeholders’ proximate goals can shift (or flex) over time to ensure that actors 
find those resource complementarities among one another necessary for maintaining the 
pursuit of larger, ultimate goals.  
 Finally, we begin to see in ArcelorMittal’s navigation of the privatization process 
the need to view bargains as existing between stakeholders (not host countries), each with 
its own ability to impact the firm’s ability to operate to varying degrees. Thus far we have 
focused primarily on ArcelorMittal’s bargain with the central government, but beyond 
settling debt payments into the central budget the firm also made good on its promise to 
settle wage arrears with Karmet workers while maintaining Temirtau social services 
(though under a new system of responsibility). Johannes Sittard, then managing director of 
ArcelorMittal’s Karmet operations, recognized that if the combine had “disgruntled 
workers” because of a lack of social services, it would negatively impact the firm’s 
productivity, and therefore the firm “had to get involved” to some extent in meeting social 
expectations.
264
 In fact within the following year ArcelorMittal would reacquire the 
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transportation system, the garment factory, and a hotel, and purchase outright the entire 
Temirtau electricity system (generation and distribution) to ensure that the combine and the 
town had consistent electricity and heat (over the course of 1996, Temirtau and Karmet lost 
power 16 times).
265
 A tram system that does not operate on schedule and a town (and plant) 
without electricity would obviously impact worker productivity. 
 ArcelorMittal also created new stakeholders within Kazakhstan that would 
strengthen the multinational’s operating position – stakeholders whose goals would be 
inextricably tied to those of the firm. In shifting the management and ownership of key 
social services over to the local government, ArcelorMittal strengthened the capacity (and 
responsibility) of the local akim while making him wholly dependent on ArcelorMittal 
budgetary contributions, and by extension, the firm’s success. “As it turned out,” then 
Temirtau Akim Aliy Karabalin notes, “a week before KarMet was handed over to Ispat 
[ArcelorMittal], I got the whole social sector dropped in my lap…Of course, that was not 
accompanied by any additional financing from the government,” but rather from 
ArcelorMittal.
266
 According to the PBM, such interdependence between ArcelorMittal and 




 ArcelorMittal also brought in the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) to 
help the firm meet the Kazakh government’s investment requirements. ArcelorMittal 
secured a USD 54 million loan from the EBRD in 1997 along with additional financing 
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from the IFC and private banks totaling USD 450 million.
268
 In the EBRD’s own words, the 
bank “strengthens an investment through its relations with the [Kazakh] Government and 
by helping to avoid specific political risks.”
269
 In other words, ArcelorMittal tied its own 
operating goals to those of larger financial institutions with their own unique powers over 
the Kazakh government. Further, in turning to the EBRD and IFC, ArcelorMittal was able 
to satisfy part of its investment commitments through outside banks sensitized to “risky” 
countries – unlike, critically, the Austrian banks tied to the First Alpine JV. These 
alternating experiences in securing financing point directly to the significance of structural 
constraints, the third component to the PBM along with resources and goals. As Eden et al. 
note, “The exercise of potential bargaining power, which depends on each party’s resources 
as valued by the other party, can be reduced by exogenous constraints.” The Austrian 
bankers operated under a system of investment values that balked at concepts like bartering 
or at the idea of providing financing in advance of an extended, in-depth audit, constraining 
the ability of First Alpine to provide the central government with the necessary financial 
resources; the EBRD and IFC, on the other hand, are two financial institutions specifically 
designed to provide financing in these riskier situations. This in itself is an interesting 
finding because it underscores the different institutions at play when it comes to 
“institutional distance” – the IFC is by no means “Kazakh” or “domestic” and yet in terms 
of international financing, the so-called “distance” to be bridged is quite small. And so 
whereas the First Alpine JV was inhibited in pursuing its goals by the Austrian banks, for 
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ArcelorMittal the EBRD and IFC were resources the firm learned to mobilize in order to 
achieve its larger goals amongst fewer institutional constraints.  
 Taken together, Table 4.1 summarizes the resource complementarities of 
ArcelorMittal and its stakeholders during the privatization of Karmet. 
Table 4.1: Resource complementarities between ArcelorMittal and Kazakh stakeholders 
Stakeholder Goals Resources 










Settle past debts, pay 
into central budget 
regularly, increase 
production 
Karmet, cheap labor, 
geostrategic position 
Yes: ArcelorMittal, with the assistance 
of the EBRD, IFC and private banks, 
was able to satisfy all stakeholder 
goals; in return ArcelorMittal became 




for social services 
Productivity of 
Karmet 
Yes: ArcelorMittal agreed to pay 
approx. USD 10.5 million per year into 
the local budget; in return 
ArcelorMittal could expect its workers 







Yes: ArcelorMittal settled all wage 
arrears and restarted stagnant 
production; in return ArcelorMittal 
received a productive work force 
EBRD 
Increase foreign 




Yes: ArcelorMittal was able to 
rejuvenate one of the largest former 








Yes: ArcelorMittal was able to 
rejuvenate one of the largest former 
Soviet Union enterprises with IFC 
support 
Table 4.1: A significant component of ArcelorMittal’s success during the privatization period was a result of 
its ability to find resource complementarities with key stakeholders.  
The Steel Boom: 2002 – 2007  
 In February of 2005, a television station in Kazakhstan ran a short human interest 
story on Vladimir Nemchinov, an assistant steel worker at Karmet. He had been working 
for the combine since 1994 and was “glad when the new master came to Temirtau,” as the 
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narrator described his feelings when ArcelorMittal took over Karmet. “But,” the narrator 
continued, “10 years have passed, and the country and people have changed.”
270
  
 Sure enough, the circumstances in Temirtau were much different in 2005 than they 
had been back in the mid-1990s. Steel production worldwide had transitioned from the 
“stagnant years” of the 1970s, 80s and 90s to the “steel boom” of 2002-2007, driven 
primarily by demand from China.
271
 Karmet was perfectly positioned to take advantage of 
the situation, but the rise in the combine’s success would coincide with two other trends 
that would complicate the multinational’s ability to maintain stakeholder bargains in 
Kazakhstan: (1) an information technology boom that would increase local Kazakh 
workers’ awareness to comparative living standards worldwide, and (2) an increasingly 
hazardous working environment for Karmet miners. In this section we see how the bargain 
between ArcelorMittal and the Karmet miners’ union transformed from cooperative to 
conflictual (to use Luo’s term
272
), and how that transformation spilled over into the 
multinational’s bargains with other Kazakh-based stakeholders, upsetting the system of 
complementarities reached during the privatization phase. 
Different Kinds of Booms 
 Despite the global growth in steel production and demand in the 2000s, for 
developed countries the profit margins were shrinking. Heightened environmental 
awareness and labor codes increased operating constraints and the equal boom in 
commodity prices – specifically iron ore and coal – made steel production expensive. 
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Transportation costs were also high.
273
 ArcelorMittal, however, was in a prime position to 
benefit from all of these constraints. Because in Kazakhstan industrial emissions rates were 
set by local governments, the multinational’s strong relationship with the local akim 
allowed Karmet to operate under minimal environmental regulations, despite the fact that 
the Kazakh Ministry of Environmental Protection claimed Karmet was one of two mining 
enterprises in the state that collectively produced 44-percent of all harmful emissions in the 
country (the other being the copper miner Kazakhmys).
274
  
 Karmet coal miners were also paid between USD 200-300 per month,
275
 way below 
international standards.
276
 And because Karmet was a fully integrated steel combine – 
meaning that all the coal and iron ore mines necessary to produce steel were included 
within the enterprise in Kazakhstan – ArcelorMittal was unaffected by high iron ore and 
coal prices that significantly impacted the ability of competing steel manufacturing 
multinationals to turn a profit. Finally, with China next door, and other strong demand 
markets equally nearby (Russia, India and Iran), transportation costs were also low.
277
  
 ArcelorMittal’s success during these years would allow it to acquire competitors to 
the point where by 2007 it was the largest steel manufacturing company in the world, with 
over 300,000 employees in 60 countries, representing 10-percent of global steel production 
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and serving as “the number one supplier to all major market sectors, including automotive, 
construction, household appliances and packaging.”
278
 
 But there were other “booms” going on during the 2000s period in Kazakhstan – 
quite literally and tragically, a series of fires and explosions in Karmet plants and coal 
mines that resulted in significant fatalities. High profile incidents include a methane 
blowout in early December 2004 that resulted in the deaths of 23 workers and a similar 
explosion in September of 2006 that killed 41 workers. These incidents came at a time 
when Kazakh access to internet and mobile phones was rapidly increasing. Anecdotally, 
Karmet workers were well aware of, for instance, CEO Lakshmi Mittal’s USD 55 million 
wedding for his daughter at a time when local workers were dying due to substandard 
safety conditions, like an incident in which the bucket of a bulldozer came down on one 
worker, crushing him to death, because he was wearing black overalls (clothing) that 
blended in with the coal (the industry standard is bright orange overalls). Other complaints 
at the time included:
279
 
 Cheaply manufactured boots 
 Helmets that had exceeded their operational service life 
 Washing soap that caused a series of rashes (it was later determined, reportedly, that 
the soap had a high formalin content and was intended to be used in morgues to 
wash corpses) 
 Cheap gloves with rotted thread 
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 The re-opening of mines suffering from fires/incidents before increased safety 
measures were put in place 
Statistically, communication and information access increased substantially during this time 
period. Between 2000 and 2009, national mobile phone subscribers jumped from roughly 1 
in 100 people to 94 in 100 people and internet usage increased from 1 in 100 people to 33 
in 100 people.
280
 In the Karaganda region alone (in which Karmet is located), medium-level 
computer literacy rates increased from roughly 54-percent of the population in 2006 to 72-
percent of the population in 2008.
281
  
 Following the December 2004 disaster, Karmet coal miners began to express 
dissatisfaction with their low wages, and the head of the local coal miners’ union made the 
unusual step of travelling to London, believing he could negotiate a new wage with CEO 
Lakshmi Mittal one on one; Mittal refused to see him, and the union boss returned empty 
handed. By March of 2005 the repeated refusal of Karmet management to meet with the 
coal miners’ union led to government action and labor protests (but no strikes). By the end 
of June, the union boss (with government support) had negotiated an immediate 10-percent 
raise to be followed by a 22-percent raise four months later, eventually increasing wages 
from roughly USD 300 per month to USD 415 per month by the end of 2005.
282
  
 By June of 2006 – roughly one year since the initial negotiations – the coal miners 
union sought a pay raise again, holding a rally numbering 3,000 workers in the nearby town 
of Shakhtinsk.
283
 But it was not until the explosion in September of that same year, killing 
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41 workers, that the situation spiraled out of control and ArcelorMittal and the government 
took notice. The timeline in Table 4.2 outlines the succession of events following the 
September disaster that would eventually lead to a 20-percent immediate raise and a 
follow-on raise of 10-percent the next year. All told, by 2007 coal miner wages at Karmet 
had increased by over 80-percent during a two year period.  




20-Sep-06 Methane explosion in local mine kills 41 people 
25-Sep-06 
In the town nearest to the disaster, Shakhtinsk, hundreds of 
workers go on strike in the town square to demand higher 
wages and improved safety conditions; other workers from the 
night shift refuse to exit the mine in protest 
26-Sep-06 Workers at three other mines nearby Shakhtinsk join the strike  
27-Sep-06 
Workers at a fifth mine join the strike, limiting Karmet's steel 
output to just 3 operating mines (of 8) 
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Workers at two more mines join the strike; Karmet managers 
claim the workers will receive an unspecified raise but the 
miners note that they will not return to work until the raise is 
received 
29-Sep-06 
Workers at the final operating coal mine under Karmet go on 
strike, bringing coal production to a complete stop 
30-Sep-06 
A protest held on Saturday in Temirtau numbers 6,000 Karmet 
workers from all operational lines; the metallurgists attending 
the protest threaten to join the labor strike the following week -
- if this were to occur, the entire Karmet combine would cease 
to operate; banners at the protest read, “No more dying for 
Mittal!” and “We don't want to live in poverty!” 
3-Oct-06 
Karmet management announces that the strikes have caused a 
30-percent dip in output; the CEO of Karmet is replaced 
4-Oct-06 
Karmet management reaches a deal with both coal miners and 
metallurgists; coal miners are to receive a 20-percent 
immediate raise and a 10-percent follow-up raise at the 
beginning of 2007; the strikes end. 
 
From Cooperation to Conflict 
 ArcelorMittal’s successful stakeholder management during the privatization process 
of the mid-1990s led to a series of interdependent relationships aptly characterized as 
cooperative – as previously noted in Table 4.1, the multinational’s efforts to find resource 
complementarities with local actors allowed the company to be successful where others had 
failed. Clearly the situation was different by the height of the 2000s steel boom. What does 
this later period tell us about our initial propositions? 
 First, just as we saw the firm’s own actions contribute positively to the bargaining 
process during the privatization phase, we must acknowledge here that the firm’s failure to 
act in improving management and safety standards during this second period had a negative 
impact on the firm’s ability to maintain cooperative relations. As one mining executive for 
a large multinational with significant Kazakh operations explained to me, fatalities at a 
mine site are generally understood within the mining industry (particularly by mining 
analysts in London-, Toronto- or New York-based investment banks) to be indicative of the 
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overall quality of the operation’s management.
285
 Agency matters, and as such we must 
recognize that the labor strikes during this period were clearly influenced by the firm’s own 
negative behavior. Just as ArcelorMittal chose to pay the central government during the 
privatization phase, they chose not to pay for orange overalls, quality hardhats or a wage 
increase.  
 Beyond firm agency, the steel boom phase teases out interesting changes in 
stakeholder relations that emphasize not only the significance of stakeholder management 
(as opposed to treating the country as a single, “host country” unit) but also the significance 
of maintaining a sort of “equilibrium” in resource complementarities – ensuring that the 
firm is constantly offering a series of resources to stakeholders that are equally valuable to 
those stakeholders, and that the reverse is also true. 
 The imbalance in complementarities is clearest in the bargain between 
ArcelorMittal and the coal miners’ union. The human interest story on Vladimir 
Nemchinov at the beginning of this section captures this perfectly – what had been 
satisfactory in the mid-1990s was no longer adequate. Coal miners’ pay had stagnated as 
operational risks increased; Karmet was more profitable than ever before. In other words, 
the coal miners’ goals changed – simply the guarantee of employment and a wage was no 
longer adequate – while ArcelorMittal was achieving its own goals to record levels of 
success along with both the regional and central governments.  
 But less obvious and just as significant were the ways in which other Kazakh-based 
stakeholders’ interests changed over time to ensure that the Karmet workers and 
ArcelorMittal returned to resource complementarity. The mistake here is to assume that the 
other stakeholders supported the coal miners’ demands out of sympathy for the harsh 
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working conditions (as witnessed in these two high profile catastrophes in December 2004 
and September 2006). A closer reading of the situation shows that wage raises associated 
with these periods were much more nuanced – less about the safety conditions and more 
about the effects of those conditions on larger social and economic stability.  
 For instance, initially the methane explosion in December of 2004 did little to upset 
the existing bargains between ArcelorMittal and other stakeholders (aside from the coal 
miners’ union). “The miners keep appealing to public opinion, the regional governor, 
influential officials, politicians and MPs,” as one writer indicated at the time. “Everyone 
nods in agreement, but no-one wants to quarrel.”
286
 In March of 2005, for example, the 
local Temirtau government refused a request from the coal miners’ union to hold a rally 
outside the Karmet operations;
287
 a similar refusal was made by the local administration in 
advance of the June 2006 rally (though eventually the request was approved).
288
  
 This is not to say that no stakeholders in Kazakhstan took up the miners’ cause. In 
March of 2005 the Karaganda region’s prosecutor’s office recommended Karmet be fined 
for refusing to meet with the union
289
 and that May Dariga Nazarbayeva (the president’s 
daughter and then deputy minister within the parliament) publically supported the miners as 
her political party at the time had aligned itself with the larger federation of trade unions.
290
 
Nevertheless the central government – that is, the president and his ministries – seemed 
more concerned with the deteriorating standards’ effect on production. For instance a fire in 
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a steel rolling plant in February of 2005 went largely unreported until the dip in production 
was felt within the national budget. Concerned with the dangers of future production 
shortfalls, Economics and Budget Planning Minister Kairat Kelimbetov recommended at 
the time the need for formal talks between the government and Karmet’s management to 
ensure such accidents were avoided in the future (notably this statement came within days 
of reports that the miners’ union was being ignored by the government on their wage 
demands).
291
 The February fire reportedly reduced Karmet’s output by a third which 
reverberated across the country – regional output declined by over 11-percent and national 
manufacturing output by 5-percent during this time period.
292
  
 A similar indifference to safety conditions unfolded during the September 2006 
strikes. At around the same time as the June 2006 rally, ArcelorMittal was finalizing a 
memorandum on cooperation on social projects with the regional akim. Hailed by a local 
television channel as “manna from heaven,” the akim announced in July that ArcelorMittal 
would provide coal at discounted prices to local towns, macadam for road construction, 
funding for local athletes training for the Beijing Olympics, 40 ambulances for local towns, 
and the construction of a football stadium – the stadium being the “best news,” according to 
the television show, because the akim was “a big football fan.”
293
  
 And while the head of the Ombudsman’s Office in Kazakhstan submitted a report to 
then Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov that same month outlining the lack of workers’ 
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rights within Karmet operations,
294
 the central government was equally silent until the 
September strikes brought Karmet production to a halt. After the initial strike on September 
25 at a single mine, a conciliatory commission was formed and headed by Emergency 
Situations Minister Shalbai Kulmakhanov; two days later, as the strike had expanded from 
one mine to five, the commission promised a resolution within 10 days. But after the eighth 
mine went on strike that Friday, followed by a threat on Saturday that metallurgists would 
join the strike and a report on Tuesday that steel output had declined by 30-percent since 
the strike, the wage demands were settled by the next day. That Friday PM Akhmetov 
would meet with the chief operating officer of Karmet to express “his satisfaction with the 
fact that the company’s administration managed to find a compromise with the miners.”
295
 
 The relative apathy to the miners’ situation in comparison to other concerns (e.g. 
production and social activities) – whether it was in 2005 or 2006 – indicates just how 
complementary Karmet had become to other stakeholders’ goals by that time. Local 
administrations across Karaganda along with the regional akimat, heavily dependent on 
Karmet for everything from basic social services to football stadiums, clearly were initially 
reluctant to upset the firm. “The main target of the memos [on social cooperation] is for the 
company to find the chance – the way – to help [the region] on those issues in which the 
budget funds are not enough,” as one Karmet director explained to me.
296
 The process is 
admittedly political, according to the director, but while some projects are clearly luxuries 
(e.g. the football stadiums), others are more critical – from providing ambulances to clean 
water. Both “political and social significance are taken into account,” he explains, noting 
that there are battles among the various cities and towns that the regional akim and the head 
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of ArcelorMittal’s Kazakh operations sort out together. So while “Shakhtinsk wants a sport 
complex, Karazhal wants water, and Karaganda City a mosque,” the net effect is region-
wide dependence on ArcelorMittal as each city administration depends on the firm’s 
support to achieve its own local goals.
297
 Karaganda citizens train in ArcelorMittal gyms
298
 
and go to ArcelorMittal dental and medical clinics;
299
 their kids take judo lessons or do arts 
and crafts in ArcelorMittal recreations centers;
300
 and the family together goes on vacations 
to subsidized ArcelorMittal resorts.
301
 
 Nationally, Karmet represented roughly 4-percent of Kazakh GDP
302
 and was the 
largest purchaser of domestic goods.
303
 The combine also contributed to larger goals within 
the central government, specifically the state-led strategy to transition the economy from 
natural resource exports to manufacturing. When President Nazarbayev drove the first 
“Kazakh car” from a Skoda plant in East Kazakhstan, hundreds of kilometers to the east of 
Temirtau, he proudly noted at the ceremony that the steel had come from Karmet.
304
 
Hundreds of kilometers to the west in Aktau, on the other hand, ArcelorMittal was 
constructing a pipe mill to supply the oil industry with piping,
305
 and in fact the first time 
the Aktau seaport on the Caspian reached its design capacity for exporting dry goods – that 
is, not oil – it was because of Temirtau steel products.
306
  
                                                             
297 Source-68 (2011) 
298 Source-66 (2011), Mar. 25 
299 Source-65 (2011), Mar. 25 
300 Source-64 (2011), Mar. 25 
301 Source-67 (2011), Mar. 25 
302 Sharma, V. (2004) 'The town that Mittal built', Hindustan Times, Oct. 31. 
303 (2000) 'LNM Group invests $650 mln in Ispat-Karmet steel works in five years', Interfax Russian News, 
Jul. 4, retrieved by Nexis. 
304 (2005) 'Kazakh president drives first Kazakh-assembled Skoda car: SOURCE: Khabar Television Almaty, 
in Russian 15:00 GMT, 25 Jun 05', BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, Jun. 25. 
305 (2005) 'MITTAL STEEL PUMPS $1.5 BLN INTO KAZAKHSTAN', Russia & CIS Business & 
Investment Weekly, Oct. 7. 
306 (2005) 'AKTAU COMMERCIAL SEAPORT (KAZAKHSTAN)', Central Asia & Caucasus Business 
Report, Apr. 19. 
135 
 
 Whereas one could argue that the return to resource complementarity between 
ArcelorMittal and the Karmet workers was an order based on the balance of power – once 
the bargaining position of the union was increased by support from alternate stakeholders, 
ArcelorMittal was forced to negotiate – the more likely explanation, particularly judging 
from the reserved response of the central and local governments, was that all parties had an 
interest in restoring complementarity to a level in which all parties could continue to pursue 
their own goals to self-satisfactory degrees. The only reason this restoration became 
conflictual as opposed to cooperative seems to be due to the behavior – that is, the agency – 
of ArcelorMittal. ArcelorMittal chose repeatedly to ignore the miners’ demands, and it was 
not until the miners’ dissatisfaction with Karmet management reached a critical point – 
significant workplace fatalities – that the miners were willing to transition from a 
cooperative to a conflictual strategy and upset the existing equilibrium among all 
stakeholders. Once that equilibrium was upset, the corresponding stakeholders stepped in to 
ensure that complementarity was resolved between ArcelorMittal and the miners. 
The Financial Crisis: 2008 – 2009  
 With the advent of the global financial crisis in 2007, and the subsequent drop in 
construction, came a sharp decrease in global steel demand. In developed countries like the 
US, for example, between January 2008 and January 2009, demand cut in half. As the 
OECD described the situation, “the global economic crisis has pushed the world steel 
industry into recession,” and complicating the situation for ArcelorMittal was the growing 
production and productivity in China that risked dramatic oversupply.
307
 Chinese 
productivity since 1995 – “tonnes of crude steel per worker” – had more than doubled,
308
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while by the end of 2008 domestic Chinese demand had decreased by 20 million tonnes 
over the year.
309
 To put this in perspective, Karmet exported on average 5-6 million tonnes 
of steel per year total,
310
 with the majority of exports in 2008 to China and Russia, while by 




 Kazakhstan felt the impact of the crisis earlier than most so-called developing 
states, recognizing a tightening in liquidity as early as mid-2007 as foreign banks restricted 
borrowing and began to call in debts. The construction sector in the country was hit 
particularly hard and with it, heightened fears of rising unemployment.
312
 In this final 
period we see how both ArcelorMittal and its Kazakh stakeholders worked together to 
maintain equilibrium in resource complementarities despite the change in conditions. 
The Canary in the Coal Mine 
 On October 1, 2008, ArcelorMittal placed over 4,000 Karmet workers on a 
temporary two-week leave (at 50-percent salary), which the company later extended to the 
entire month of October in the wake of an announcement that production levels would be 
cut at the combine by 30-percent due to a decrease in global demand.
313
 Of the major 
mining multinationals operating in the country, ArcelorMittal was the first to announce 
such drastic measures as the crisis began to make the firm’s existing bargains untenable. 
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The Kazakh stakeholders responded immediately. On October 3, Prime Minister Karim 
Massimov met with ArcelorMittal CEO Lakshmi Mittal in Astana to discuss possible anti-
crisis measures.
314
 By mid-October the regional akim of Karaganda, Nurlan Nigmatulin, 
had negotiated with the multinational to ensure that despite a necessary decrease in steel 
production, coal production would remain the same, and that of the over 4000 workers on 
leave, 500 would return.
315
 And by late October a formal committee had been set up 
between all the major stakeholders to formalize a plan forward – not just between 
ArcelorMittal, the unions, and the regional and central governments, but with Kazakhmys 
and ENRC as well, the two other mining giants in the country that along with ArcelorMittal 
represented close to 300,000 jobs in Kazakhstan.
316
  
 On October 28
th
, all stakeholders signed the “Memorandum on the initiative of the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mutual cooperation regarding the production 
processes stabilization and employees social protection.” Signatories included the minister 
of industry and trade (representing the central government), along with all the relevant 
regional government heads and the chief executives of the major mining firms, including 
ArcelorMittal’s Kazakh operations CEO. A final signatory was the head of Samruk-
Kazyna, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, whose relevance will become clear in a 
moment. 
 The overriding goal of the Kazakh stakeholders was to maintain employment – a 
promise not to layoff any workers. If, for instance, employees were no longer relevant due 
to decreases in production, the firms should transition these employees to modernization 
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and other investment projects, which the firms agreed to expedite (ArcelorMittal, like 
ENRC and Kazakhmys, was under specific capital investment schedules over certain 
periods of time). In return, the central and regional governments would increase 
“investment attraction” – essentially decrease regulatory constraints and tax burdens – 
while the unions were “obliged to raise employee's awareness of [the] measures being 
taken” by the multinationals, specifically in order to ensure “labor and production 
discipline.” In other words, as long as the employees retained their jobs, no strikes. And 
finally, Samruk-Kazyna offered to provide co-financing to the firms for investment projects 
under the accelerated investment schedule.
317
  
Employment Equals Stability 
 During the 2005 presidential elections, President Nazarbayev emphasized the 
country’s stability as its key to economic success – a theme that was particularly apt at the 
time as nearby Kyrgyzstan was in the midst of its first political revolution.
318
 In many ways 
Nazarbayev was right. Kazakhstan by 2005 was below the average risk rating for the CIS 
(though globally, still significantly risky),
319
 while the country scored much closer to its 
neighbors on metrics of political freedom, corruption, and free speech (that is, they all 
scored poorly with the exception of Kyrgyzstan).
320
 Though Nazarbayev has never been 
elected in a “free and fair” contest, the president remains largely popular and most analysts 
tend to agree that his popularity is mainly based off of his ability to attract foreign 
investment into the country, which is a direct result of his ability to maintain political 
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stability, which overall leads to economic stability.
321
 In fact the Kazakh government’s 




 But the financial crisis threatened to undercut that stability in a way the country had 
not experienced since the days of independence in the early 1990s. Whereas in 2005 
independent polling indicated that 90-percent of Kazakhs believed the country was headed 
in the right direction and 5-percent that it was headed in the wrong direction, by 2008 that 
split had changed to 67/18, the lowest public opinion scores in the country between 2004 
and 2011. Further, 33-percent of individuals polled were only able to buy “basic products” 
for their households, with an additional 12-percent reporting that they did not have “enough 
money for basic needs” – in other words, almost half the country was only able to afford at 
best basic needs. Perhaps most threatening to the president’s ability to maintain stability, 
72-percent of individuals expressed concern over high prices, and critically, 45-percent of 
individuals blamed high prices on the “government’s lack of a coherent economic plan.” 
Likewise in 2008, 58-percent of those polled indicated that overall they perceived the 
“majority or many” of the people in Kazakhstan to be afraid to “openly express their 
political views,” compared to 41-percent in 2004 and 34-percent in 2011.
323
 With 
increasing economic stress seemingly came increasing perceived political repression. 
 Clearly stability in Kazakhstan in 2008 was threatened like it had never been in 
recent years, and when ArcelorMittal responded to the decrease in global steel demand by 
lowering production and temporarily laying off workers, central and regional government 
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stakeholders recognized that unlike during the boom period – when maintaining production 
levels (and its benefits, whether those were budgetary payments or football stadiums) 
appeared to be more important even than worker safety – now employment was the 
priority. Put more bluntly, social stability became these stakeholders’ ultimate goal: taxes, 
transport tariffs and environmental regulations were all negotiable.
324
 Table 4.3 provides 
direct quotes from four key stakeholders explicitly stating that the memorandum’s priority 
was to maintain employment and thus social stability. 





"The first and the most important thing that we have 
achieved is the guarantee of no layoffs or trimming of 
personnel. Miners and metal workers will keep their 
jobs."325 
Vladimir Shkolnik, 
Minister of Industry 
and Trade  
The aim of the memorandums is "to guarantee 
interests of parties in labor relations and provide social 
protection under possible economic risks."326 
Karim Massimov, 
Prime Minister 
"Plant workers are our main concern. The workers 
must enjoy social security despite external factors."327 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
President 
“There was a threat of cutting workplaces. However, 
we concluded contracts with our investors not to 
dismiss workers. It is very important. A person has to 
have a job. He can have a leave but he cannot lose his 
job, I know it from my own experience. He and his 
family should know that he has a job. Therefore, we 
did not allow job cuts.”328 
 
 Within that one critical month of October 2008 we see stakeholder resource 
complementarities break out of and then return to equilibrium, and notably in a rather 
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cooperative manner. Reportedly ArcelorMittal management presented to the anti-crisis 
committee three possible future scenarios on global demand and how each would impact 
Karmet’s operations. Communication proved critical – initially, for instance, Kazakh 
Deputy Prime Minister Umirzak Shukeyev wanted to force ArcelorMittal to maintain 
Karmet production while decreasing ArcelorMittal production at the multinational’s other 
global sites. “Arcelor Mittal annually sells up to 110 million ton of steel on the world 
market,” he was reported to have stated, asking why “isn’t it possible to sell our five 
million tons?” But when it became clear that the government could not have it both ways, 
the priority became employment and ArcelorMittal responded accordingly. As one director 
recalls, “We made a mistake in thinking that unemployment was not our problem but the 
problem of the government – now we know that this is our problem,”
329
 and in turn the 
multinational lowered Karmet production but maintained Karmet employment while 
downsizing in other countries (actually by 9,000 people, or 3-percent of the total workforce, 
just the following month).
330
 By the beginning of 2009, though Karmet production had 
decreased significantly, employment remained steady, and a new tax code was in place that 




 That said, ArcelorMittal would test the boundaries of complementarity throughout 
the financial crisis. In late December 2008, the firm announced plans to shorten work 
weeks for some workers from five to four days,
332
 and then in January announced that the 
                                                             
329 Source-68 (2011) 
330 (2008) 'Arcelor Mittal Temirtau, part of the global steel maker, ArcelorMittal, confirmed its previous com-
mitments not to lay off', Kazakhstan Mining Weekly, Dec. 9. 
331 (2009) 'Arcelor Mittal Temirtau sold 2.9 million tons of steel products in 2008', Kazakhstan General 
Newswire, Jan. 19. 
332 (2008) Arcelor Mittal Temirtau, part of the global steel maker, ArcelorMittal, confirmed its previous com-
mitments not to lay off'. 
142 
 
company would be spinning off most of the non-core assets it had reacquired back during 
the privatization phase: Temirtau’s public transportation system, a hotel, the garment 
factory, and the utilities company (responsible for the heat, electricity and hot water for all 
of Temirtau). Overall in 2009 tax revenues to the government would also decrease by USD 
6 million to approximately USD 65 million.
333
  
 In May 2009 the company revealed that the Temirtau operation ran at a USD 100 
million loss in the first quarter, forcing negotiations with the labor unions and a decision to 
remove an existing bonus structure under which employees that filled orders in time 
received a 14-percent raise.
334
 The company also began offering a voluntary USD 10,000 
severance package to workers over the age of 50 who had worked for the company for 10 
years or more. This latter move would be one step too far, bringing the unions to file a 
complaint in November that led to a cease and desist order from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection. The union’s complaint? The decrease in employees had led to an increase 
in the responsibilities of the remaining workers without a raise; reportedly 1200 people had 
left the company on these initial terms.
335
 
 The parallels to the privatization period are obvious, with the key difference being 
the fact that unlike in the mid-1990s, in 2008 the Kazakh central government was cash rich, 
not cash poor. Therefore while in the 90s the central government’s main priority was direct 
and indirect budgetary support (directly though cash payments to settle debts and indirectly 
through production that would lead to tax revenue) and to a lesser but still significant 
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extent, social stability, during the 2000s financial crisis, social stability moved to the 
forefront. In return, just as was the case the in 1990s, ArcelorMittal was allowed significant 
flexibility as long as it maintained social stability – spinning off non-core assets to increase 
the firm’s balance sheet (exactly what happened in the 1990s), lowering wages and the 
work week, but keeping the employment roster stable.  
Conclusion 
 The case of ArcelorMittal’s successful presence in Kazakhstan for now almost two 
decades seems to affirm many of our initial propositions. First of all, behavior on the 
stakeholder (as opposed to the “host country”) level is clearly a more appropriate unit of 
analysis. In several instances ArcelorMittal’s Kazakh-based stakeholders acted in 
alternating, sometimes competing interests, to which ArcelorMittal had to respond 
differently. During the privatization period the local Temirtau administration was forced to 
absorb a series of social responsibilities without any financial support from the central 
government – whose priorities at the time were different – and thus the local administration 
relied heavily upon ArcelorMittal for support. During the steel boom years in which 
Karmet reached record levels of profitability, both the central and regional governments 
seemed much less concerned with employee safety, and in fact did not step in to assist the 
labor unions until Kamet production (and thus tax revenue and high priced social projects) 
was at stake. And even more recently we see how the labor unions themselves must be at 
times disaggregated as ArcelorMittal mistakenly assumed that a voluntary severance 
package system would be embraced without controversy.  
 Clearly, stakeholder goals are dynamic – they change as the situation warrants and 
as information increases. Whereas during privatization the miners were more than happy to 
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see a consistent wage and guaranteed employment, those goals expanded dramatically 
during the steel boom only to contract once again during the financial crisis. The central 
government, as earlier discussed, shifted its own priorities as the country went from cash-
poor to cash-rich, becoming concerned much more about social stability during the crisis 
than had been the case during privatization. 
 Further, agency matters. While resource complementarity certainly seems to be 
indicative of successful multinational-stakeholder bargaining, maintaining complementarity 
is an active process and can quickly turn from cooperative to conflictual when the 
equilibrium is lost. ArcelorMittal found complementarities early on with the central Kazakh 
government and the miners when it quickly settled Karmet’s legacy debts and wage arrears 
– remember, ArcelorMittal paid; the others did not. But the firm equally caused its own set 
of problems when it actively decided to ignore union requests for increased wages and 
improved safety conditions during the steel boom. As the crisis hit home in 2008 and 
ArcelorMittal and its stakeholders realized resource complementarities were again at risk, 
the stakeholders came together to actively restore equilibrium, finding that mid-point at 
which all stakeholders, ArcelorMittal included, could pursue their own goals to a self-
satisfactory degree – an attempt to “develop rules wherein our social and economic 
requirements are balanced,” as one Karmet director recalls the situation.  
 Finally, structure matters. It is as influencing on stakeholders as stakeholders are on 
it. The failures of First Alpine and US Steel to integrate (or adapt) into the Soviet structure 
of Karmet’s territorial-industrial complex had an influence on the Kazakh government that 
then allowed ArcelorMittal more flexibility in its negotiations. Conversely, ArcelorMittal 
found a way to respond satisfactorily to Temirtau’s unique system of socioeconomic 
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development while at the same time minimizing the firm’s liabilities. And whereas the First 
Alpine JV was constrained by the risk-averse Austrian banking community, ArcelorMittal 
relied on financing from financial institutions undaunted by an economy in transition. 
Later, as the financial crisis threatened Karmet’s profitability, ArcelorMittal flexed to the 
former Soviet state’s overemphasis on employment, laying off workers across the globe but 
not in Karaganda. Equally, whereas during the Soviet era Kazakhstan placed heavy 
emphasis on production, as the country became more sensitized to the international market 
economy and the global steel market went into a recession, the central and regional 
government flexed on meeting previously sacred production targets – that is, these 
stakeholders recognized the impact of supply and demand constraints on post-Soviet, 
independent Kazakhstan. 
 We now turn to Cameco, a Canadian-based uranium mining multinational, to build 
on our existing knowledge of the active, subjective and dynamic process of maintaining 
resource complementarities and the inhibiting effect of structural constraints as 




Chapter Five: Becoming more trustworthy, not necessarily more 
“domestic”: Cameco and uranium mining in Kazakhstan 
Introduction 
 In the spring of 2008, journalist Abraham Lustgarten published a profile on 
Moukhtar Dzhakishev
336
 in Fortune magazine. At the time, Dzhakishev was the head of 
Kazatomprom, the Kazakh state-run enterprise for uranium mining and production, and 
with uranium prices at historic highs in 2008, and Kazakhstan home to almost 20-percent of 
the world’s uranium reserves,
337
 Lustgarten’s report showered Dzhakishev with 
compliments that in hindsight seem almost theatrical in their hubris. Describing the rising 
Kazakh elite as the “self-made Kazakh uranium czar,” Lustgarten wrote that Dzhakishev’s 
confidence in his claims about his own power and success to date – “between spoonfuls of 
Beluga caviar and bites of ruby-colored tuna flown in from Dubai” – “might be laughable if 
his arguments weren’t so damn convincing.”
338
  
 Little did Lustgarten know, or Dzkahishev, that within a year’s time this self-made 
Kazakh uranium czar would be behind bars. 
 True enough, however, back in 2008 Kazakhstan’s uranium industry was on the 
verge of a major breakthrough since the country became independent in 1991. Uranium 
production during the 1990s suffered many of the same operating challenges of the larger 
mining sector in Kazakhstan in the early independence period, as described broadly in 
Chapter Three and detailed in-depth with regard to the steel industry in the previous 
chapter. Uranium production under what was then known as the Kazakh National Company 
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for Atomic Energy (KATEP) declined 35- to 40-percent per year, causing the government 
in 1997 to revise its overly state-centric strategy and focus instead on drawing foreign 
investment to the industry
339
 – not unlike its decision in 1995 to privatize Karmet in 
Temirtau. KATEP was scrapped and Kazatomprom was created in June of 1997 to control 




 Dzhakishev was named Kazatomprom’s president, and in the late 1990s the 
company faced a tough balance sheet: significant physical depreciation of uranium assets, 6 
month wage arrears of just under USD 12 million, bank loans and debts to foreign 
companies at USD 44 million, anti-dumping restrictions that put quotas on uranium exports 
to the US and Europe, and a monetary crisis in Russia that made uranium fuel pellets 
produced in Kazakhstan unaffordable to the Soviet-era customer they were designed for – 
nuclear power plants located in Russia.
341
 According to Dzhakishev, only a fraction of 
uranium production in the country during this time was actually booked to customers.
342
  
 Significant restructuring and foreign deal-making by the “self-made uranium czar,” 
paired with anticipated rising demand in uranium in the 2000s, led Dzhakishev to publically 
set as policy the country’s first major goal within the uranium industry. In September 2004, 
at the annual symposium of the World Nuclear Association in London, he announced the 
“15,000 MT, U by 2010 plan,”
343
 (henceforth referred to as the 2010 plan) which called for 
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Kazakhstan to become the world’s largest producer of uranium by 2010 (in 2004 the 
country was ranked a very distant third place in production worldwide
344
). At the time, a 
series of JVs were moving from the exploration to the development and production phase, 
with more on the horizon. Specifically, Kazatomprom had entered into JVs with a variety 
of Canadian, French, Russian and Japanese private and state-owned companies.
345
  
 While Kazatomprom saw its 2010 plan realized – by the end of 2009, Kazakhstan 
became the leading producer of uranium worldwide
346
 – Dzhakishev, for all his success, 
would ironically witness the event from prison. In May of that year, he was arrested by the 
KNB following accusations that he had illegally sold state assets as president of 
Kazatomprom at his own financial benefit. While these allegations may have been true (and 
Dzhakishev remains in jail at the time of this writing), most analysts believed at the time 
that the charges were politically motivated, as Dzhakishev had become over the years 
considerably close to a group of elites within the country viewed as potential contenders to 
President Nazarbayev’s rule, specifically a controversial individual named Mukhtar 
Ablyazov, who has since fled the country after the government nationalized the bank at 
which he was chairman.
347
 
 Dzhakishev’s anecdote is but one example in a string of events that together seems 
to confirm Kazakhstan’s reputation as a politically risky country for foreign investment in 
the uranium sector. As was briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, in 1997 the Canadian miner 
World Wide Minerals’ Kazakh operations were expropriated by the government following 
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claims that the miner failed to fulfill its management agreement.
348
 And in response to 
Dzhakishev’s arrest in May 2009, another Canadian miner, Uranium One, suffered a near 
40-percent dive in share price on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) in a single day, 
forcing the exchange to suspend trading.
349
  
 Notably, however, one Canadian uranium mining company has remained successful 
in Kazakhstan throughout these incidents and up to the present day. Cameco, also traded on 
the TSX (and the NYSE), has been operating in Kazakhstan since 1993. As World Wide 
Minerals was on its way out of Kazakhstan, Cameco was becoming increasingly embraced, 
and while the Dzhakshev arrest almost brought Uranium One to collapse, the event had no 
effect at all on Cameco’s share price, despite the fact that the company was also involved in 
a venture with the Dzhakishev-led Kazatomprom. In fact, just as ArcelorMittal today is 
considered one of ten “success stories” by President Nazarbayev’s Foreign Investors 
Council, so too is Cameco.
350
 
 This prompts us to restate the guiding question of this thesis: why are some firms 
able to operate successfully in so-called “risky” countries? Why has Cameco been 
successful, like ArcelorMittal, where others have failed?  
 The following chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first section we provide a basic 
overview, set chronologically, of the resource complementarities formed between Cameco 
and its Kazakh-based stakeholders from 1993 to 2009. While in many ways we reaffirm 
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broadly our theoretical findings from the previous chapter on ArcelorMittal, in this section 
we see that resource complementarities need not necessarily be recognized simultaneously 
(as was the case with ArcelorMittal) but rather can be maintained in an iterative, 
reciprocating process over the long-term. Critical to this form of maintaining resource 
complementarities, however, is the concept of trust – opposing stakeholders can only enter 
into bargains that are not immediately in an actor’s self-interest if that actor trusts that the 
opposing stakeholder will reciprocate the good behavior later (i.e. “return the favor”). 
 In the second section of this chapter we further develop the concept of trust in 
examining Cameco’s bargains with three separate stakeholders from 2009 to 2011: 
Kazatomprom; the village of Taikonur in which Cameco operates; and the akim of South 
Kazakhstan (the oblast in which Taikonur is located). Our intent here is to refine our 
understanding of our agency and structure propositions under the PBM framework by 
focusing on relationships that continually challenge Cameco’s ability to remain successful 
in the country in ways separate from what we observed with ArcelorMittal in Temirtau. 
Whereas ArcelorMittal employs 55,000 people, Cameco employs just about 500; whereas 
ArcelorMittal inherited a single-enterprise city with a population of 180,000 along with 
significant non-core business activities (e.g. city-wide transportation and electricity), the 
village of Taikonur is so small and remote that it is not even legally recognized by the 
government as a town.
351
 These differences and many more (to be detailed) both frustrate 
and encourage Cameco’s ability to be successful in Kazakhstan in ways different than 
ArcelorMittal, mainly because of the institutional (or structural) asymmetries that exist 
between the firm and its stakeholders and how these influences in turn can constrain the 
actors’ ability to find resource complementarities. Again, trust here is a core component of 
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success. When Cameco cannot act in a way expected by its Kazakh stakeholders due to an 
inviolable home country constraint, the Kazakh stakeholders must be able to trust that 
Cameco is telling the truth (and not, for instance, using the issue as an excuse for advancing 
the firm’s own interests). Likewise, when a particular Kazakh stakeholder cannot act in a 
way expected by Cameco, Cameco must be able to trust that in adapting to the 
stakeholder’s needs, Cameco will be rewarded.  
 In the third and final section, we bring these different elements of trust together to 
reflect on their significance for Eden et al.’s political bargaining model, the institution-
based school of strategic management within IB, and the greater agent-structure debate 
within the social sciences. Here I argue, based on what we see in Cameco’s case, that 
bridging institutional (or structural) divides is not necessarily about becoming more 
“domestic” in the sense of becoming more “Kazakh,” as the existing scholarship on 
institutional distance would suggest, but rather about becoming more trustworthy. By 
exploring the concept of trustworthiness – how to build and maintain it, and how it is lost – 
and by specifically focusing on the implications of trust to the PBM and the agent-structure 
debate, our case study of Cameco in Kazakhstan allows us to enrich our thus far 
ArcelorMittal-informed understanding of why some firms are successful in seemingly 
politically “risky” countries.  
Building Trust: 1993-2009 
 We begin by providing an overview of Cameco’s relationship in Kazakhstan from 
independence up until the country achieved its goal of becoming the leading uranium 
producer in the world. Unlike in ArcelorMittal’s case in which the firm established a 
bargain with Kazakh stakeholders based on resource complementarities recognized by all 
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parties immediately (i.e. the firm agreeing to a series of investment and employment 
guarantees in exchange for immediate access to a fully vertically integrated steel 
enterprise), Cameco’s early presence in Kazakhstan began with the firm’s offer of 
significant assistance to the country’s state uranium company with little guaranteed in 
return in the short-term (but with the expectation that Cameco would later be allowed to 
develop uranium resources in the country). Such a situation introduces the concept of 
“trust” into our characterization of the bargain that is formed between a firm and a given 
stakeholder when the former enters into the seemingly “risky” investment environment of 
the latter, and it is this idea of trust that we develop in-depth throughout this chapter. 
First impressions 
 When Kazakhstan became independent in the early 1990s, the government simply 
had no knowledge of how uranium was typically traded on the international market, much 
like was the case in many export-driven sectors across the country. Prior to independence, 
uranium produced in the country had been marketed by the Soviet enterprise 
Technabexport out of Russia, and considering that in 1993 Kazakhstan was responsible for 
approximately 8-percent of global uranium production and yet now had little idea on how 
to sell it, increasing marketing expertise within KATEP (Kazatomprom’s predecessor) 
became a leading priority early into independence.
352
  
 Cameco sees its own decision to provide KATEP managers with marketing 
assistance back in 1993 as the early foundation for the company’s success in the country up 
through the present day. In the early 1990s, when Kazakhstan “had no presence in or 
knowledge of the Western market [for uranium],” as a Cameco director relayed to me, the 
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firm formed a marketing JV with KATEP that allowed the Republic to “earn real money at 
a time when the country had no hard currency”
353
 (recall from Chapter Three that 
government budget resources in 1993 were at half the level as they were in 1991
354
). 
Cameco agreed, along with its German partner Uranerz, to invest USD 3 million into 
KATEP facilities to increase efficiency and safety and environmental standards in return 




 This initial agreement between Cameco and KATEP illustrates a slightly skewed 
case of established resource complementarities between stakeholders, as compared to our 
ArcelorMittal example, because of the large gap in time that passed until Cameco was 
rewarded for its initial good behavior. Victor Yazikov, the then head of KATEP, was 
quoted at the time as noting that his intent was to “benefit from the experience of Cameco 
and Uranerz in negotiating long-term contracts” within the industry.
356
 And true enough, up 
until this point KATEP had run into serious challenges in trying to market uranium on its 
own – dumping allegations by the US and European countries, for instance, had already led 
to anti-dumping restrictions on Kazakh uranium in these markets (dumping is when a firm 
exports a product at a price substantially below market prices, causing importing countries 
to react with protectionist measures aimed at defending domestic markets). KATEP had the 
clear goal of rejuvenating the country’s uranium sector, and certainly a structurally-
influenced constraint in this manner was its inability to market uranium in an international 
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market economy (i.e. beyond the Soviet command economy) – which Cameco, as an 
experienced international player, could easily fulfill.  
 Cameco, for its part, recognized Kazakhstan for its sizeable uranium reserves, and 
very explicitly understood the marketing venture to be the first step in creating a positive, 
lasting relationship with the Kazakh government. “This agreement,” then Cameco CEO 
Bernard Michel explained at the announcement, “provides Cameco with an opportunity to 
play a major role in uranium development in a country that has proven, extensive, in-situ 
leachable uranium resources.”
357
 Cameco had the traditional multinational miner’s goal of 
access to reserves, which KATEP could provide, and thus together the two actors found 
complementarities in their resources.  
The significance of trust 
 The parallels here to ArcelorMittal’s case are clear. The Kazakh government offered 
ArcelorMittal access, ArcelorMittal in return offered the necessary technological and 
capital investments, and together each actor pursued the mutual goal of rejuvenating the 
steel industry, even if the motives behind this shared goal were different (i.e. purely profit 
vs. budget revenue, social welfare, and employment). However, there is one key difference 
in Cameco’s case that must be underscored. Unlike the bargain formed with ArcelorMittal, 
Cameco’s bargain did not immediately guarantee access to Kazakh uranium reserves. 
Rather, the initial marketing and investment deal was made in good faith (though explicitly 
stated) that this was just the first step in the firm’s long-term relationship with KATEP (and 
by extension, the Kazakh government). In other words, there was an element of trust in 
Cameco’s early presence in Kazakhstan – a sort of “pay it forward” approach to 
establishing positive relations in the politically “risky” country (and at the time, still a 
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largely unknown country – recall that this initial deal was made in 1993, two years before 
ArcelorMittal’s deal in the country and the failed attempts by the First Alpine JV and US 
Steel).  
 Trust in this instance reaffirms the significance of agency. In hindsight, certainly 
there was an element of trust in Temirtau with ArcelorMittal that we earlier attributed to 
agency – unlike US Steel and the First Alpine JV, ArcelorMittal paid the initial up-front 
cash injection of USD 50 million. That was a choice the firm made that its predecessors 
were unwilling to make. But again, that action was in return for immediate access, whereas 
in Cameco’s case the down payment of an investment of USD 3 million and assistance in 
marketing was in return for only the expectation of future access. It is worth noting as well 
that Cameco reflects on this early deal as not having been in the firm’s interest in the short-
term. According to one source familiar with the negotiations, helping Kazakhstan market its 
uranium had the predictable effect of increasing the supply of uranium on the global 
market, which had a negative impact on the value of Cameco’s own uranium.
358
 
 Interpreting trust as a component of agency resonates with Teegen et al.’s research, 
as described earlier, in which they swapped out MNEs in Vernon’s traditional MNE-host 
country bargaining framework with NGOs. Their observations confront the power-focused 
understanding of Vernon’s bargaining model in noting that NGOs appear to develop 
positive, lasting relationships with stakeholders based mainly on trust. They describe the 
“trusted position”
359
 that successful NGOs maintain within their operating area as a 
function of a commitment to long-term reciprocity and recognition of mutually beneficial 
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“common ground” among stakeholders.
360
 In this sense, trust is treated by NGOs as a 
resource that can be mobilized to maintain positive relations, seemingly placing Teegen et 
al.’s research in the resource-based school of strategic management (and therefore in the 
agent camp in the larger agent-structure debate). It would then follow that Cameco’s aim in 
1993 was to accept trust as a resource in return for providing assistance in marketing, the 
expectation being that KATEP would later reciprocate with permission to develop uranium 
deposits. Just as ArcelorMittal made the active choice to immediately inject USD 50 
million into the Kazakh steel industry, Cameco made the active choice to trust that KATEP 
would later reciprocate.  
 Others, however, see trust as more closely associated with the institutional or 
structural environment of the firm’s operating location. Suzana B. Rodrigues, for instance, 
examines in a detailed monograph the failures of trust within international alliances and 
how they are repaired. Equally as cognizant as Teegen et al. of the relationship between 
trust and reciprocity, Rodrigues adds in a cultural (and thus structural) layer. “Reciprocity 
is a political weapon,” she writes, “that although not well understood in the West, is a very 
important mechanism for trust building in business collaborations in the East.” Practically 
speaking, she points out that in the United States contracts are viewed as impersonal 
documents maintained by a legal framework wherein China contracts tend to be highly 
personal and maintained through trust and commitment.
361
 
 There is no reason why both of these perspectives cannot be reconciled, in fact 
Rodrigues’ description of “reciprocity” as a weapon implies that it can be used or abused 
by an agent to achieve a particular goal. Further, Charles E. Stevens argues that a core 
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assumption of Vernon’s bargaining framework is that the “host government is 
fundamentally antagonistic towards foreign firms, due to distrust relating to their 
‘foreignness.’”
362
 Here he is drawing a direct parallel between “distrust,” “foreignness” and 
a “legitimacy” deficit, much in the way that proponents of the institution-based school of 
strategic management see overcoming the “liability of foreignness” as key to ensuring 
domestic legitimacy and thus decreased exposure to government intervention in the MNE’s 
local affairs.
363
 Recall, however, that in our examination of ArcelorMittal in Chapter Four, 
we saw some limitations to this concept – specifically that becoming more “domestic” can 
have negative implications if in doing so the firm becomes entangled in informal domestic 
politics (e.g. elite politics) or if the motivating desire of the government is in fact 
international legitimacy (as was the Kazakh government’s interest in bringing an 
international player to a legacy Soviet steel enterprise in dire need of international market 
economy-informed expertise). 
 Importantly, what Stevens argues (in his interpretation of Vernon’s work) is 
something different than simply an embrace of the traditional institutional distance 
perspective. In seeing “distrust” here as synonymous with “foreignness,” he recognizes a 
broader interpretation of essentially what Rodrigues argues in the specifically US-Chinese 
case. Simply to be an outsider, regardless of the country, is to be immediately suspected as 
distrustful. What then follows from such an observation is what we see in Cameco’s case 
here: that overcoming the “liability of foreignness” is not necessarily about being more 
“Kazakh,” but rather about being more trustworthy. That is a distinct and important 
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difference – and one that this chapter and thesis will continue to develop. Cameco’s actions 
in 1993 under this line of reasoning can therefore be equally attributed to agency and 
structure. The firm actively decided to “pay it forward” in a potentially long-term 
reciprocating relationship that in turn had a reputational effect as the firm became more 
“domestic” – a term understood here as having no significance beyond the trait of 
trustworthiness.  
 The facts seem to bear this out. In 1999-2000, Cameco finalized its contracts with 
Kazatomprom for what would eventually be a 60/40 uranium mining joint venture (JV) 
known as Inkai in which Cameco would not only maintain the majority share but also retain 
direct control over operations and marketing. Compared to other JVs formed between 
foreign partners and Kazatomprom, these terms were highly favorable (and continue to be) 
– almost all other Kazatomprom JVs are operated by Kazatomprom, Kazatomprom is the 
majority shareholder, and in some cases Kazatomprom controls marketing as well.  
 Further, we know that KATEP and then Kazatomprom were not seeking foreign 
partners for the sake of their “domestic legitimacy” as understood traditionally within the 
institution-based school of strategic management. Cameco was not expected nor 
encouraged to become more “Kazakh” but rather to make the uranium sector in Kazakhstan 
more international, through marketing (under the 1993 agreement) and through technology 
(under the Inkai JV) – precisely what we saw with regard to the Kazakh steel industry and 
ArcelorMittal.  
 We also know from the experiences of other uranium mining companies that there 
were in fact risks in becoming too domestic in the traditional sense. Uranium One’s stock 
suffered following the arrest of Dzhakishev because Dzhakishev – an elite within the 
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country who was increasingly viewed as a threat to Nazarbayev’s leadership – constructed 
the Kyzylkum LLP around Uranium One, Japanese investors, Kazatomprom, and an 
unidentified offshore company believed to be connected to Dzhakishev. This offshore 
company became the subject of the KNB investigation that led to Dzhakishev’s arrest, led 
to a larger investigation announced by the KNB of the entire Kyzylkum LLP, which then in 
turn led to Uranium One’s dive on the TSX.
364
 In other words, Uranium One’s close 
association with Dzhakishev – what could be interpreted as making the Kyzylkum LLP 
more “domestic” than, for instance, Cameco’s Inkai JV – actually decreased Uranium 
One’s ability to be successful in Kazakhstan. In this sense Uranium One’s association with 
Dzhakishev seems very similar to the relationship described in the last chapter between 
Voest Alpine Intertrading and Bulat Abilov (another Kazakh elite who fell out of favor with 
Nazarbayev) in the First Alpine JV.  
 Rather, domestic legitimacy seems to be more about mutual trustworthiness than 
about being more “Kazakh.” In World Wide Minerals’ case, for example, there was a clear 
lack of trustworthiness between World Wide Minerals and the Kazakh government. World 
Wide Minerals was convinced that it would be able to freely market its uranium outside of 
Kazakhstan; the Kazakh government was under the impression that World Wide Minerals 
would manage and maintain operations at a particular legacy Soviet uranium mine. When 
World Wide Minerals’s ability to market uranium was blocked, the firm suspended 
operations at its site, which in turn led the Kazakh government to expropriate the mining 
operations. This instance not only highlights the significance of mutual trust in a successful 
bargain (or lack thereof in an unsuccessful bargain), but perhaps even more importantly, 
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points to the fact that agency plays a critical role in maintaining trust – the Kazakh 
government actively decided to block World Wide Minerals’s ability to market uranium, 
World Wide Minerals actively decided to reciprocate by suspending operations, which the 
Kazakh government then reciprocated by dismissing the firm from the country. 
 To sum, broadly speaking Cameco’s successful bargain with the Kazakh 
government up through 2009 can be understood by the two actors’ ability to maintain 
resource complementarities among one another under a system of trustworthiness. In the 
early 1990s, when Kazakhstan needed assistance in marketing uranium, Cameco was there 
to help. Confirming the reputational effect of Cameco’s early assistance, the firm entered 
into the Inkai JV under terms that would eventually be much more favorable than under 
other production JVs formed with Kazatomprom at the time. By the time Kazatomprom 
announced an ambitious plan to make Kazakhstan the number one uranium producer in the 
world, Cameco was already well on its way in investing the necessary technology and 
capital to transform the Inkai deposit into a world class site capable of producing 5 million 
pounds of yellowcake per year.
365
 Unlike in ArcelorMittal’s case, these resource 
complementarities were not necessarily established concurrently but rather through iterative 
reciprocity – trust – over a more than 15-year time period (see Table 5.1 for a summary). 
Table 5.1: Initial Goals, Resources and Constraints for Cameco in Kazakhstan 
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Losing Trust: 2009-2011 
 A series of endogenous and indigenous events in the 2009-2011 timeframe 
significantly altered the operating environment for Cameco in Kazakhstan. Following 
Kazatomprom’s achievement of its first strategic challenge – becoming the leading uranium 
producer in the world – the state-run enterprise increased its pursuit of a plan aimed at 
completing the nuclear fuel cycle within the country, reaching out to Cameco for 
assistance. It was also during this timeframe that the Inkai JV came into full production, 
which triggered a clause in Cameco’s existing contract with the Kazakh government that 
would increase significantly the importance of Cameco’s relations with the regional 
government of South Kazakhstan oblast (where the Inkai JV is located). Furthermore, in 
2010 a new subsoil law came into effect, and it quickly became apparent that the Kazakh 
government would push firms operating under legacy subsoil agreements to comply with 
the new terms, despite previous assurances that this would not be the case – such as 
Cameco’s existing agreement with Kazatomprom that was forged under the 1996 subsoil 
law. 
 In this section we see how these new developments challenged Cameco’s ability to 
maintain resource complementarities with its Kazakh-based stakeholders. Just as Cameco’s 
success up through 2009 was largely characterized by mutual trust between the firm and 
Kazatomprom, following that period the firm labored to maintain a reputation of 
trustworthiness within the country, whether through Kazatomprom or through the regional 
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government of South Kazakhstan. Equally, Cameco over this time period became 
increasingly distrustful of its own stakeholders’ intentions with regard to the firm.  
Breaking the trust with Kazatomprom 
As Kazakhstan was on its way to becoming the number one uranium producer in the 
world, Kazatomprom turned its focus to a new policy aimed at transforming the state 
enterprise into a vertically-integrated transnational company “participating in all stages of 
the nuclear fuel cycle,” with the exception of nuclear waste disposal.
366
 Because the 
uranium industry within Kazakhstan during the Soviet era was part of a command economy 
spread across the USSR, the country’s legacy elements in the fuel cycle are disjointed – the 
full process is: production (mining); conversion; enrichment; reconversion; fuel pellets; 
fabrication of fuel assemblies; and nuclear power plant construction. Kazakhstan’s role 
during the Soviet years was in production, reconversion and fuel pellets, and while no date 
has been publically announced for the achievement of full vertical integration, 
Kazatomprom has signed a series of JVs and memorandums of understanding with Cameco 
(for conversion), Russia’s Techsnabexport (for enrichment), the China Guangdon Nuclear 
Power Corporation (for better fuel pellets), France’s Areva (for fuel fabrication), and 
Russia’s Atomstroyexport (for nuclear power plant construction).
367
 
Cameco signed its initial agreement with Kazatomprom in 2007-2008 to form the 
Ulba Conversion LLP, a 49/51 split respectively in which Cameco would mainly be 
responsible for providing technological assistance to Kazatomprom as it constructed a 
conversion facility in East Kazakhstan.
368
 Conversion is the process of turning yellowcake 
uranium (the final product from the Inkai JV) into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and 
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critically, since 2008 the market for UF6 has remained flat due to a glut in supply. By most 
market analyses, the dominating conclusion at the moment is that the construction of new 
conversion facilities globally is simply not financially viable.
369
 Cameco, perhaps not 
surprisingly, has therefore been reluctant to go ahead with the construction of a new facility 
despite the 2008 agreement with Kazatomprom – a critical choice that we will return to in a 
moment. 
This particular situation is not the first time Cameco and Kazatomprom have had 
different opinions toward uranium sector development in Kazakhstan. In one anecdote 
relayed to me by a Cameco director, the company faced significant resistance from 
Kazatomprom as it pushed to rubberize all production equipment within the facility – 
something that is “not commonly done” in Kazakhstan because “rubberizing the pipes and 
tanks add to your capital costs and capital here has been difficult or expensive to get,” 
according to the director.
370
 And so while Kazatomprom preferred to “deal with it as an 
operational issue,” Cameco preferred to avoid, quite bluntly, “acid tanks bursting.”
371
 
Because Cameco has maintained operational control at Inkai, it has been able to ensure 
such safety standards.  
Cameco has also long disagreed with Kazatomprom on who should market the 
uranium from Inkai. Kazatomprom has become increasingly more confident over the years 
in its ability to market uranium independently to global customers, whereas Cameco argues 
that Inkai-based uranium is more valuable if marketed through Cameco based on the 
concept of country risk. “Not every customer likes dealing with state enterprises and not 
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every customer wants to deal with a sole source,” the same Cameco director explained to 
me. In other words, “Cameco uranium” comes from the US, Canada, Australia or 
Kazakhstan, while “Kazatomprom uranium” comes only from Kazakhstan, making the 
latter source much more exposed to country risk. Eighty percent of uranium is sold under 
long term contracts, defined within the uranium industry as greater than two years – a 
significant time period for political risk forecasting, or put another way, a significant period 
of time to trust that the demand will be met – and therefore as Cameco sees it, customers 
prefer Cameco-marketed (country-diversified) uranium. 
Further, Kazatomprom and Cameco hold different philosophies on uranium 
production quotas in the country. While under open conditions Cameco would adjust 
production according to demand, Kazatomprom sets very specific quotas for each mine. As 
it was explained to me by a former official within Kazatomprom in charge of overseeing 
JVs, the state-run enterprise believes that if it does not set specific quotas, foreign 
companies will be opportunistic in their mining strategies, taking “the good 40-percent” at 
the cost of the “bad 60-percent,” and so an operating constraint was implemented by 
Kazatomprom that requires 95-percent efficiency in uranium resource extraction over a 
period of time set by the government. In other words, Kazatomprom does not trust its 
foreign JV partners to control production. “All companies have strategic plans,” this 
individual explained to me, and these plans are authored by Kazatomprom and outline 
specific production quotas (based “on geology”) up through the life of the mine (the Inkai 
JV has an expected mine life of 30 years).
372
  
It is on this subject of production that it became increasingly clear over the 2011 
timeframe that the pre-existing mutual trustworthiness between Kazatomprom and Cameco 
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was eroding. In 2011, Cameco requested permission to double production levels at the 
Inkai JV and the firm and Kazatomprom signed a memorandum of understanding to this 
effect in which Kazatomprom agreed to move ahead with making the requisite changes to 
Inkai’s operating licenses to allow this to occur. However, in practice Kazatomprom made 
no moves on the regulatory side to allow this to happen. Why? As a 2012 Cameco 
corporate document argues in reflecting on the challenges of operating in Kazakhstan over 
the course of 2011, “We expect [that] our ability to double annual uranium production at 
Inkai will be closely tied to the success of the uranium conversion project.”
373
 The 
assessment in Nuclear Intelligence Weekly was a bit more blunt, describing Cameco’s 
challenge as a “conundrum of how not to build a promised UF6 plant in Kazakhstan.”
374
 
 Cameco’s perception (as stated in the above mentioned corporate document) that it 
had thus failed to receive regulatory permission to increase production because of its failure 
to move forward on the Ulba Conversion LLP was in essence an admission that 
Kazatomprom no longer trusted Cameco. Whereas the two actors had previously operated 
under a system of trustworthiness in which resource complementarities could be realized 
iteratively over long periods of time as opposed to concurrently, Cameco perceived the 
production-conversion dilemma in this new period as only possibly resolved via 
simultaneously realized resource complementarities. “I have what you need” – the 
technology for conversion – and “you have what I need” – the permission to increase 
production – and I will not get the latter until you feel confident that you will get the 
former.  
                                                             
373 (2012) '2011 Management's discussion and analysis', Cameco (based on information known by 8-Feb-
2012), p. 81. 
374 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (2011) 
166 
 
While in the production-conversion dilemma it was Kazatomprom that initially lost 
trust in Cameco, it is important to note that another development during this time period 
caused Cameco to lose trust in Kazatomprom. Specifically, the Inkai JV had been signed 
under the 1996 subsoil law and that agreement included several stabilization clauses – 
terms that would be guaranteed to Cameco despite any potential future legislation. 
However, when the 2010 subsoil law was passed, Kazatomprom and the Kazakh 
government began to “encourage” Cameco to bring its operations under the new law. “Over 
time, we’ve found…that you get asked to let go of those contract provisions and follow the 
law now that the law has been developed,” as one Cameco manager described to me. In 
other words, the government decided to change the terms of Cameco’s operating 
conditions, despite previous promises to the contrary (what is known as a “stabilization” 
clause). On the smaller points, he continued to describe, if they are not “unreasonable” then 
Cameco will oblige, but larger points such as the right to international arbitration – which 
was not guaranteed explicitly in the 2010 law – create more friction and lead to more in-




How to explain this dissolution of trust between Cameco and Kazatomprom? If we 
look at the main points of friction – capital vs. operating expenditures, country-diversified 
vs. single-country uranium marketing, market-driven vs. state-determined production 
quotas and conversion facility construction, and finally honoring stabilization clauses vs. 
respecting more recent legislation – a clear pattern develops in which Cameco’s interests 
are in line with the expectations of the international market economy and corresponding 
legal system while Kazatomprom’s interests are state-oriented and rooted in either the 
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country’s Soviet past or contemporary nationalist strategies (or both). Less emphasis on 
capital expenditures and strict compliance with production quotes extend from the 
country’s Soviet legacy, when capital was not readily accessible and production was 
managed from Moscow; plans to complete the nuclear fuel cycle, maintain full control over 
marketing and disregard the previous subsoil law seem more likely rooted in post-
independence nationalist strategies aimed at establishing the country’s independence 
among foreign actors.  
Therefore in this time period it seems that trust dissipates due to structural gaps 
between the two actors, an observation more reminiscent of traditional understandings of 
institutional distance. The clearest structural asymmetry between the stakeholders is on the 
tradeoff between conversion and production. Kazatomprom, as an agent, is influenced 
structurally by the country’s larger drive toward independence and autonomy, which 
translates into a desire to complete the nuclear fuel cycle and maintain control on 
production by foreign firms. Cameco, as an agent, is influenced structurally by the markets 
under which it trades publically and the capitalist country from which it extends, which 
translates into a desire to only pursue financially viable projects and to increase production 
as dictated not by states but by markets. Seemingly the distance between these two 
structural influences prevents the two actors from achieving resource complementarities 
(see Table 5.2 for a summary). 
Table 5.2: Shifting Goals, Resources and Constraints 




Access to uranium 














At the same time, however, the fact remains that significant structural asymmetries 
existed between the two actors back in the early 1990s and yet resource complementarities 
via mutual trust were still possible to establish. How to reconcile these two periods and 
their different outcomes? Before we explore the answers to this question, it is necessary to 
take a look at a similar dissolution of trust though here between Cameco and the regional 
government of South Kazakhstan (in which the Inkai JV is located). We will then return to 
further develop the concept of trust in all of these instances in the chapter’s ultimate 
section. 
Failing to trust: regional relations 
According to the original contract Cameco signed to establish the Inkai JV, the firm 
was legally bound to spend a specific amount of money annually on social contributions up 
until the Inkai JV came into full operation (which occurred in the 2009-10 timeframe). 
Cameco spent approximately USD 4 million on social projects in Kazakhstan over this 
roughly 10 year period, a sum higher than contractually required due largely to Cameco’s 
own internal corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. In the end, Cameco decided to 
spend the USD 4 million almost entirely on the nearby village of Taikonur (Cameco’s CSR 
philosophy is to focus on the communities closest to its operations) and a local council was 
set up in the village to determine how the money would be spent.
376
 The council decided to 
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rebuild the local school along with the settlement’s water supply system and to construct a 
medical aid station,
377
 all sourced when possible with local people and local supplies.  
On the eve of the Inkai JV coming fully into production, therefore, Cameco’s 
bargain with its local stakeholders appeared to be cooperative and based on achieving 
mutual interests: funding social projects in Taikonur allowed the firm to achieve its 
shareholder-instituted CSR goals, while the community itself was able to leverage 
Cameco’s social contributions to improve local infrastructure. Once the Inkai JV went into 
full production, however, social programming shifted from being Cameco’s responsibility 
to technically being the Inkai JV’s responsibility (this was agreed upon in the firm’s initial 
contract with the Kazakh government), wherein Inkai was expected to provide the regional 
akim of South Kazakhstan with significant financial assistance on social projects on an 
annual basis, not unlike the situation between ArcelorMittal, the regional akim of 
Karaganda, and the city akim of Temirtau, as described in the last chapter. Just as was the 
case with ArcelorMittal, if Inkai (and by extension, Cameco) wanted the mandated social 
contributions to be tax deductible, the JV needed to sign a memorandum of cooperation 
with the regional governor in which both parties agreed on the social projects to be funded 
by the JV.  
Complicating Inkai’s ability to incorporate Cameco’s CSR philosophy into this new 
arrangement, however, was the fact that the Taikonur community is not legally recognized 
as a town by the Kazakh government because of its small size and remoteness. In other 
words, during this time period there was no Kazakh-based formal incentive for Inkai to 
spend money on Taikonur, while there was a compelling tax incentive to spend money 
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according to the regional akim’s interests, hundreds of kilometers away from the Taikonur 
site.  
Furthermore, as was briefly described in the preceding chapter, because a 
significant level of regulatory power is pushed down to the regional akimats in Kazakhstan, 
Inkai had significant operational risk incentives to keep the regional akim pleased. This 
point is a critical one to grasp as its implications for political risk management are 
momentous. Recall from the introductory chapter of this thesis the comment made to me by 
a Kazakh businessman. “Without a strong political roof,” he advised, “you have no chance 
to do business here.”
378
 This concept of the political krisha or roof refers directly to the 
firm’s ability to maintain strong regional level relations. In Kazakhstan, regional akims 
operate with relative autonomy from the central government. This decentralization, as 
Shahjahan H. Bhuyian argues, has not led to better governance but significant local 
corruption.
379
 And in neighboring China, Ting Gong finds a similar situation in which the 
failure to devolve power from local leaders has granted them significant autonomy 
accompanied with increased corrupt practices.
380
 
In Kazakhstan, decentralization manifests itself practically-speaking by the fact that 
all permitting and regulatory inspection is done on the regional level, controlled by the 
akim’s office (remember, for instance, that ArcelorMittal was able to operate for some time 
under eased environmental regulations mainly because of its strong relationship with the 
regional government). The akim knows, as a manager within the Inkai JV explained to me, 
that if the production facility shuts down for a day due to a regulatory roadblock, the JV 
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loses approximately USD 500,000. And so the akim can withhold permits or order a snap 
inspection, the manager continued, if the JV does not cooperate with the governor on issues 
like social contributions.
381
 Further, because of the complex and constantly changing 
regulatory framework, as one former Ministry of Finance official revealed to me, “the 
government sees that you can’t meet all the requirements,”
382
 and so if the akim wants to 
catch the firm in non-compliance, he likely can.
383
 Even for something as simple as a 
license plate one needs to pay extra, otherwise the application will just sit there, the Inkai 
JV manager described to me.
384
 It is therefore widely believed that the memorandum 
process on social cooperation is an opportunity for multinationals to curry positive favor 
with the regional akim, thereby reducing the firm’s exposure to operational risks as 
described above. 
While on the surface this may seem like a simple situation for maintaining resource 
complementarities (as we saw, for instance, with ArcelorMittal) – Cameco has money, the 
akim needs money, and both have a goal of improving the social fabric of the region – in 
practice, the akim’s goals as revealed to Cameco in the 2010/2011 memorandum process 
put the akim at odds with Cameco’s shareholder-instituted corporate philosophy on two 
fronts. 
First, as previously mentioned, the firm believes in supporting those communities 
closest to Cameco’s mine sites, a policy challenged by Taikonur’s odd status as a town not 
legally recognized by the government and therefore, as relayed to me by one Inkai 
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 not a priority for the akim. Second, the company is publically traded, which 
opens the door to constraints aimed at preventing the company from engaging in corrupt 
practices. The regional akim would prefer a situation in which the two actors agree on a 
series of social development projects after which Inkai would cut a check to the akim to 
fund their construction, giving the akim full control over which contractors, for instance, 
receive the projects – a significant source of power. In neighboring China this practice is 
similar to xiaojinku (“little money lockers”), in which local leaders are able to garner extra-
budgetary funds from local businesses.
386
 But as one Cameco director explained to me, for 
the firm “cutting checks won’t do – in fact, it might even cause problems for you with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the US,” along with complicating “fiduciary 
obligations to your shareholders.”
387
 This was confirmed by two Kazakh-based auditors for 
mining multinationals who both cautioned that if a company claims a certain deduction due 
to a social project, and there is no evidence of the project being built (or the amount spent 
does not match the value of the project), the firm can find itself in significant regulatory 
danger, for example under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (which Cameco is exposed 
to as it is traded on the NYSE).
388
  
In the 2010/11 negotiating period in which the Inkai JV was required to negotiate 
with the akim on social contributions (if it wanted to claim such contributions as tax 
deductible and reduce, theoretically, its exposure to operational risks), the process 
collapsed. Initially the JV agreed to support the akim’s budget for social projects at USD 1 
million, but when the JV asked the akim repeatedly for a government-registered bank 
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account to which it could transfer the money, the akim would not give one (Inkai believes 
this is due to the akim knowing that if the money went into a government account, it would 
be difficult for him to spend it on his informal goals – specifically, patronage to local elites, 
which we will return to in a moment). Instead, the akim provided the bank account of an 
NGO – what Inkai believed to be a front company established by the akim – and so in the 
end the JV transferred its social contributions to Kazatomprom-Demeu, the philanthropy 
unit of Kazatomprom.
389
 In other words, because Cameco could not trust the akim to spend 
the money as promised, the firm decided to take an alternate route. Whether or not going 
through Kazatomprom-Demeu would be tax deductible was unclear to Cameco at the time 
of the decision,
390
 but in failing to find common ground with the akim, the Inkai JV (and 
Cameco by extension) nevertheless left itself highly exposed to operational risks associated 
with the akim’s other sources of power (e.g. permitting). 
We see here in the friction between Cameco and the regional akim the same 
structurally-derived challenges that prevented Cameco and Kazatomprom from achieving 
their own resource complementarities, though in this case the akim’s actions were 
influenced not by nationalist strategies and legacy Soviet command economics but rather 
the informal neopatrimonial system within the akim’s area of responsibility. Traditionally 
research on Kazakhstan (and greater Central Asia) has focused on elite maintenance at the 
national level or between national level leaders and oblast-level leaders,
391
 but as described 
to me by various sources, the same basic concept of balancing competing interests among 
elites through informal patronage networks exists within oblast level as well. Equally it is 
the case that such neopatrimonialism is an extension of Soviet institutional legacies and the 
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pre-Soviet informal politics of the region (sometimes referred to as clan politics).
392
 So 
whereas Cameco as an agent was operating under the influence of its shareholders, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the NYSE and TSX, thus driving the firm to 
invest locally and avoid corrupt practices, the regional akim, alternately, operated under the 
expectation that Cameco’s presence would serve as a source for rents to spread to local 
elites (see Table 5.3. for a summary). 
Table 5.3: Goals, Resources and Constraints between Cameco and the Local Akim 
Stakeholder Goals Resources Constraints 
Oblast Akim Maintain stability 
Control over 










CSR funding Shareholders, regulators 
Trust and the Political Bargaining Model 
 Briefly restated here, Eden et al.’s PBM framework argues that when a 
multinational firm enters into a given country, the firm establishes a series of bargains with 
those stakeholders relevant to the firm’s in-country operations. Each of those bargains can 
be characterized as the intersection of the actors’ goals, resources and constraints. Each 
actor has its own individual goal or goals, it has a series of resources it can mobilize to 
achieve those goals, and while doing so it operates under a series of constraints. Resource 
complementarities between actors – you have what I need, and I have what you need – lead 
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 In our case study of Cameco, the concept of constraints within the PBM framework 
seems particularly important. Eden et al. rightfully connect the challenge of operating 
constraints to the more developed strategic management literature on institutional distance, 
and both of these concepts clearly identify with the larger theoretical embrace within the 
social sciences of the influence of structure on agents. Proponents of institutional distance 
argue that firms are less likely to be successful in a given area as the distance between each 
actors’ home institutions widens, and certainly this seems to be the case here. Philosophical 
disagreements between Cameco and its Kazakh-based stakeholders on topics like 
marketing, production, and corporate social responsibility (to name a few) appear to extend 
from larger institutional asymmetries, whether they be on liberal free market principles, 
nationalist strategies or the informal patronage network of an akim’s oblast. And further – 
and as we would expect given the institutional distance literature – clearly these differences 
complicate Cameco’s ability to be successful in Kazakhstan. These differences and their 
proposed structural roots are summed in Table 5.4. 
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 But while the institutional distances between Cameco and its stakeholders on a 
variety of issues challenge the firm’s ability to be successful in Kazakhstan, we depart 
somewhat from the institution-based theories of strategic management in understanding 
how that distance can be bridged. Recall that the traditional institution-based model argues 
that conformity to the host country’s institutional environment is a “survival value” for the 
firm, and therefore to remain successful in the country, the firm must embrace the country’s 
local rules and norms.
394
 “Legitimacy,” Eden et al. write, “can be achieved if the MNE 
becomes isomorphic with the institutional environment in the host country.”
395
 Does this 
mean, then, that Cameco can only be successful in Kazakhstan if it ignores its TSX- or 
NYSE-instituted operating constraints on issues such as corruption? Or that Cameco must 
build a conversion facility in East Kazakhstan despite the fact that there is no market for it? 
Or that the company should disregard its shareholder-demanded corporate policy on 
employee safety and instead allow the tragedy of bursting acid tanks to be treated as an 
operational risk? 
 Cameco’s institutional constraints appear to exist on a spectrum, from highly pliable 
on one end to extremely rigid on the other. And as described to me by individuals familiar 
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with Cameco’s operations, the ways in which the firm manages such constraints is directly 
related to their flexibility – the difference between actual legal constraints, for instance, and 
“best practices,” in that the former are more rigid (e.g. FCPA) while the latter are more 
pliable (e.g. shareholder expectations). Explicitly stated, the greater the flexibility of the 
institutional constraint, the greater the onus is on Cameco as an agent to adapt to the 
corresponding institutional environment of the stakeholder; alternately – and here we depart 
from Eden et al.’s expectations above – the more rigid the institutional constraint, the great 
the onus is on Cameco to influence its corresponding stakeholders and their associated 
institutional environment to flex to Cameco’s constraints. In other words, instead of 
Cameco becoming more “Kazakh,” in some instances the strategy is in fact to make the 
Kazakh stakeholders more “Canadian.” Trust is a key element in both of these situations. In 
the former, Cameco must trust its corresponding stakeholder to recognize that Cameco is 
operating against its own self-interest, and therefore will be rewarded in some way for such 
an action – which is exactly what we saw in the 1993 agreement that later turned into a 
favorable Inkai JV for Cameco. In the latter case, the stakeholder must trust Cameco: when 
the firm says a particular operating constraint is inviolable and thus requires the stakeholder 
to flex, the stakeholder must believe that Cameco is telling the truth. So how to build this 
latter form of trust? 
 As alluded to earlier, employee safety (manifested in Kazakhstan as the institutional 
divide between capital expenditures and operating costs) is one of those challenges for 
Cameco that extends from rigid operating constraints and thus requires, in Cameco’s 
estimation, the firm’s Kazakh stakeholders to flex. Cameco cannot simply say, “Oh we’re 
in Kazakhstan – cut the [safety] standards in half,” as one Cameco representative explained 
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to me. The firm realizes that they would “get pillared” by shareholders if something 
happened because they were operating to lower standards than in Canada, Australia or the 
US.
396
 So how to convince Kazatomprom that such safety standards are necessary? That is, 
how to convince Kazatomprom that it, not Cameco, must flex? Cameco’s strategy under 
these circumstances is to expose the stakeholder to other operations in order to build trust – 
to put it bluntly, to prove to the stakeholder that it is not getting swindled while other host 
country governments are getting a better deal. Specifically, Cameco flies key Kazakh 
stakeholders out to its other operations. In one instance, Kazakhs toured an older Cameco 
uranium mining facility located in the US and could not believe that the equipment at Inkai 
was in a better condition than it was in the US. The Cameco representatives reminded them 
that the Inkai facility was newer, so of course it was in better condition. Along this line 
Cameco also works in concert with the Canadian embassy in Kazakhstan to fly Kazakh 
officials out to Canadian mining conferences, such as the Prospectors and Developers 
Association of Canada’s annual conference, to further increase these stakeholders’ 
exposure to international best practices.
397
 
 We see a similar strategy in the firm’s reaction to the changes between the 1996 and 
2010 subsoil law that challenged some of Cameco’s more rigid operating constraints. As 
was briefly pointed out earlier, the firm remained willing to flex on most changes but not 
on the right to international arbitration (the right to international arbitration is the ability of 
the firm or the host government to seek an objective third party judgment on a particular 
dispute; for those that may question the objectivity of such a third party, it is worth pointing 
out that in World Wide Minerals’ case, international arbiters repeatedly sided with the 
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Kazakh government, not the firm). The 2010 subsoil law failed to explicitly confirm the 
right to international arbitration, which became an issue not only for Cameco but for a 
variety of foreign and domestic operators in the country. The overall strategy therefore was 
the same – increase the Kazakh government’s exposure to the industry-wide consequences 
of such a law in order to build a broader trust. Practically speaking, this meant that Cameco 
worked through its industry associations within the country to show how it was not the only 
one with this problem.
398, 399
 Specifically, the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) 
in Kazakhstan and the Association of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (AGMP) are 
two organizations that exist to maintain and defend industry interests in the Kazakh 
government. These organizations influence the Kazakh government in a variety of ways 
(see Table 5.5 for descriptions) – from reacting to controversial laws to working with 
legislators while laws are in draft form in order to ensure that the broader industry’s 
interests are defended. Whereas AmCham draws on all the major multinationals operating 
in Kazakhstan, AGMP consists of both foreign and domestic members, and thus adds 
credibility to Cameco’s argument that inflexible operating constraints such as the right to 
international arbitration are not limited to Cameco or even to foreigners. The net strategy 
remains the same as in the example of employee safety: influence the opposing stakeholder 
and its institutional environment in order to flex the host government to the home 
goverment – which is the direct opposite approach of what is traditionally argued in the 
institutional distance literature. Here the idea is to make Kazakhstan more “Canadian,” or 
in fact more “international.” 
Table 5.5: Making Kazakhstan more “international” through industry groups 
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Drawn from its 
membership, 
which includes 
almost all of the 
main multinational 
enterprises 
operating in the 
country; also the 
US Embassy. 
All foreign businesses are invited to 
become members of AmCham – the 
firms need not be American. 
AmCham draws much of its strength 
from both its membership and the 
understanding that its activities are 
strongly supported by the US 
Embassy. Most foreign investors 
agree that AmCham is the most 
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in support of foreign business, and the 
chamber is in contact frequently with 
deputy-minister level representatives 
in the Kazakh government. 
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consisting of 65 
companies in all 
mining activities 
outside of oil and 
gas 
AGMP is an industry-specific 
association and because it focuses 
only on mining outside of oil and gas, 
its predominating relationship is with 
the Ministry of Industry and New 
Technologies (MINT). The majority 
of its work deals with commenting on 
draft legislation that may affect the 
mining community or raising 
complaints with the MINT when 
miners run into operating issues 
because of new legislation.  
 
 The situation with the akim of South Kazakhstan is more complicated but captures 
neatly the spectrum of flexibility as it regards operating constraints – much like above in 
that Cameco was willing to adopt many but not all of the new clauses in the 2010 subsoil 
law. Whereas Cameco would ideally prefer to spend all of its CSR funding on Taikonur (in 
keeping with its shareholder-enforced corporate philosophy – an institutional constraint), it 
has opened itself up to the akim’s interests in social spending across the entire oblast. 
Going forward, as one Cameco manager described to me, Inkai will support:  
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social contributions in the area, and by “area” I now mean probably the region of South Kazakhstan 
because one of the criticisms we got in developing Taikonur was that the two akims400 were going, 
“but you didn’t spend any money on my projects,” [which was] true…[And so even though] we will 
probably continue the community based structure as well, I think we have realized [that because] we 
draw employees from as far as Kyzylorda, as far as Shymkent…we realize that we’ll probably look 
at doing [social projects there].401 
In other words, Cameco has since adopted a social programming philosophy more 
amenable to the greater region, seemingly justifying the project by noting that employees 
come from across region but nevertheless explicitly stating that such a philosophy is more 
in line with the interests of the local and regional akims – Shymkent is the capital of South 
Kazakhstan with a population of roughly 630,000. Such behavior is exactly what 
proponents of institution-based school of strategic management would expect. 
 Further along these lines, Cameco also recognizes the need to become more adept at 
understanding the informal politics of the region – in order to adapt to them. For instance, 
the firm employs directly or as consultants local Kazakhs that work on maintaining 
“government relations” but in practice are tasked with the responsibility of understanding 
and explaining to Cameco and Inkai management the formal and informal sources of power 
of the oblast akim and his corresponding akimat. One individual familiar with the 
company’s operations describes a government relations specialist for Cameco who 
“analyzes and instantly knows the clan structure [and] then probable power basis within the 
clan” of stakeholders critical to the firm. “You still have to deal with people,” this 
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individual describes, “but it’s better to know their interests.”
402
 This is particularly 
important with CSR spending, where local informal leaders “are really keen on mapping 
were those [social contributions] go.” As another individual familiar with Cameco’s 
operations continues, “You have to be conscious of the tie to the oblast, which fits into the 
broader tribal structure. Because that is what they [i.e. local leaders] are going to be 
thinking about…They want to know how this helps their akim.”
403
  
 While such a description of the operating environment resounds well with existing 
scholarship on neopatrimonial politics in Kazakhstan (and greater Central Asia), the fact 
remains that Cameco cannot wholly align itself with traditional practices if it means 
violating those less flexible operating constraints relating to corruption. As was previously 
described, in brokering the 2010/11 memorandum on social programming, the firm opted to 
go through Kazatomprom and not the akim of South Kazakhstan, effectively refusing to 
adapt to the informal institutional environment of the oblast and thus increase the firm’s 
operational risk exposure. In this sense, concepts like domestic legitimacy or organizational 
credibility – proposed by Eden et al. and Luo, respectively, as avenues for increasing 
cooperativeness in multinational company-host country bargaining
404
 – are at times largely 
irrelevant. If gaining domestic legitimacy requires Cameco to violate its seemingly 
inviolable institutional constraints, Cameco may actually cede the hopes of achieving a 
cooperative bargain and instead revert to a strategy more aptly described as conflictual that 
nevertheless allows the firm to achieve its ultimate goals to an acceptable degree. When 
Cameco decided to contribute to Kazatomprom-Demeu instead of to the budget of the 
regional akim, the firm essentially decided that the proximate goals of tax deductions and 
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domestic legitimacy were less important than those of social responsibility and adhering to 
shareholder-instituted constraints. This also runs contradictory to Eden et al.’s expectation 
that good social performance will result in lower costs for managing stakeholder 
relationships within a country and therefore result in higher financial returns for the firm.
405
 
In Cameco’s case, a commitment to good social performance (i.e. not participating in 
corrupt practices) would come at the cost of managing a positive relationship with the 
regional governor, which translates into lower financial returns as the Inkai JV is exposed 
to greater operational risk in the form of permitting and inspections. 
 Since the 2010/11 crisis, however, Cameco has increased its Kazakh staff members 
and actively worked to educate regional stakeholders on what the firm can and cannot do as 
it regards institutional constraints such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In other 
words, the firm has recognized that continually refusing to address its operational risk 
exposure at the local level is not a viable strategy over the long-term (i.e. it does not want to 
repeat the 2010/11 standoff). Therefore, again it has embarked on a policy of education to 
gain trust, though notably through Kazakh (not Canadian) Cameco employees (a point we 
will return to in a moment). The head of Cameco in Kazakhstan, for instance, is now for the 
first time a Kazakh with a background in key leadership positions within Kazatomprom, a 
series of local Kazakh banks, and within the Ministry of Economy and Budget.
406
 Further, 
other mining multinationals and individuals within industries supporting the mining sector 
(e.g. lawyers, consultants and auditors) confirm that a regional akim’s willingness to flex to 
a multinational’s home country operating constraints is generally directly correlated to that 
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akim’s past exposure to multinationals in his oblast – over time, as the akim becomes more 
sensitized to Cameco’s operating constraints, the akim should become more flexible. 
 On the most pressing set of institutional asymmetries between Cameco and 
Kazatomprom – conversion vs. production – the firm appears to pursue a similar approach 
of adapting when possible and terraforming when necessary. On the question of production, 
just as was the case in promoting the firm’s safety standards, Cameco exposes the relevant 
Kazakh stakeholders to how production at the firm’s other operations is determined – by 
demand, not regulators. In one anecdote that was relayed to me by a Cameco manager, a 
Kazakh official visiting a Canada-based Cameco operation asked an accompanying 
Cameco employee how much the operation produced in a year, to which the individual 
replied that the market determined how much the operation produced. A Canadian 
government nuclear regulator was also accompanying the delegation, and so the Kazakh 
official then turned to him and asked, “How much do you limit their production?” The 
official replied that his office does not limit production, and he waved his hand toward 
other potential mines that were currently being assessed. “If those get approved,” he told 
the Kazakh, “those companies could all open their mines to produce.” The visiting Kazakhs 
could not believe it, according to my source. “‘If the market will bear it,’” the regulator 
continued, then the investments will be made and production will occur.
407
 Here we see 
again the idea that bridging institutional distance is not always about becoming more 
“domestic,” but rather about bridging gaps in trust. This Canadian regulator trusts us to 
produce freely, the firm appears to be arguing – and so you can trust us too. 
 The fact remains, however, that despite the firm’s attempts at educating 
Kazatomprom on production, Cameco has become increasingly drawn to the conclusion 
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that Kazatomprom will not amend the current production quota structure in the absence of 
the actualization of the conversion plans outlined by the two actors in 2007-2008. Notably, 
this is not because Kazatomprom distrusts Cameco to extract uranium from Inkai efficiently 
(which is the traditional argument made by Kazatomprom for the production quota policy) 
– and therefore to some degree it appears the firm’s “exposure policy” as highlighted in the 
production anecdote above is working. Rather, it seems that Kazatomprom’s distrust is in 
Cameco’s willingness to fulfill its past promise on conversion. In other words, the friction 
here is not caused by a lack of understanding – Kazatomprom recognizes that the UF6 
market is flat – and therefore overcoming the dispute is not about increasing information 
that in turn leads to the state enterprise embracing Cameco’s position. 
 In fact Cameco initially attempted to settle the dispute in early 2011 by brokering an 
agreement in which Kazatomprom would have access to conversion facilities at a plant in 
the UK, the theory being that this would give Kazatomprom a stake in the existing 
international conversion market and thus allow Kazatomprom to achieve its conversion 
goals within its greater national strategy of completing the nuclear fuel cycle.
408
 
Kazatomprom’s refusal of this offer and continued pursuit of a conversion facility 
constructed in Kazakhstan underscores the obvious – that Kazatomprom’s goal is not a 
consequence of a lack of understanding of the international UF6 market but rather rooted in 
a nationalist strategy, and therefore educating and exposing Kazatomprom to international 
practices (i.e. low international demand for conversion), as has been the strategy in other 
challenges (e.g. safety, international arbitration, and corrupt practices) is largely irrelevant. 
In this situation, the roles are reversed – whereas in the past Cameco has often required its 
Kazakh stakeholders to flex to its own inviolable institutional constraints, here we find an 
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instance in which a Kazakh stakeholder is claiming the reverse situation – that the structural 
constraints under which Cameco operates must now flex to Kazatomprom’s structural 
constraints.  
 As the institutional distance literature would predict, it appears as if Cameco has 
turned the corner and realized that it must adapt to the nationalist strategy of its operating 
country if it is to gain permission to increase production. While this particular situation 
remains unresolved at the time of publication, most recently Cameco and Kazatomprom 
have begun to work out the necessary regulatory issues required by the Canadian Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission to allow a Canadian company to transfer nuclear-related 
technologies to a non-Canadian partner.
409
 It is the most serious step that has been made in 
the direction of realizing conversion plans in Kazakhstan since the signing of the 
memorandum in 2007-8 and is arguably a direct result of Cameco’s conclusion as identified 
in the firm’s 2011 annual review that an increase in production will be unlikely without 
moving forward on the conversion facility. Just as Cameco operated outside of its own 
short-term self-interest in 1993 in order to build trust and realize long-term success, it 
appears the same situation has presented itself to Cameco today.  
Conclusion 
 As we recounted in Chapter Two, IPE encourages us to see the MNE as the point of 
interface between the international market economy and the domestic political economy of, 
in our case, a country in transition. Scholarship within the field of strategic management 
provides us with a worthy theory in deconstructing this interface: that both the MNE and 
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the country’s stakeholders are heavily influenced by a series of institutional constraints, and 
that the greater the divide between these structures, the greater the difficulty the MNE will 
find in being successful in the given country. It then follows, according to the proponents of 
this theory, that in order to increase MNE success in the country, the MNE must adapt to 
the country’s structural constraints. Such an act is described as the ability to “become 
domestic” or overcome the “liability of foreignness” that characterizes an MNE when it 
enters into a given country.
410
  
 Eden et al. draw these institutional (or structural) challenges into the PBM through 
the concept of constraints. They argue that when the MNE enters into a country, it pursues 
a string of proximate goals that lead to its ultimate goal of profitability but must do so 
under a series of operating constraints that stem from larger institutional differences. But 
critically, Eden et al.’s PBM also recognizes that the MNE possesses a series of resources 
that it can mobilize within these operating constraints in order to achieve its proximate and 
ultimate goals. By bringing in the concept of resources, Eden et al. equally recognize the 
agency inherent within an MNE, and thus in our case, the PBM becomes a neat framework 
for analyzing the intersection of agents and structures (resources and institutions) against 
the setting of a uranium mining multinational’s political risk management strategy in 
Kazakhstan.  
 In many ways our case study of Cameco confirms what proponents of institutional 
distance would expect. When the institutional constraints stemming from Cameco’s home 
country are flexible, the firm adapts to the Kazakh institutional environment. On the 
regional level, this is most readily obvious in the firm’s decision to expand its CSR 
activities from the small village of Taikonur to the greater oblast of South Kazakhstan; on 
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the national level, we see such behavior in the firm’s decision to assist KATEP in 
marketing uranium and lately, to assist Kazatomprom in constructing a conversion facility 
in the country. It is important to recognize that all of these actions are not in the immediate 
self-interest of Cameco and in fact violate what the firm’s shareholder or market-instituted 
constraints would demand. However, Cameco is able to flex to the Kazakh environment in 
these instances because (1) these particular home country constraints are relatively pliable 
and (2) Cameco trusts that the firm will be rewarded over the long-term for such actions – 
on the regional level, by decreased exposure to operational risks, and on the national level, 
initially through the Inkai JV and now through the expectation that the firm will be able to 
increase production levels. Therefore, we slightly amend the current understanding of “the 
liability of foreignness” as described within the institution-based school of strategic 
management by arguing that there is an element of trust in bridging these institutional 
divides. Becoming more “Kazakh” for Cameco is related to the firm’s ability to trust that 
the opposing stakeholder will reciprocate.  
 Perhaps more interesting is the firm’s reaction to institutional divides that stem from 
more rigid home country constraints such as legal and safety demands and the need to 
maintain profitability through increased production. Here we provide a more powerful 
addition to our existing understanding of institutional distance scholarship. In cases in 
which Cameco feels it cannot violate its structural constraints, instead of becoming more 
“Kazakh,” the firm opts instead to make its operating area more “Canadian.” Again, this 
process relies heavily on Cameco’s ability to maintain trust with its Kazakh-based 
stakeholders. In these instances, Cameco exposes these stakeholders (literally in many 
cases) to the firm’s inviolable institutional constraints to impress upon the Kazakh 
189 
 
stakeholders the brevity of the situation. Cameco’s strategy here underscores the influence 
of structure on agents and agents on structure – the firm believes that by exposing these 
Kazakh agents to the US or Canadian institutional environment, the agents will in turn 
influence the Kazakh institutional environment to become more symmetrical (or 
isomorphic, to use Eden et al.’s term) to these legal, safety and capitalist principles. 
Compounding the success of this strategy is Cameco’s practice in bringing in other 
stakeholders (foreign and domestic) or other Kazakhs to reinforce Cameco’s 
trustworthiness – to essentially corroborate Cameco’s claims on what it can and cannot do 
(due to home country structural constraints) in Kazakhstan. In other words, when Cameco 
puts in place a new head of its Kazakh operations who is in fact Kazakh and with previous 
employment with a key Cameco stakeholder – Kazatomprom – Cameco is not becoming 
more “Kazakh,” but rather relying on Kazakhs to relay the exact same “Canadian” 
messages, enact the exact same “Canadian” strategies and enforce the exact same inviolable 
“Canadian” operating constraints. The difference is that these individuals are received by 
Kazakh stakeholders as more trustworthy – they do not bring with them the inherent 
foreignness (and distrust) of a Canadian corporate executive.  
 The Cameco case, therefore, tells us that the “survival value” as outlined by the 
institution-based school of strategic management is not necessarily about becoming “more 
domestic,” as in, “more Kazakh,” but about becoming more trustworthy. In fact, as we saw 
in the case of Uranium One and in Chapter Four in the First Alpine JV, actually becoming 
more “Kazakh” – by aligning, for instance, with elites – can in some instances challenge a 
firm’s ability to “survive” in a given country if by doing so that firm damages its 
trustworthiness (which seemed to be the case when Uranium One’s and First Alpine’s 
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respective elites fell out of favor with the country’s leadership). We now move onto the 
next chapter, in which we examine the bargains formed by a small gold and copper miner – 






Chapter Six: Junior Miner, Major Challenges: Frontier’s hyper-sensitive 
gold and copper developments in Kazakhstan 
Introduction 
 During the late 1990s, an American named Brian Savage was working on a project 
in Kazakhstan funded by the US government to help the country determine radiation levels 
in the former Soviet nuclear testing grounds of Semipalatinsk. Savage was at the time the 
president of Earth Sciences Services, a remote sensing company contracted by the US 
Department of Energy to provide the technology for the Kazakh project. Over the course of 
the group’s investigations into the Semipalatinsk area, they came across significant mineral 
deposits in areas free of radioactive contamination. Savage saw the opportunity 
immediately and left Earth Sciences Services to create Frontier Mining, a company 
incorporated in the US that would soon acquire the requisite subsoil rights to develop two 
gold and copper deposits in Kazakhstan within the former nuclear testing ground.
411
  
 In 2004 Savage would take the company public on London’s Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), known for its lower regulations and created specifically by the London 
Stock Exchange for companies operating under riskier circumstances – whether they be 
financial, political, operational, or a combination thereof.
412
 By the end of 2011, Frontier 
would employ over 500 people
413
 and operate under a series of subsoil licenses in various 
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stages of exploration and development across Kazakhstan, with financial and mining 
analysts lauding the company’s current and future potential success.
414
 
 To the non-specialist, Savage’s luck and Frontier’s case may seem highly unusual, 
but in practice, such instances are a regular component of the larger mining industry. 
Frontier is known as a mining “junior,” meaning it is a small mining company primarily 
focused on exploration and early stage development of mineral deposits. Mining juniors are 
the riskiest component of the mining industry – high potential rewards, yes, but also a high 
rate of failure – and they are designed to absorb much of the geological risk that larger, 
“major” mining companies (e.g. like ArcelorMittal or Cameco) are unwilling to take. Such 
juniors often begin with some sort of “local knowledge” – like in Savage’s case – and from 
there expand into larger operations. Once the junior has established a particular deposit as 
profitable, the firm has two options – continue to develop the deposit on its own (and 
perhaps grow the company into a mid-level player or even an eventual “major”) or sell the 
company to a major mining multinational and move on to the next potential deposit.
415
 
Roderick Eggert, a professor within the Division of Economics and Business at the 
Colorado School of Mines, surmises that in roughly 500-1000 exploration projects, 100 
might lead to advanced exploration of which 10 might become actual development projects. 
Of those 10 mines, only 1 is likely to become profitable.
416
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 To sum, mining juniors are hyper-sensitive to risk in all forms – geological, 
financial, and operational challenges are common and regularly threaten the company’s 
ability to be successful. All of these risks are complicated by political risks – as we will see 
in Frontier’s case in Kazakhstan, a geological delay may put the firm in violation of quotas 
set within its subsoil agreement if the license cannot be amended, exposing the firm to the 
political will of the regulatory body. Such a delay might then push back production 
expectations, which in turn could affect the firm’s profitability.  
 In this way and others, Frontier Mining – the third and final case study of this thesis 
– represents a situation distinctly different from that of ArcelorMittal or Cameco and as 
such, provides us with a set of unique circumstances from which to apply our bargaining 
framework and further develop our propositions on agency, structure and the role of 
stakeholders. Not only is Frontier hyper-sensitive to all the risks previously captured in our 
previous case studies, but additionally the mining junior’s deposits back in 1998 were 
“greenfield” (meaning that prior to Frontier’s activities, the mining sites were almost 
completely undeveloped), and the sites themselves were and continue to be several 
kilometers away from any form of substantial population (more so even than Inkai). 
Frontier’s Naimanjal site – its first development site – is 40 km from the closest village of 
Kurchatov, a city with a population of 8,000. Finally, Frontier’s operations in gold and 
copper represent a purely primary source extraction enterprise, playing no role in the 
country’s larger industrial diversification plans (such as is the case with ArcelorMittal in 
manufacturing steel or Cameco in contributing to Kazatomprom’s initial production goals 
and current nuclear fuel cycle plans).  
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 Taken together, unfolding Frontier Mining’s success in Kazakhstan introduces a 
series of new conditions for our independent variables which this chapter will explore in 
depth. We proceed in three parts. First, we look at the junior’s experience up until 2009, 
under which the firm’s success was regularly threatened by technical and financial delays 
that were amplified by political challenges from both the central and regional governments. 
In the second part, from 2009 up through the present, we follow the firm’s turnover in 
management from its initial founders and directors – primarily non-Kazakh – to a new 
management team composed of Kazakhs with deep experience in operating successful 
enterprises within the country and with access to capital from within Kazakhstan. Savage, 
for instance, would be moved from CEO and chairman to non-executive director by the end 
of 2008, and by 2011 would be off the board altogether.
417
 As the institutional distance 
scholarship would expect, this “Kazakhization”
418
 of the firm correlates neatly with the 
firm’s decreased exposure to operational (or institutional) constraints that previously 
limited the company’s ability to pursue its ultimate goal of profitability.  
 However, in unfolding Frontier’s experience, a larger theme develops with regard to 
our proposition on the role of stakeholders, to be covered in the final section. Though 
previously observed to some degree in both ArcelorMittal’s and Cameco’s case, Frontier’s 
junior status, which makes it hyper-sensitive to any changes within the operating 
environment, accentuates the importance of acknowledging and adjusting to the unique 
goals, resources and constraints of the firm’s various stakeholders, here specifically the 
differences between the regional and central governments. Frontier’s case shows that there 
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truly is no such thing as the “host country”: even within a given country’s own government, 
under the ultimate leadership of the same individual, there can be distinct groups with their 
own distinct challenges. In Kazakhstan’s case, these differences are largely attributable to 
the fact that – as Frontier’s experience makes clear – the country is still largely in transition 
from a Soviet Socialist Republic within a command economy to an independent nation state 
within the international market economy. 
Changes as challenges: 2004 – 2009  
 In this first section we look at two different dynamics regarding Frontier’s 
regulatory environment in Kazakhstan and the consequent challenges for Frontier that 
emanate from their combination. We begin by describing the legislative and regulatory 
process as it moves from the central to the regional government – from where legislation is 
envisioned and drafted to where it is enforced. Here we see how well-intentioned, rapid 
reforms enacted in Astana to make the country more competitive according to international 
standards are misinterpreted – generally unintentionally – as they are implemented in the 
oblasts (provinces) by poorly trained local regulators. We then see in the second section 
how the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Astana’s reforms are further 
complicated by the constant turnover within the oblast machinery itself (the provincial 
government offices), again, often under good intentions but with adverse effects for 
Frontier’s operational environment. The combination of these constant changes – either 
from Astana to the oblast, or within the oblast itself – place an added complexity on 
Frontier’s ability to maintain strong relationships both with central government and 
regional government stakeholders, as at times these stakeholders’ own actions may be 
incompatible with one another. 
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Top-down changes, bottom-up challenges 
 President Nazarbayev aims to create “the most attractive conditions for investors” in 
Kazakhstan, often at an alarming rate.
419
 Take, for instance, the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business rankings. Kazakhstan scored at 63 of 183 countries in 2010, leading the 
government to state as a goal by the year 2020 to break into the top 50 – which it 
accomplished well in advance, coming in at 47 in 2012.
420
 But as we noted in Chapter Two, 
despite such commendable rankings, the country nevertheless continues to score as a 
significantly risky environment for investment on most political risk indices. How to 
reconcile these two different perspectives?  
 Critically, the World Bank’s Doing Business survey focuses almost entirely on 
legislative reforms – not how that legislation is then enforced – and further, the measures 
within the index refer specifically to the “largest business city” in the country (Almaty), 
not, for instance, a mine site 40 km away from a town with a population of 8,000 in East 
Kazakhstan oblast.
421
 In fact, according to multiple interviews detailed within this chapter 
from government officials, trade groups, consultants, auditors, accountants, lawyers and 
mine operators (including, of course, from Frontier), the country’s rapid pace of reform has 
had the adverse and unintentional effect of creating a legislate environment that changes at 
such a rate that local regulators cannot keep up.  
 To highlight with a small anecdote, the very literature that the Kazakh Ministry of 
Industry and New Technology gives to English-speaking investors is full of typos or poorly 
phrased sentences, such as the following:  
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Nowadays the power has chosen the main priority in establishing a good dialogue with the business 




Passages like these (or the “50 milliard dollars” that the National Fund now has in gross 
reserves
423
) are rather harmless to investors – aside from the reputational effect such typos 
or complicated sentences may have on potential investors – but the same sort of sloppiness 
is evident in legislation as well – with much more serious implications for firms operating 
in the country. Typos or a misplaced comma can lead to alternate interpretations of the 
same legislation, or the legislation itself may be “inconsistent with other acts,” as the 
managing partner of one consulting and accounting firm relayed to me, requiring the 
mining executive or accountant or local regulator to make his or her own interpretation on 
how to reconcile one law with a competing law.
424
  
 The country’s 2008 change of the tax code captures neatly this confusion. The 
Ministry of Finance drafted new legislation over the course of 2007 to revise the tax code 
away from what accountants call a “tax stability” program in which a miner’s corporate tax 
rate would be locked in for the duration of the firm’s subsoil contract with the government 
(e.g. at 30-percent). Most developed countries instead work off of a tax rate that is variable 
– one that depends on the parliament and can be increased or decreased as these legislators 
decide, year to year. This latter system of tax reform is looked on as more favorable by the 
World Bank because it generally results in lower rates, and in line with such expectations, 
the Ministry of Finance claimed publically in the run-up to the new code that the 2009 
corporate tax rate would be 20-percent, the 2010 rate would be 17.5-percent, and the 2011 
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rate would be 15-percent.
425
 Not surprisingly, one of the key drivers of Kazakhstan’s 




 However, because the legislation was crammed through the Mazhilis (parliament) 
so quickly, the new tax code is full of typos, including misplaced commas that according to 
tax experts create space for alternative interpretations. Enter the local tax inspector, 
interpreting such changes in his or her own way. According to the director of one tax 
advisory multinational operating in Kazakhstan, these local inspectors always err on the 
side of over taxing, less out of a desire to “punish” the firm and more out of a fear of under-
taxing the firm and thus losing their job. “Don’t worry,” these local inspectors are known to 
say to firms, “[my judgment] will probably be overturned by the national government” 
(where the officials are better educated and trained).
427
  
 Of course, there is also no guarantee that the Ministry of Finance will change the tax 
rate as promised and in fact in some instances, the ministry has been known to change its 
mind mid-year and apply the changes retroactively for the entire year (as of 2011, for 
instance, the corporate tax remained at 20-percent).
428
 
 Frontier explains such risks as a result of the country’s “transformation from a 
command to a market-oriented economy,” warning shareholders that  
various legislation and regulations are not always clearly written and their interpretation is subject to 
the opinions of the local tax inspectors, National Bank officials, and the Ministry of Finance. 
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Instances of inconsistent opinions between local, regional, and national tax authorities and between 
National Bank and the Ministry of Finance are not unusual.
429
 
Tax advisors agree, attributing such legislative acts to “national pride,” wherein President 
Nazarbayev believes the country is in a new stage of development closer to being a 
developed rather than a developing economy, and therefore should maintain legislation in 
line with such a status.
430
 And to the country’s credit, such acts like the anecdote from the 
Ministry of Finance are well-intentioned and these good intentions exist across the 
spectrum of ministries in Astana. That said, good intentions in the country’s capital lead to 
confusion in the local akimats, and not just on taxes but across the full range of regulations 
concerning a mining operation like Frontier (to be covered specifically in a moment). This 
is largely due to a lack of training at the local level compared with the fear (as described 
above) of quick reprisal for any mistakes that favor the foreign operator at the expense of 
the government. One mid-level manager from the Ministry of Industry and New 
Technology (the MINT, responsible for regulating the mining industry) explained to me, 
half-joking, that “it’s a problem of what we call a ‘human factor’.” This individual admitted 
that there are some situations “where the law does not consider all the issues, or there is 
some kind of error” that then lead ministries to release “instructions” to local governments 
that are then further confused by the local regulators and inspectors. While acknowledging 
that “we sit here in Astana and sometimes we don’t know about all these problems,” the 
manager nevertheless noted that the local level regulators are “not very competent,”
431
 an 
observation echoed by mining juniors including Frontier.  
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Changes within the akimat 
 In Kazakhstan, the president maintains the power to appoint oblast akims, and in 
turn these regional leaders (akin to governors) maintain the power to appoint district level 
leaders as well as staff the akim’s machinery (the regulators, inspectors and general staff of 
the oblast akimat). Researcher Rico Isaacs describes this framework as following a system 
of “interconnected patron-client relationships” that extend from President Nazarbayev all 
the way down to the local level, a system specifically designed to maintain loyalty among 
all levels of leadership within the country.
432
 For foreign firms, this method of appointing 
government officials is complicated at the local level by two issues: first, as previously 
described in Cameco’s case, all general permits and licenses are provided at the regional 
level, and the revenue from such responsibilities is cycled back into the regional akim’s 
budget; second, government officials within the country – at all levels – are regularly 
rotated into different offices, often in different regions, under a policy aimed formally at 
reducing corrupt practices but recognized informally as a method for ensuring no single 
leader at any level becomes too powerful and thus capable of succeeding his or her 
superior. This is widely observed among the regional akims and the ministers in Astana, 
where Nazarbayev is continually shuffling these officials to new positions,
433
 but the same 
system exists within the regional governments themselves, all the way down to the local 
police officer being moved from district to district.
434
  
 This latter strategy – the constant rotation of employees – has the unintended 
consequence of preventing individuals from developing expertise in a particular field, 
                                                             
432 Isaacs, R. (2011) Party System Formation in Kazakhstan: Between formal and informal politics (London: 
Routledge), p. 64. 
433 See, for instance, Cummings (2005) 
434 Source-62 (2011), Mar. 24  
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whether it is taxation, environmental regulation, business development or investment 
attraction. Take, for instance, my own personal experience with an individual named 
Erzhan Sembinov, the Head of External Relations and Protocol for East Kazakhstan oblast 
(the region in which Frontier’s Naimanjal site is located). Apparently naively, I assumed 
Sembinov to be my best initial point of contact (as head of external relations) to discuss 
mining investment opportunities in East Kazakhstan, including Frontier’s operations, when 
I arrived in Ust-Kamenogorsk, the oblast’s capital. Sembinov, however, provided on a daily 
basis excuses for not being able to meet (while, notably, government officials in the region 
with much greater authority welcomed me into their offices). At points I even received 
conflicting messages on whether or not Sembinov was actually in the office, raising 
suspicions that he may be actively trying to avoid me – suspicions that were confirmed, in 
my estimation, when I had him on the phone at one point, lost the connection, and called 
back immediately only to be told by his secretary that he was not in the office. 
 Recall that Sembinov’s title is Head of External Relations, but in investigating his 
background, it turned out that Sembinov (in his late 30s) had held at least 10 different 
positions, many of which were unrelated to one another, since becoming Deputy Director 
of Traffic Safety within the oblast in 1998:
435
 
 Deputy director then director of Public Revenue in East Kazakhstan (1999-2002) 
 Director of a regional investment firm (2002) 
 Deputy director of Real Estate within the regional Ministry of Justice (2003-2006) 
 Unidentified private industry work (2006 – 2007) 
                                                             
435 (2011) 'External Relations and Protocol Department', Eastern Kazakhstan Akim Official Website, available 
at: http://www.akimvko.gov.kz/en/rule/akimat-vostochno-kazaxstanskoj-oblasti/apparat-akima-vostochno-
kazaxstanskoj-oblasti/otdelyi-apparata-akima/otdel-vneshnix-svyazej-i-protokola/personyi/sembinov-erzhan-
altaevich.html (last accessed April 14, 2013). 
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 Chief expert at the Processing Industry Department (2008) 
 Head of Foreign Economic Relations (Jan 2009 – Aug 2009) 
 Head of External Relations and Protocol for East Kazakhstan (Aug 2009 – Sep 
2009) 
 Head of akim machinery for Ridder town (Sep 2009 – Nov 2010) 
 And then in December of 2010, he returned to his position as Head of External 
Relations and Protocol for East Kazakhstan 
Under such conditions, Sembinov’s lack of professionalism in my instance becomes much 
more understandable – at the time of my trip to Ust-Kamenogorsk, he had just over a year 
of experience in external relations. Now apply this experience across the regional 
government, and one can begin to understand the “human factor” challenges facing foreign 
miners on the local level. One consultant for mining juniors in Kazakhstan described to me 
the great difficulty in simply finding a single individual within the akim’s office that 
understands at a minimum “the process of business,” because “they have no clue about 
mining practices, absolutely no clue, and it’s very difficult to explain to them why you need 
to do this, this and that.” At least an individual versed in business can “understand – at least 
he can hear you,” this consultant continued, and then he or she can in turn explain the 
situation to the person who is actually in the relevant decision-making position.
436
 Such a 
trend was affirmed by the management of another mining junior operating in the country, 
equally attributing the root of the problem to the constant “changes in the management of 
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the akimat,” under which “every new manager brings in a new team,”
437
 resetting the points 
of contact for a local mining operation.  
Frontier’s perfect storm 
 To review the implications of these different dynamics, let us take the position of 
the local inspector against Frontier’s operations in Naimanjal in 2005. As a stakeholder, the 
inspector’s formal goals remain ensuring that Frontier is operating according to the law. 
This goal is immediately challenged by the fact that the inspector is likely not experienced 
or specialized within his or her particular position, and further, the legislation pushed down 
to the inspector from Astana is changing at such a rate, with regular inconsistencies and 
unclear passages, that even if he or she was specialized, interpretation would still be 
challenging. Informally, the inspector recognizes that he or she is in this particular position 
of authority because of an appointment likely from the regional akim, a relationship 
traditionally understood in Kazakhstan to be one of patron and client. Because the 
legislation is inconsistent and unclear, it is often easy to find the foreign miner operating in 
non-compliance, thus exposing the miner to operational risks which could be settled 
formally by fines or informally through “grease” or outright corrupt payments, all of which 
allow the inspector to “reward” his or her superior through increased budget revenues 
(formally) or patronage (informally).  
 As stated at the beginning, by Frontier’s very nature as a junior miner, the firm is 
already exposed to significant geological, operational and financial risks in advance of this 
particular situation in Kazakhstan. If we now focus in on the firm’s early operations in 
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2005, we will see how all of these issues came together to challenge seriously Frontier’s 
ability to remain successful in Kazakhstan.  
 Frontier operated in 2005 (along with most miners) under a very specific subsoil 
contract that detailed exploration, production and investments across a strict schedule – as 
another manager for a junior described the situation, the contract is “very strict and you 
should be at any time in compliance.” The various schedules tend to be listed in 2 to 2 ½ 
year timeframes, and if at any time the firm anticipates needing to operate outside of this 
schedule, it will need to renegotiate the contract with the relevant ministry back in 
Astana,
438
 which in itself will take several months and therefore deviations from the 
schedule essentially need to be anticipated several months before they are likely to occur. 
Aside from the natural geological challenges that Frontier may encounter that would 
require the firm to renegotiate the subsoil contract, there are a series of procedures 
indirectly related to maintaining the subsoil schedule that require approval from the local 
akim. So in other words, as a manager for Frontier described to me, “you have the national 
regulation looking after your performance on the subsoil [contract] and the locals looking at 
[your operations] in their place [of authority] – construction, the use of 
cyanides…everything related to your operational place, and everything is controlled.” 
 Access to cyanides was a sticking point in 2005 that caused the company serious 
delays. The gold extraction process for the Naimanjal site leveraged a concept known as 
heap-leaching, which is the practice of dripping a cyanide solution on a large pile of 
crushed ore which in turn dissolves the gold within the ore into the cyanide solution, and is 
then collected to re-separate the gold from the solution. Unfortunately for Frontier, the 
company was mining ore out of the ground, according to schedule, but unable to turn the 
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ore into poured gold due to local delays in getting the appropriate permits to use the 
cyanide. This backed up the company’s ability to mine, as stockpiled ore reached several 
thousand tonnes without the requisite cyanide to turn it into gold, causing the firm to miss 
its 2005 production targets (“due to delays in obtaining the required permits”)
439
 and 
overall requiring a 2 ½ year extension to Naimanjal’s existing subsoil schedule.
440
  
 According to one individual working for Frontier at the time, episodes like the 
cyanide delay were common and due to “Western managers,” sent to Kazakhstan “to 
manage the company” who “ignored all the small things like regulation and tried to 
concentrate on doing things for the shareholders as opposed to the right way based on 
regulations.” This is a direct reference to these Western managers’ overwhelming focus on 
production at the cost of “small things.” After all, it is in moving from the exploration to 
the production stage that a junior miner proves to its shareholders (or London’s AIM) that 
the company can produce gold or copper at a margin. Proving that point leads to more 
capital which in turn allows the company to stay alive.  
 The rush, however, without the due deference to the regulatory process, is often 
what puts foreign miners in jeopardy. Lawyers in Kazakhstan describe similar situations in 
which the miner – unwilling to wait for the proper licenses – acts in a way or imports a 
particular chemical without a permit that then exposes the firm to government interference. 
“They come to us and we say that if you came to us earlier you wouldn’t have had this 
problem,” one Almaty-based lawyer with clients in the mining industry relayed to me. My 
source within Frontier agreed. “Not paying attention to the small things” and instead 
“trying to push” is a mistake that in the end will lengthen the waiting period. That said, the 
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situation is further complicated by the fact that regulatory or licensing agencies take much 
longer to respond to a given request than legally mandated. “Theoretically you could sue,” 
as the Almaty-based lawyer describes, but “as a practical matter you’ll never sue them 
because you’ll never get the consent.”
441
 In other words, bringing a lawsuit leads to a 
negative reputation which in turn will further expose the firm to the operational risks of the 
local permitting office. 
 How to interpret these challenges within the bargaining framework? In this instance, 
Frontier’s goal was profitability, or more specifically, the ability to produce gold and/or 
copper at a profitable margin. To do so, the firm mobilized its capital and technological 
resources, but under the regulatory and licensing constraints of the local and central Kazakh 
government, the looser regulatory constraints of London’s AIM, and the patience and risk 
tolerance of the firm’s shareholders. Because Frontier’s involvement in Kazakhstan does 
not fold into any of the country’s larger strategic initiatives (such as industrial 
diversification), both the central and regional government’s goals at the time were limited 
to revenue, mainly through taxes and fines in the case of the former and licensing fees in 
the latter. Informally, however, local level inspectors were incentivized to find firms in 
noncompliance (and thus subjected to fines) as a source of patronage for their superiors 
(that would translate into job security up the line of interconnected patron-client 
relationships) or as a source of leverage for small, local graft (i.e. payment in lieu of formal 
fines).  
 The friction point for these three stakeholders was on Frontier’s production. 
Frontier’s ability to produce affected directly the level of tax revenue the central 
government could draw from the company. If local government inspectors were 
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overcautious in assessing Frontier’s operations to the degree that production was seriously 
threatened by unnecessary delays, or if local government regulators could not process 
licensing requests (such as for cyanide) at reasonable time intervals, a situation begins to 
form in which the local government’s goals run contrary to the central government’s goals. 
And on a larger level, the more such challenges to Frontier’s ability to be successful in 
Kazakhstan become public or widespread across the industry, the less attractive Kazakhstan 
would appear to foreign investors, again challenging the central government’s ability to 
raise future tax revenue. This was all further complicated by the fact that Frontier, because 
of shareholder expectations to show as quickly as possible that the firm could produce gold 
and/or copper at a profitable margin, would apparently under Western management often 
ignore the regulatory bureaucracy, placing the firm in actual noncompliance.  
 Two larger threads are evident here, both of which we will further develop 
throughout the chapter. First, the tension between the central and local governments seems 
to be more of a tension between formal and informal institutions within Kazakhstan. While 
legislative reforms aimed at international best standards may emanate from Kazakhstan’s 
center, so too does Nazarbayev’s patron-client strategy that is replicated down to the local 
level. If government officials were rewarded (and held accountable) wholly on competence, 
then processing times would shorten, regulators and inspectors would be encouraged to 
specialize, and the consequences for overcautious behavior would be as dire as for under-
cautious behavior. 
 Second, Frontier’s active decision to ignore the “small things,” as one Frontier 
managed put it, reinforces yet again a theme we have seen across this thesis: that firm 
agency can contribute to or complicate the firm’s ability to be successful in a given country.  
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 We now turn to Frontier’s operations from 2009 onwards to see how these issues 
changed with subsequent changes in the firm’s management.  
Frontier’s Kazakhization 
 By the fall of 2008, then CEO Brian Savage was forced to recognize that the 
production delays at the Naimanjal site were “not technical in nature,” admitting that the 
site proved to be a “more challenging project than anticipated.” In early 2009, Savage 
would step aside as CEO and chairman in place of an individual named Erlan Sagadiev, a 
young, talented Kazakh with a record of business success in Kazakhstan. Under Sagadiev’s 
leadership, other Western managers who had been with the firm since the early years would 
be swapped out for Kazakh operators, what could be termed the “Kazakhization” of 
Frontier, or to use parlance from the institution-based school of strategic management, the 
making of the firm as “more domestic,” as in, more Kazakh. In the short sub-sections that 
follow, we examine this Kazakhization at Frontier that ultimately loosened the firm’s 
operating constraints under three key stakeholders: the central government, the 
regional/local government, and finally, the AIM and the expectations of its associated 
shareholders. 
Friends in Astana: Erlan Sagadiev 
 According to one Western mining consultant for the World Bank in Kazakhstan, the 
key to success in the country is for the firm to have “someone within the organization 
spending 99-percent of their time with local officials or national officials” in order to 
minimize operational risks,
442
 and according to my source in Frontier, Erlan Sagadiev is 
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that individual on the national (central government) level.
443
 Sagadiev was appointed CEO 
and chairman of Frontier at the age of 41 after successfully purchasing and running a failed 
dairy enterprise during Kazakhstan’s privatization period in the early 1990s. The company 
turned to be the largest dairy provider in Central Asia with “dominant” market share in 
Kazakhstan and Moldova and to a lesser extent in Ukraine, and in 2004 the company was 
sold to a European dairy multinational.
444
 
 In a US study on successful practices in foreign dairy-food markets, W.D. Dobson 
profiles Sagadiev’s company, Foodmaster, as a small case study in how to avoid corrupt 
practices associated with foreign markets. According to Dobson’s interview with a major 
Western investor in Foodmaster, the company “encountered relatively few problems with 
corruption because the firm is managed by a well-connected Kazak (sic),” that is, Erlan 
Sagadiev, whose father, Dobson notes, was president of Kazakhstan's Academy of 
Sciences. “These sorts of connections will allow a firm to be left alone by local officials 
who would normally solicit bribes,” the study concludes.
445
  
 But describing Sagadiev’s father as the president of the Academy of Sciences is just 
the tip of iceberg. Kenzhegali Sagadiev was a prominent figure in the early 1990s 
formation of the pro-Nazarbayev political party known as the Union of People’s Unity of 
Kazakhstan (SNEK). SNEK was an early advocate for a strong presidential system in 
Kazakhstan and supported Nazarbayev’s push to dissolve parliament in 1993, which 
opened the door for Nazarbayev to pass the 1995 constitution (strengthening the 
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presidency) and move forward with his privatization plans (as covered in Chapter Three). 
SNEK is widely recognized as the precursor to Nur Otan, Nazarbayev’s political party that 
today continues to dominate the parliament (in fact up until 2012, every member of 
parliament was a member of Nur-Otan, as noted in Chapter One).
446
 While it is true that 
Kenzhegali Sagadiev was president of the National Academy of Sciences from 1994-1996, 
more notably in 2004 he became a deputy of the Mazhilis (parliament) as the chairman of 
the Finance and Budget Committee and in 2007 as the chairman of Nur-Otan's Council on 
Diversification of the Economy within the Mazhilis.
447
  
  Under Erlan Sagadiev’s leadership today, Frontier’s subsoil licenses are routinely 
updated with minimal government delay, the firm’s annual reports highlight the 
strengthened management of the firm,
448
 and on a critical acquisition for the firm’s 
continued success – taking over a small Kazakh mining firm known as Coville Intercorp 
Ltd – Frontier received government approval. This last achievement must be further 
emphasized: in 2010, Coville and Frontier were in a 50/50 joint venture to develop a copper 
deposit with high expectations known as Benkala. Though Frontier expressed interest in 
taking over Coville’s share of Benkala and owning the deposit outright, the Kazakh 
government by law had the pre-emptive right to buy Coville’s share for itself, which would 
have been effectively creating a 50/50 JV between Frontier and the Kazakh government.
449
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 Sagadiev is also responsible for driving the further “Kazakhization” of the firm’s 
management team, as detailed in the two sub-sections that follow. 
The local krisha 
In Frontier’s first year under Sagadiev’s leadership, the firm was able to cut overhead costs 
at its operations by 50-percent, a feat attributed to Frontier’s “new and stronger 
management team”
451
 that happened to be more heavily staffed with Kazakhs. This trend 
would continue up through the present, a nod to focusing more heavily on the “small 
things,” such as maintaining strong personal relations on the local level, something that is 
“very important,” as described to me by one Frontier manager because there are bound to 
be “some misunderstandings” like those on permits or regulations as described in the 
previous section between Frontier, the central and the regional government. “This is why it 
is important to have someone who is local,” he continued. “If you need something, some 
permits, just send it to the local person and compare how quickly it is done.”
452
 
 When such misunderstandings occur, this Kazakh Frontier manager explained to 
me, “one option is fighting with the person who is [interpreting] the regulation,” bringing in 
lawyers, for instance, as is the Western approach, but this is less necessary with a strong 
Kazakh management team. Instead, there is “the other way,” which is to “sit with the 
person,” talk out the problem and determine a way forward to fix it. “That person is easier 
to talk with,” the manager continued, “if [you’re] Kazakh.” In fact an even more successful 
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practice exercised by Frontier is to sit down with the local inspectors before hand – to 
address potential misunderstandings before they occur – in order to “come to a good 
agreement,” the manager explained, “so if you do it this way, you will not have questions 
with him tomorrow.”  
 The 2011 appointment of Yerbulat Tastanov as Head of Government Relations at 
Frontier demonstrates well the type of local profile capable of ironing out any so-called 
misunderstandings. Tastanov’s career in mining stretches back to the 1960s when he was a 
researcher and eventually the Dean of the School of Metallurgy at the prestigious Kazakh 
Polytechnic Institute. With independence he held key posts at various state aluminum 
operations in the country that would in due course be packed together into ENRC, one of 
Kazakhstan’s largest mining companies with strong elite-level connections to 
Nazarbayev
453
 and in which the Kazakh government owns a sizeable stake.
454
 Under a 
contemporary system of government that does not promote specialization among regulators 
– or as one Kazakh mining consultant put it less eloquently, “because they are idiots”
455
 – 
an individual like Tastanov, whose background and experience commands a level of 
respect and authority, is seemingly just the profile to ensure inspectors and Frontier 
interpret the sector’s various laws in the same way. 
Out from under AIM’s shadow 
The appointment of Erlan Sagadiev also represents – along with the firm’s subsequent 
decision to bring on a Kazakh banker named Yerlan Aliyev in 2010 – Frontier’s revised 
financial strategy of moving away from London’s AIM and Western investors as the 
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primary sources of capital. Instead, under Sagadiev and Aliyev, Frontier would move 
toward Kazakh and Russian sources of financial support that would simultaneously co-opt 
additional locally-based stakeholders into having a stake in the firm’s success while 
loosening the Western-imposed operating constraints that would have come with funding 
from an internationally recognized bank.  
 Sagadiev brought to Frontier not only his competence as a manager and his strong 
elite connections to the ruling regime, but further his association with Zere Group JSC, a 
Kazakh-based holding company focused on entrepreneurial activity in oil, gas, mining and 
education that he controlled.
456
 In 2009 Zere Group provided a USD 10 million loan to 
Frontier at a time “critical to reinvigorating the financial health of the Company.”
457
 It 
would repeat the USD 10 million loan facility in 2010 and today is a major shareholder in 
Frontier (though Zere Group is now known as New Technology LLP). Aliyev’s 
appointment as a non-executive director likely opened the door to Russian financing, 
specifically from Sberbank from which Frontier received a USD 29 million loan in early 
2012.
458
 Aliyev had previously worked in high positions for a variety of Kazakh and 
Russian banks operating in Kazakhstan.
459
 
 Together these moves made the firm less accountable to the patience and risk 
tolerance of the firm’s Western shareholders – a challenge that previous CEO Brian Savage 
was unable to balance against the frustrating operating environment of Kazakhstan as 
described earlier. These moves also lifted significantly Frontier’s need to respond to larger 
                                                             
456 (2009) 'Frontier Mining Ltd Directorate Change', London Stock Exchange Aggregated Regulatory News 
Service, Feb. 9. 
457 (2009) Annual Report (Frontier Mining). 
458 (2012) 'Frontier Mining agrees US$29 mln financing for expansion of Benkala copper mine', Proactive 
Investors, Jan 12. 
459 See http://www.frontiermining.com/company/directors.html 
214 
 
operating constraints expectant of the international banking community, namely the 
Equator Principles, which are social and environmental requirements agreed upon by the 
world’s largest investment banks for investment in projects with capital costs of USD 10 
million or more.
460
 In 2010, Frontier acknowledged that its Benkala site was not Equator 
Principles compliant but that it planned on making the necessary changes in the near 
future.
461
 Then in early 2011, the firm announced that a team would be put together to 
determine exactly how Benkala could become compliant,
462
 a step lauded by corporate 
social responsibility advocates as reaffirming the strength of the Equator Principles 
association with the banking sector, as Frontier was in need of additional funding. The blog 
at Eco-Coach, for instance, connected Frontier’s announcement to the firm’s desire to 
receive financing from the British bank HSBC, an Equator Principles member.
463
 However, 
the project went nowhere and to this day, the Benkala site remains non-compliant.
464
 Why? 
Because it became an unnecessary expense in light of the fact that the firm’s financing now 
comes predominately from private Kazakh sources (such as Zere Group) or non-
participatory banks such as Russia’s Sberbank. See Table 6.1 for a timeline of the 
“Kazakhization” of Frontier. 
Table 6.1: The “Kazakhization” of Frontier 
Year Event Interpretation 
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Brian Savage discovers high 
concentrations of gold and copper in 
areas previously thought to be 
contaminated with radiations, creates 
Frontier Mining 
Typical way for mining junior to 
start 
2004 
Frontier Mining goes public on 
London's AIM 
Exposes Frontier to the UK 
regulatory constraints and 
shareholder expectations 
2005 
Failure to receive local permits causes 
significant operational delays 
Indicates constraining force of 
local government 
2008 
Savage admits that operational delays 
are "not technical in nature" 
Underscores constraining force 
of local government 
2009 
Savage steps aside as CEO, replaced by 
Kazakh Erlan Sagadiev 
First indication of 
"Kazakhization" of the company 
2009 
Sagadiev's Zere Group provides USD 
10 million loan to Frontier at critical 
time 
Indicates shifting of reliance on 
international investors to 
domestic investors 
2010 
Frontier acknowledges that Benkala site 
is not compliant with "Equator 
Principles" (necessary to receive 
international financing), but that the 
company plans to meet the necessary 
requirements in the near future 
Indicates that the company still 
maintains a possible interest in 
international financing 
2010 
Yerlan Aliyev appointed as non-
executive director 
Further indication of 
"Kazakhization" of the company 
2011 
Benkala site remains not complaint 
with "Equator Principles" 
Indicates less focus on 
international financing 
2011 
Yerbulat Tastanov named as head of 
government relations 
Further indication of 
"Kazakhization" of the company 
2012 
Frontier receives USD 29 million loan 
from Sberbank with strong Kazakh 
presence, a Russian bank that does not 
adhere to Equator Principles 
Indicates further focus on 
domestic financing 
 
Implications for the PBM 
How to interpret Frontier’s “Kazakhization” within the framework of the PBM? How to 
unfold Frontier’s experience against the domestic political economy of a country in 
transition? Perhaps it is telling that Frontier’s presence in Kazakhstan, compared to our first 
two cases, dates the farthest away from the country’s Soviet past and also appears to most 
closely follow what the institutional distance scholarship – focused on “domestic 
legitimacy” – would expect: that in becoming “more Kazakh,” Frontier has increased its 
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prospects for success. In this final section we analyze this argument, first through the lens 
of the PBM and then from the perspective of the country’s transition from a command to a 
market economy. 
Harmonizing constraints 
If we think back to Frontier’s challenges with production back in 2005, there were four 
areas of friction: non-specialist inspectors; the rapidly changing legislative environment; 
the informal patronage incentives for finding a firm in non-compliance; and the production 
demands of the AIM and Western shareholders. Now we will re-approach the situation to 
see how the firm’s operating constraints changed with the Kazakhization of the 
management team.  
 Whereas in the past the combination of poorly trained inspectors and a swiftly 
shifting legal system led to confusion and alternate interpretations of a given law (what we 
can term “constraint ambiguity”), with an individual as experienced in mining in 
Kazakhstan as Yerbulat Tastanov and with a strategy of co-opting inspectors ahead of 
inspections to agree in advance on the law’s interpretation, opportunities for 
misunderstanding decrease substantially. And because Tastanov is of course Kazakh, he 
does not bring with him an inherent foreignness (i.e. distrust) as other researchers have 
reported
465
 (e.g. Rodriguez, as discussed in the last chapter), closing the gap on the 
Frontier’s earlier legitimacy deficit.  
 Furthermore, while in the past such areas of legal ambiguity may have been viewed 
by the inspector as an opportunity to solicit fines or bribes and thus reward superiors – 
participating as expected in the country’s informal patronage network that extends from the 
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local level up into Astana – in Frontier’s case, under Sagadiev, this incentive is removed 
completely as Sagadiev himself is connected to top level elites within the country and thus 
interference in his operations would have a potentially adverse effect on the local level 
inspector. In PBM lexicon, whereas previously the local inspector held as a proximate goal 
the satisfaction of his or her patron – as patronage satisfaction is a resource the inspector 
can mobilize to achieve his or her own ultimate goals – under Frontier’s revised status the 
firm itself fits into this patron-client network and at a very high level, and therefore 
satisfying the firm’s needs becomes a component of the inspector’s expectations as a client. 
In other words, to some extent Frontier itself becomes the patron.  
 Finally, because Frontier now relies largely on Kazakh sources of financial support, 
the same sort of pressure to produce at all costs – at the expense, for instance, of the “small 
things” – is substantially relieved. Furthermore, the firm can ignore international standards 
in social and environmental practices with little repercussions. So, for instance, whereas 
Cameco was deeply concerned with how and where its social contributions would be spent 
and was unwilling to “cut checks” – behaviors influenced by internal corporate 
philosophical and external regulatory structures – Frontier chooses to “not deal with the 
details, [instead] simply sending the money to the funds,”
466
 as described to me by a 
manager within Frontier, such as in the firm’s USD 1.5 m liability to the Astana Fund or 
the USD 1.6 m payment to the Nazarbayev Education Fund,
467
 along with various small 
projects for local akimats.
468
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 All said, however, the firm is not completely immune from the negative aspects of 
the Kazakh business environment with its new Kazakh team. For instance, despite the fact 
that the firm’s acquisition of Coville was approved by the government, the process took 
much longer than expected – close to a year in length from beginning to end. Why? 
Because during the review of the transaction, President Nazarbayev instituted major 
changes within the central government. Specifically, Tau-Ken Samruk was created within 
the country’s sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, to handle the state’s interest in all 
mining ventures (outside of oil, gas and uranium). Essentially, over 2010 Frontier brought 
the Coville deal through the various government processes to obtain the appropriate 
ministerial approvals, upon which the case was referred to the Inter-Ministerial Committee 
for final review. Though Tau-Ken Samruk was founded in early 2009, the state enterprise 
seemingly had yet to fully develop until late into 2010, and therefore at the last moment 
Frontier was required to step back in the process, seek Tau-Ken Samruk’s approval, and 
then refer the case again to the Inter-Ministerial Committee (notably, when I was in 
Kazakhstan in 2011, many managers and consultants within the mining industry were still 
unsure of Tau-Ken’s exact role and how it would develop).  
 Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that although much of Frontier’s success via 
eased operating constraints is attributable to Sagadiev’s relationship with the country’s 
elites, the difference here between his case and the previously discussed cases of, for 
instance, Bulat Abilov or Mukhtar Dzhakishev, is that Sagadiev is connected to the “right” 
elites, that is, his father who is connected to President Nazarbayev. Recall, however, that at 
one time both Abilov and Dzhakishev shared connections with Nazarbayev – connections 
that quickly turned sour and resulted in negative repercussions for the firms associated with 
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these individuals. No doubt Frontier runs the same risks. If, for instance, Kazakhstan’s next 
president does not share the same positive relations with the Sagadiev family, Frontier’s 
status could be put in jeopardy to a greater degree than had the firm decided not to involve 
itself in elite-level politics.  
 Taken together, however, Frontier as it exists today compared to Frontier during the 
early years appears to largely validate the main propositions of scholarship on institutional 
distance and the institution-based school of strategic management, with a few 
qualifications. While it is true that the Kazakhization of the firm helped bridge the 
structural distances between the firm and its stakeholders – from focusing on the “small 
things” to removing the incentive for opportunistic graft or over judicious fining – 
constraint or institutional uncertainty can nevertheless exist and can regardless of the firm’s 
foreign or domestic status, complicate the firm’s ability to be successful. As the Coville 
process indicates, the constant changes within the formal institutions of the country 
increase uncertainty which leads to operational challenges for foreign and domestic firms 
alike.  
 Further, Frontier’s strategy of sitting down with inspectors ahead of time to come to 
an agreement on a law’s interpretation is not in itself a result of the firm’s Kazakhization 
(though it is certainly aided by the fact that the conversation exists between Kazakhs, and 
therefore does not maintain the same inherent distrust potentially attributable to a 
foreigner). Just as Frontier’s Western managers actively chose to avoid the “small things,” 
Frontier’s Kazakh management opted to speak in advance with inspectors to iron out the 
“small things.” Both cases highlight the significance of the firm’s agency, the difference 
being that the Kazakh managers clearly took the local regulatory environment more 
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seriously. This brings us back to a comment made by one Western lawyer with significant 
experience in the country referenced in Chapter One: that Western investors often mistake 
“risky” investment environments as ones in which they can take shortcuts. In other words, 
the institutional distances between the firm and the host country may actually be closer than 
expected – i.e. on simple concepts like ensuring you have a permit for cyanide use – but the 
foreign firm misperceives the country, because of its frontier or “risky” status, as being the 
kind of place where such details can be glossed over. In this sense, the “distance” in the 
concept of institutional distance may be to some degree more about perceived distance than 
actual distance. 
Formal vs. Informal Networks in Transition 
 Perhaps the most interesting theme to arise from Frontier’s case is the unintended 
consequence of Astana-driven reforms on local governance – specifically, the observation 
that in rushing to draft and enact legislation more aligned with international norms, the 
central government promotes unintentionally a degree of confusion and uncertainty at local 
levels of government that in fact increase a firm’s operational risk exposure. Paradoxically, 
in successfully improving its position within the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
rankings, Kazakhstan actually creates a business environment locally that makes doing 
business more difficult. As this trend regards formal governance, it is important to 
recognize that the increased uncertainty is potentially temporary – that while the changes 
may be rapid, thus making it difficult for local inspectors and regulators to keep up, at some 
point the legislative reforms should stabilize.  
 However, as we have seen, the legal ambiguity at the local level is only partly 
attributed to changes in formal governance. The problem is also largely due to the constant 
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rotation of government officials from the central down to the local level, along with the 
impetus to remain loyal within the country’s informal network of patron-client 
relationships. The former strategy ensures a lack of specialization, leading to poorly-
informed inspectors and regulators; the latter behavior incentivizes inspectors and 
regulators to seek out opportunities to solicit brides or impose fines. So while agents in 
Astana are actively trying to reshape the country’s formal structural influences on 
individuals (or firms) operating in Kazakhstan with laudable intentions, these same agents 
continue to reify the country’s legacy informal structural influences. The impression is one 
in which the informal structural components of the business environment bleed through 
whenever there is formal institutional uncertainty, intentionally or unintentionally – 
uncertainty about a particular law, for instance, or uncertainty regarding whether a 
particular individual can be trusted to maintain a position of power for a lengthy period of 
time. This is exactly what Gül Berna Özcan describes, for instance, in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, where informal networks “provide a degree of stability” for small and medium 
sized businesses or entrepreneurs faced with high uncertainty in legal and institutional 
structures – in other words, these networks can actually be enabling.
469
 This dynamic, 
which the Frontier case (as a hyper-sensitive mining junior) has clearly underscored in 
Kazakhstan in a way much more visible than previously observed in the situation of either 
ArcelorMittal and Cameco, is a point we will return to the penultimate chapter.  
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 Frontier Mining is not the largest steel manufacturer in the world, or one of the 
largest publically traded global uranium multinationals; Frontier is a mining junior that 
employs very few individuals and produces a product that in itself does not contribute to 
any of Kazakhstan’s larger strategic initiatives. Taken together, Frontier allows us to 
process-trace “success” and the interaction of our independent variables under a very 
different set of conditions. At the very least, this case in itself highlights how even within a 
given sector – mining outside of oil and gas – there are a variety of sub-sectors, each with 
its own set of unique technical, non-technical and financial challenges. Frontier’s hyper-
sensitivity, in this sense, has teased out the clear uncertainty that exists at the local level in 
institutions, both formal and informal, and what we see is in many ways what the 
institutional distance literature would expect – an increasing domestication of the firm that 
parallels the company’s rebound to success. That said, let us not forget that once again, the 
firm’s own agency plays a large role in this success (and in the firm’s previous challenges), 
and specifically, the idea of how paying attention to the “small things” is less about 
whatever actual “distances” may exist between the regulatory environment in Kazakhstan 
and Frontier’s historical association with American management and continued association 
with London’s AIM, but rather more about the firm’s perception of that distance: a 
perception that sees the country as one in which the firm can take regulatory shortcuts. 
Further, the company’s goal for overcoming the formal institutional uncertainty is not 
completely pinned to simply swapping out impatient Americans with Kazakhs. While 
clearly elite associations in this instance are an asset (though over the long term, a 
questionable asset given the uncertainty that equally exists within elite-level politics), 
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communication – just as we saw with ArcelorMittal and Cameco – plays a significant role. 
It is not just that Yerbolat Tastanov is a local, it is that he is a local with deep knowledge of 
the sector and the willingness to sit down with local inspectors and ensure both he and his 
stakeholders identify and interpret the firm’s operating constraints in the same way. This is, 
in many respects, no different than Cameco flying out Kazakhs to Canada and the US, or 
ArcelorMittal’s CEO sitting down with Nazarbayev to discuss the privatization of Karmet, 
or ArcelorMittal’s meetings with Kazakh stakeholders to explain the impact of the financial 
crisis on the global supply and demand of steel: communication breeds understanding, and 
in doing so, reduces uncertainty. We now turn to the penultimate chapter to explore further 




Chapter Seven: Political Risk and the Political Bargaining Model 
Introduction  
 In this penultimate chapter, we now consider our three cases not as individual 
studies but as a between-cases design, looking to draw parallels and distinctions among the 
different pathways that have led these firms to be seemingly successful in the “risky” 
country of Kazakhstan. As we noted from the outset, by holding our dependent variable 
constant – “success” – we have allowed for the possibility of equifinality, or the idea that 
alternate pathways can lead to the same ultimate outcome. This chapter will now proceed 
by examining these alternate pathways in the context of our larger research objectives: first, 
to assess the PBM as a response to the ontological and epistemological dilemmas recounted 
within traditional political risk analysis that prevent us from accounting for successful firms 
in so-called risky countries; then, to explore the agent-structure implications of our case 
studies, and how existing understandings of the role of agents and structures and their 
consequent interaction can better inform our understanding of firm success.  
The PBM as a response to traditional political risk analysis 
 The first major barrier to accounting for a firm’s ability to be successful in a given 
location, we proposed, is the existing scholarship’s ontological embrace of the host country 
as the unit of analysis. Even a cursory reading of the highly practically-oriented research 
within CSR makes clear that the concept of the “host country” is a myth – there is no 
single, unified country that a firm interacts with, but rather a series of stakeholders from the 
local to the national and even international level that are more sensibly understood as those 
individuals or groups that can affect a firm’s ability to operate in a given location. 
Epistemologically, we proposed that typical political risk analysis misleadingly approaches 
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the concept of risk and risky behavior through the host country, which, putting aside for a 
moment the ontological argument against such a focus, equally remains problematic 
because such an approach strips from the firm its own agency while overstating the agency 
of the host country – when a political event occurs that threatens the firm’s existence, such 
as the decision to expropriate the firm’s operations, the blame rests with the host country 
with little deference to the corresponding behaviors of the firm. Here we turned to the 
extant scholarly debate on the role of agents and structures to propose that the firm, like its 
stakeholders, both shapes and is shaped by the multiple structures within which it operates.  
 Taken together, these ontological and epistemological barriers are captured neatly 
within the political risk index – the standard product of political risk research – and 
consequently we argued that a more appropriate framework for understanding political risk 
would be to focus in on the relationships a firm builds and manages (and mismanages) with 
its stakeholders, understanding the unit of the “relationship” as one that would allow us the 
epistemological freedom to investigate the role of both agency and structure within the 
context of our three deviant cases within the mining industry in Kazakhstan – firms 
operating successfully in a country in which we would expect them to fail. Conveniently, 
Eden et al.’s PBM provides just such a framework for studying firm-stakeholder relations, 
understanding each relationship (or bargain) formed between a given firm and a stakeholder 
as a function of the intersection of the goals of each actor, the resources each actor can 
mobilize to achieve those goals, and the constraints under which each actor must operate 
while it leverages those resources. In doing so, the PBM brings together two existing 
schools within IB study – resource- and institution-based theories on strategic management 
– which dovetail neatly with our interest in the interactions of agents and structures. The 
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resource-based school, as will be recalled, focuses on a firm’s active management style in 
responding to local uncertainty, while the institution-based school sees conformity to the 
institutional environment as a “survival value” for the foreign firm and argues for following 
local rules and norms. 
Resource complementarities 
 Eden et al. propose within their PBM that actors with complementary resources – 
the “I have what you need, you have what I need” philosophy – will lead to positive, 
cooperative relations as both actors can leverage one another to achieve their own 
respective goals. Broadly speaking, this expectation is realized across the three cases 
presented within this thesis. Just as Vernon observed many decades ago in his own 
research, here within the mining sector in Kazakhstan resource complementarities are based 
largely on an exchange of capital and technology (on the part of the mining firm) in return 
for access to the mineral deposit, affordable labor, the necessary permits and licenses and 
noninterference in the firm’s operations, with each complementary resource (and here is 
where we depart from Vernon and embrace instead Eden et al.’s updated bargain) with its 
own corresponding stakeholder, such as the central government (or a specific ministry), 
labor unions, the regional government (akimat) and its governor (akim), and the local 
community, from Temirtau to Taikonor to Kurchatov. In return, each of these stakeholders 
draws resources from the firm to achieve its own goals, ranging from budget revenue to 
employment to funding for local social projects and even maintenance of informal power 
networks. In ArcelorMittal’s and Cameco’s cases, we can add to this web of corresponding 
relationships the fact that both of these mining firms add value beyond what we would 
traditionally expect from primary-resource oriented multinationals – steel from Temirtau is 
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used in cars manufactured in East Kazakhstan and pipes for the oil industry on the Caspian 
coast, while uranium from Inkai allows the country to retain its place as the leading 
producer of uranium worldwide and one day may be further processed into UF6 via a 
conversion plant based on Cameco technology. In both cases, these firms complement the 
Kazakh central government’s larger strategic objectives on industrial diversification, not 
simply revenue drawn from primary resource exports.  
 Now we can enhance the existing understanding of resource complementarities 
within the PBM framework (and the greater resource-based school of strategic 
management) by drawing from our cases a few important modifications to our largely 
confirmed Agent/Resource Proposition: that achieving and maintaining resource 
complementarities with stakeholders is an active, dynamic process, wherein wide latitude 
exists for both the firm and the stakeholder to achieve (or mishandle) such potentially 
cooperative relations; second, that while valuation of the opposing stakeholder’s resources, 
as Eden et al. predict, is important (resource valuation), resource self-valuation is equally 
critical as the two are interrelated; and third, that high resource complementarities in the 
absence of institutional similarities can actually challenge the firm’s ability to maintain 
cooperative relations with relevant stakeholders. 
 Recall, for instance, that ArcelorMittal’s CEO Lakshmi Mittal explicitly discussed 
with President Nazarbayev the priority resource deficits within Kazakhstan that the firm 
should address with its own resources, allowing the firm to realize those activities that were 
non-negotiable and those open to further debate. Unlike in the cases of First Alpine and US 
Steel, ArcelorMittal knew that to be successful the firm first had to settle wage arrears and 
debts while maintaining employment, in advance of activities aimed at increasing 
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production (which would normally be the firm’s primary objective); at the same time, the 
firm was able to renegotiate its initial role with regard to Karmet’s several non-core 
business activities, shifting the burden from ownership and management to only financing 
(unlike in US Steel’s case, for instance, in which the firm assumed full ownership and 
management of all non-core activities). It is equally the case that when the equilibrium in 
resource complementarities between ArcelorMittal and the labor unions collapsed during 
the early 2000s steel boom, it was not because Kazakhstan was a “risky country” but 
because ArcelorMittal had actively ignored labor union requests for increased wages and 
increased investments in healthy and safety. When these demands were met (along with the 
added pressure by other stakeholders with an interest in seeing productivity return), the 
bargain between the two actors returned from conflictual to cooperative. 
 In Cameco’s case, the firm made the unusual decision in the early 1990s to satisfy 
Kazakhstan’s inability to successfully market uranium despite the fact that this choice was 
not at the time perceived to be in the firm’s short term interests; later this “pay it forward” 
strategy would result in a highly favorable JV structure as the firm established a production 
presence in the country. That said, currently Cameco finds Kazatomprom stalling on the 
firm’s request to increase production, again, not because Kazakhstan is a risky country, but 
because Cameco had earlier agreed to provide Kazatomprom with the technology to 
construct a conversion plant and yet had equally been stalling to satisfy this promise. And 
early challenges for Frontier Mining were similarly due not to Kazakhstan’s so-called risky 
business environment but rather because the firm’s managers actively chose to avoid the 
“small things” (e.g. in permitting), which led to production delays. When the firm brought 
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in new management that placed greater concern on the permitting and regulatory process, 
the mining junior’s ability to operate successfully increased dramatically. 
 The fact that the equilibrium in resource complementarities between actors is not 
static but rather dynamic is clear in the ever-shifting valuation and self-valuation of each 
actor’s resources. There is little doubt, for instance, that ArcelorMittal benefited from the 
failures of previous Karmet privatization attempts. Recall the observation at the time of 
Zhannat Ertlesova, the then deputy economics minister: by the time of the ArcelorMittal 
deal a considerable “change in the psychology” of the Kazakh people had occurred as it 
regarded social services – an increased appreciation that everything comes at a cost despite 
what may have been considered to be free in the past.
470
 In other words, key Kazakh 
stakeholders had, by the time ArcelorMittal expressed interest in Karmet, lowered their 
own self-valuation of the enterprise and its responsibilities. It is equally the case that during 
the steel boom of the 2000s period the labor unions shifted their own self-valuation of their 
worth to the firm as miners and metallurgists. Recall the human interest piece on the 
assistant steel worker at Karmet who was happy just to have a job and a steady paycheck 
back when ArcelorMittal arrived in 1995, but by 2004 felt undervalued by the firm.
471
 In 
Cameco’s case, the firm valued its ability to market uranium at a level much higher than as 
perceived by Kazatomprom, with the fact that the firm could draw on a resource base with 
diversified country risk (Kazakhstan, Australia, United States and Canada) being of little 
significance to Kazatomprom and thus frustrating the two actors’ ability to maintain 
resource complementarities. Whereas Eden et al. focus on the concept of resource valuation 
– how one actor assesses the opposing actor’s resources – what our cases make clear is that 
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resource valuation is as much about how an actor self-values his or her own resources in 
achieving resource complementarities. This has significant implications for the influencing 
role of agents and structures, to be discussed in the following section.  
 But perhaps the most interesting adjustment to the existing understanding of 
resource complementarities within the PBM comes from the ways in which resources 
interact with constraints – what, on a larger level, can be understood as the interactions 
between the resource-based and institution-based theories of strategic management. This is 
most apparent in Cameco’s challenges with the akim of South Kazakhstan, in which there 
appeared to be strong resource complementarities in that Cameco needed to spend a given 
sum on social responsibility and powerful incentives existed for that sum to be spent in 
coordination with the akim. Due to the firm’s institutional constraints (e.g. the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act – the FCPA), however, Cameco backed away from a deal with the 
akim and as such increased the firm’s exposure to operational risks. What this incident 
highlights is the idea that in the absence of institutional constraint similarity – i.e. an equal 
appreciation between actors on constraints such as the FCPA – resource complementarities 
are not guarantors of reduced political uncertainty, and in fact it likely means an increase in 
political uncertainty. Why? Because resource complementarities indicate that opposing 
stakeholders hold resources deemed valuable to each other in achieving their respective 
goals, and if one actor refuses to engage in this potentially cooperative relationship (e.g. 
Cameco refusing to deposit cash into the akim's alleged front company) then by default the 
opposing actor can equally withdraw its resource from the bargain (e.g. the governor 
stalling on permit approval). Under such conditions, political uncertainty is high as 
opposing stakeholders can be expected to mobilize alternate resources to achieve their 
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respective goals (e.g. a hypothetical snap inspection at the Inkai production facility that 
shuts the operation down for a day). 
Constraints 
 Eden et al. argue that as the firm and its corresponding stakeholders mobilize their 
resources and the resources of each other to achieve their respective goals, each actor 
nevertheless operates under a series of constraints. Here our understanding of constraints is 
informed by the rich literature on institutional distance, defined as “the difference or 
similarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutional environments of 
the home and the host countries of an MNE,” with the expectation that the greater the 
institutional distance, the “more difficult it will be for the MNE to understand the host 
environment.” Under the institution-based school of strategic management, institutionally 
distant firms are encouraged to bridge this divide by adapting their own organizational 
practices to host country requirements.
472
 
 Among our cases, these expectations are most clearly realized within Frontier 
Mining and the “Kazakhization” of its management over time. Recall that Frontier was 
founded by Brian Savage, an American, but by 2008 he was forced to admit that the 
production delays in Kazakhstan “were not technical in nature” and that the development 
proved to be a “more challenging project than anticipated.” From that moment on, Frontier 
would increasingly transform the top management of the firm from foreign to Kazakh, with 
individuals such as Erlan Sagadiev, whose father has a close association with President 
Nazarbayev, Yerbulat Tastanov, an individual who held key posts within the mining sector 
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both before and after independence, and the Kazakh banker Yerlan Aliyev, who along with 
Sagadiev was able to shift the firm’s focus on raising capital from London to Kazakhstan. 
 Whereas Frontier’s experience in many ways follows exactly the path Eden et al. 
anticipated and which on a larger level one would expect from a reading of the scholarship 
on institutional distance, the experiences of ArcelorMittal and Cameco deviate from this 
path significantly and provide powerful evidence for a reconsideration of the conditions 
under which adapting to host country norms would be understood as a successful political 
risk management strategy. Clearly in some respects these firms absolutely respond to the 
domestic institutions in the way in which they operate – ArcelorMittal’s heavy role in a 
series of non-core business activities in Temirtau is an obvious response to Karmet’s Soviet 
legacy as a territorial-production complex. And in Cameco’s case, the fact that the firm is 
reluctant to participate in the South Kazakhstan akim’s informal elite maintenance activities 
shows how refusing to become “domestic” can in some ways complicate the firm’s ability 
to be successful.  
 However, recall that in the privatization of Karmet under the First Alpine JV and in 
the relationship between a Cameco peer, Uranium One, and Kazatomprom, establishing 
close relations with Kazakh elites – becoming more “domestic” – actually increased the 
firm’s exposure to political risks within the country. In the First Alpine JV, Bulat Abilov 
was an early contender for power at a time when President Nazarbayev was actively 
consolidating his authority over the country; equally Uranium One’s close association with 
Moukhtar Dzhakishev would become a major liability when Dzhakishev was arrested for 
corrupt practices in a move largely interpreted as a politically motivated step by 
Nazarbayev to limit an increasingly powerful and popular threat to his leadership. 
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 Further, remember that both ArcelorMittal and Cameco were invited to establish 
operations in Kazakhstan specifically because of their foreign status. Both Karmet and 
Kazatomprom were in desperate need of foreign investment and technology in order to 
restart their respective operations. And beyond the practical challenges, the fact that these 
firms decided to invest heavily in the country had a significant reputational effect for 
Kazakhstan in its attempts to draw FDI into the country. As previously noted, today 
ArcelorMittal and Cameco are explicitly and actively held up by the Kazakh government as 
examples of success stories in the country as a strategy for convincing other multinationals 
that they too can be successful in Kazakhstan. In this sense, while in some respects Kazakh 
stakeholders may expect these firms to become more “domestic” in that they should absorb, 
for instance, the legacy role of the Soviet era territorial-production complex and its 
associated non-core business activities in their daily operations, on other levels it is the very 
fact that these firms are “international” that contribute to their success.  
Stakeholders 
 While Eden et al. recommend in their description of the PBM to incorporate the 
existing research within CSR on stakeholder management, they provide little guidance on 
how they expect the various web of bargains between the firm and its corresponding 
stakeholders to manifest itself in practice. What is clear across our cases is not only the less 
sensational observation that surely there exist various stakeholders within a given country, 
each with their own unique goals, resources and constraints, but more importantly, that 
even within the Kazakh government there exist real differences among stakeholders and 
their corresponding interests. In other words, not only is the host country a myth, but the 
idea of a single Kazakh government is also clearly challenged in our cases.  
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 Frontier’s hypersensitivity to various risks, rooted in the fact that the firm is small 
and its viability is constantly challenged by even the smallest production delays, teases out 
most clearly the opposing stakeholder dynamics between the ministries in Astana and the 
local level inspectors within the oblasts. We also see in Cameco’s case a similar interaction 
between Cameco, its JV partner Kazatomprom, and the akimat of South Kazakhstan. In 
both cases, the local stakeholders’ attempts to satisfy informal elites complicates the firms’ 
ability to remain successful, wherein success is not only in the interest of the profitability-
based motives of the firms but also in the interest of the central government (i.e. through 
budget revenue) and in Cameco’s case, the fact that Kazatomprom maintains a 40-percent 
stake in the JV. The regional akimats, Kazatomprom and the various ministries all 
ultimately answer to President Nazarbayev, and yet often their interactions with the firms in 
our cases run contrary to the interests of one another. As such, the PBM should be modified 
to deconstruct stakeholder goals into proximate and ultimate objectives, a clear contribution 
of this thesis to the existing understanding of stakeholder theory. For instance, in the case 
of the regional akim of South Kazakhstan, while he maintains a series of proximate goals 
that include local elite maintenance and FDI attraction, ultimately his objective could be 
understood as to maintain socio-economic stability in his area of responsibility (if this is to 
erode, I would suggest, he is likely to be relieved of his responsibilities as akim). The 
challenge for the akim then becomes reconciling these proximate goals in a way that does 
not frustrate his ultimate objective. If, for instance, he focuses too heavily on elite 
maintenance at the cost of pushing Cameco out of South Kazakhstan (and thus pushing out 
the millions of dollars the firm contributes both locally and nationally through social 
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spending, permits and licenses, and budget revenue), the akim will have clearly failed in 
maintaining his ultimate objectives.  
 Besides operationalizing the concept of the stakeholder within Eden et. al’s PBM, 
this thesis also provides unique insight into how the foreign firm identifies and attributes 
agency to stakeholders. The very fact that we have defined a “stakeholder” within this 
thesis as a group or individual with the capacity to impact the firm’s ability to operate is 
telling: here we are saying, from a political risk perspective, that agency is synonymous 
with impact. The corollary is that those groups or individuals that cannot impact the firm 
are stripped of their agency.  Take, for instance, the local environmental NGOs that 
surround ArcelorMittal in Temirtau. They are engaged by the ArcelorMittal staff not 
because of their ability to affect KARMET, but rather because ArcelorMittal’s shareholders 
expect ArcelorMittal to engage local environmental NGOs in the name of corporate social 
responsibility.
473
 In other words, the stakeholder here of interest to ArcelorMittal is the 
shareholder and his or her associated ethics, not the local NGO. Frontier’s consideration of 
compliance with the Equator Principles is similar. The company’s interest in compliance 
was not about meeting environmentally responsible behavior but rather about attracting 
international financing which happened to have as a requirement certain environmental 
standards. Once Frontier determined a path forward that allowed the company to operate 
outside of such a constraint (i.e. by seeking financing from banks and/or investors that were 
not signees to the Equator Principles), the impetus for environmental responsibility 
collapsed. 
 The same is true for the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and why it has 
largely been avoided as a “stakeholder” in this thesis. Staffers within the ministry admit 
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that they maintain, from the perspective of improving the environment, very little power. 
As they describe, the ministry is used as a tool by the central government to extract 
additional rents from the foreign firm in the name of “environmental fines” – as a resource 
the central government can mobilize to achieve some other unrelated proximate goal. This 
is underscored by the fact that environmental fines are not cycled back in the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection to rehabilitate the contaminated areas or improve environmental 
conditions more generally. Rather, these fines go back into the central government where 
they are controlled by the prime minister.
474
  
The risk is in the relationship 
 What can we say, thus far, about the PBM as a framework for political risk 
analysis? It seems to be the case that the ideal condition for the firm – that is, the 
circumstances under which the firm is least exposed to political risks – is one in which high 
resource complementarities exist between the firm and its stakeholders within a system of 
shared institutional constraints. We can add to this the observation that the existence of 
resource complementarities is fragile, ever changing and must be constantly maintained. 
Further, that the institutional “symmetry” need not necessarily require those constraints of 
the firm to adapt to those of the stakeholder of interest, an important modification to our 
Structure/Constraints proposition; in some cases it can be the opposite, or a combination 
thereof, and as such this symmetry (or isomorphism, to use Eden et al.’s term) is better 
conceptualized as existing on a spectrum, wherein increasing symmetry increases the 
likelihood that resource complementarities can be realized under a cooperative bargain (and 
thus with decreased exposure to political risk) while decreasing symmetry increases the 
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likelihood that resource complementarities will be achieved (if at all) through conflictual, 
power-based behavior (and thus with the firm’s increased exposure to political risk). 
Finally, because we have clearly demonstrated that the firm must enter into relationships 
with a series of different actors within a given country, often with goals that run contrary to 
one another, with resources of varied interest to the firm, and even at times under systems 
of varying institutional constraints, a firm’s exposure to political risks seems best assessed 
by the quality of its relationships with these stakeholders, not by the country in which they 
happen to reside (an affirmation of our Stakeholder proposition).  
Trust and distrust, agents and structures 
 While on a practical level the PBM seems to be an apt framework for assessing a 
firm’s political risk exposure in a given country, clearly the key independent variables of 
the PBM – the resources and constraints that both afford and frustrate the firm’s ability to 
achieve its goals – stem from larger considerations within the social sciences on the 
interaction of agents and structures. Agents and structures, we argue in Wendt’s vein, are 
co-determined, mutually constituted entities that both influence and are influenced by one 
another, and in our setting of the foreign mining firm entering the former Soviet republic of 
Kazakhstan we see this over and again. The implications here for political risk management 
eclipse smaller, more tactical arguments on, for instance, the role of resource 
complementarities or institutional distance: here, the larger point is that the successful 
foreign firm exercises the ability to adapt to its operating environment while recognizing 
and leveraging its capacity to influence and alter this environment.  
 One of the more interesting and, admittedly, less expected ways in which the 
interaction of agents and structures manifested itself across our cases is in the concept of 
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trust. This is clearly an area for further research, as the literature on trust is highly 
developed, but nevertheless here were can make a series of narrow observations on the 
seeming role of trust in our own cases. In Cameco’s experience the significance of trust was 
most obvious, as we argued that the firm’s “pay it forward” strategy early on, which came 
at Cameco’s short-term expense and without any established promises going forward, could 
only be described as a gesture aimed at inculcating trust with relevant stakeholders within 
Kazakhstan that notably paid off later on in the Inkai JV. From there, Cameco’s at times 
trying relationship with JV partner Kazatomprom and also with the regional akim of South 
Kazakhstan seemed most accurately described as a function of trust. When Cameco 
requested permission to increase production, for instance, only to be stonewalled by the 
Kazakh government, it seemed that the impetus for the government’s behavior was the fact 
that it no longer trusted Cameco to fulfill an earlier promise to construct a UF6 conversion 
facility in the country. In this sense, characterizing the bargain between Cameco and its 
stakeholders as either cooperative or conflictual often seemed to be a function of whether or 
not the opposing stakeholder trusted Cameco – and the reverse, as Cameco equally felt that 
the trust had been broken when the new subsoil law changed the terms under which the 
firm operated, despite earlier promises to the contrary. 
 As Charles E. Stevens highlights in his reading of Vernon’s Sovereignty At Bay, 
Vernon argues at times that there is an inherent distrust on the part of the host country when 
a foreign firm decides to enter into and invest in the country, and it is here where we begin 
to see how agents and structures play a role in a firm’s ability to be successful and how 
success seems premised to some degree on trust. The distrust attributed to the firm, as 
Stevens points out, is due to its foreignness, but we should admit further that the firm is 
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equally distrustful of the host country. Vernon did, after all, describe the entry event as one 
in which the firm takes the “plunge into the dark and chilly waters of a less-developed 
country,” hardly promoting an image of trust and trustworthiness.
475
 What seems clear, 
however, is that in both cases it is the foreignness or otherness of the stakeholder that elicits 
an initial impression of distrust, not the stakeholder itself. In this sense, this feeling of 
initial distrust is premised on the social context in which the firm (or the Kazakh 
stakeholder) exists – perhaps the exploitative, capitalist mining multinational or the risky, 
former Soviet republic. “The capacities and even existence of human agents,” as Alexander 
Wendt describes, “are in some way necessarily related to a social structural context – that 
they are inseparable from human sociality.” After all, how else could a stakeholder or a 
firm form an opinion on an opposing actor in advance of interacting with that actor unless 
that opinion was somehow premised on the larger structural context in which the actor 
exists?  
But must the waters be so chilly? Eden et al. seem to think so: 
Since the HC [host country] will lack familiarity or is likely to have stereotypical views about the 
MNE, the government will treat the MNE as an outsider, that is, as a firm without legitimate status in 
the host country. Legitimacy can be achieved if the MNE becomes isomorphic with the institutional 
environment in the host country; however, it takes time and commitment by the MNE to build a 
reputation and become recognized as an insider by the host country.476 
And yet despite this stereotypical outsider baggage – what Eden et al. refer to as the 
“liability of foreignness” – in one swift action, Cameco was able to completely reorient the 
Kazakh government’s perception of the foreign firm by offering its expertise in marketing 
long-term uranium contracts. That active choice opened the firm up to future success and 
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critically, not because Cameco became more “domestic” as Eden et al. recommend above 
but because it became more trustworthy. This is a key departure from Eden et al.’s 
understanding of foreignness and one of the key contributions of this thesis to our existing 
appreciation of a foreign firm’s success in a given country. The firm need not necessarily 
run away from the structural context in which it exists and toward the structural context in 
which the stakeholder is embedded – though this is one possible strategy – but rather 
cultivate with the opposing stakeholder, through reinforcing behavior, a context in which 
each actor trusts one another. This new context – what we could term a “society” in the 
broadest sense of the word in that it is a system characterized by a series of social 
relationships among the firm and its stakeholders – is one in which the risks of adverse 
political action are significantly reduced, and hence here we have a strong indication as to 
why some firms are successful in countries in which we would expect them to fail: trust.  
 While in hindsight the fact that trust became our point of focus within Cameco’s 
case study should not be overly surprising – Cameco is, after all, the only case in which the 
firm is structured locally through a joint venture, and the extant scholarship on international 
business and trust is almost wholly relegated to research on JVs – clearly trust serves as a 
compelling unit of interest for understanding the mutual constitution and co-determination 
of agents and structures in all of our cases. As the discourse from Vernon and Eden et al. 
make clear, initial expectations of distrust are influenced by larger structural connotations 
on foreign or otherness, and in fact the argument that firms must become domestic in order 
to decrease their political risk exposure (i.e. overcoming the “liability of foreignness”) is 
equally influenced by the structural implication that because you are “one of us,” you must 
somehow be more trustworthy. And yet what Cameco’s single act shows us is that these 
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strong, structurally-rooted preconceptions of foreign firms as distrustful can be altered 
almost immediately with the act – the agency – of the agent. In this section we now dig 
deeper into the significance of Cameco’s act (and acts) while drawing in equally 
compelling examples on the interaction of agents and structures with one another in the 
cases of ArcelorMittal and Frontier Mining, as each of these firms’ attempts to build and 
maintain (and at times mismanage) an environment of trust with corresponding 
stakeholders.  
Trust through reciprocity  
 How to understand Cameco’s decision to help Kazakhstan market uranium? Or 
ArcelorMittal’s simple yet critical decision to pay the USD 50 million in wage arrears and 
public and private debts up front while others would not? Peter Aykens writes that “when 
trust is conceptualized as a socially derived context of interaction…such that it shapes how 
actors embedded in it perceive their own environment…behavior is cast in an entirely 
different light.”
477
 So what do we know about the mining sector and how trust may play a 
role? For one, as described in Chapter Three on the differences between mining and other 
sectors, even within the extractive industries mining is exceptionally socially and 
environmentally disruptive. We also know that mining is a long-term process that requires a 
substantial investment up front in terms of capital costs that is only realized if the firm can 
ensure its presence in a given location for a long period of time. And finally, we know that 
in Kazakhstan mining was the anchor of socio-economic development in the country for the 
decades leading up to the country’s independence and equally so it was the case that the 
                                                             
477 Aykens, P. (2005) '(Mis)trusting authorities: a social theory of currency crises', Review of International 
Political Economy, 12(2), pp. 310-33 (p. 329) 
242 
 
sector’s deterioration post-independence was largely responsible for the dire socio-
economic conditions facing the country in the early 1990s.  
 Enter now, within this context, ArcelorMittal, on the heels of two failed 
privatization attempts of the metallurgical enterprise known as Karmet that directly 
employed tens of thousands of Kazakhs and indirectly supported a city of over one hundred 
thousand in a country of only 15 million people. Whereas both First Alpine and US Steel 
failed to live up to their initial agreements, ArcelorMittal paid immediately and within a 
month offered to buy the enterprise outright. Earlier we noted that this act underscored the 
power of agency – that ArcelorMittal decided to act when others would not – but now it 
seems more appropriate to recognize, in a wider context, this act in a slightly “different 
light,” to borrow from Aykens: as a first step in cultivating a context of trust with a series 
of stakeholders that would remain critical to ArcelorMittal’s success for decades to come. 
How to characterize this first step, then, of ArcelorMittal, along with Cameco’s own unique 
initial action? As one of commitment – commitment not in the first instance to what would 
be expected, that is, the pursuit of the firms’ own narrow goals of profitability, but rather 
commitment to the tangential goals of the firms’ stakeholders. “The requirements for 
investment in trustbuilding are greater in the formative period of a relationship,” as Anoop 
Madhok writes in his studies on international joint ventures, “in order to absorb the initially 
higher costs of creating commitment.”
478
 This step, or what others have described as the 
“leap of faith,”
479
 seems aimed at establishing a vital norm within this new context of 
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interaction between the foreign firm and its local stakeholders from which both 
ArcelorMittal and Cameco would ultimately benefit: reciprocity.  
 Reciprocity is a norm that has “a powerful influence,” as Naresh Khatri, Eric W.K. 
Tsang and Thomas M. Begley explain, in that it nurtures “sentiments of gratitude and 
rectitude”
480
 – equal parts appreciation and obligation. In some instances this chain of 
reciprocity may seem obvious and ordered – think, for instance, of Cameco and its back 
and forth with the Kazakh government, KATEP and later Kazatomprom: Cameco provides 
assistance in marketing, the Kazakh government offers a favorable JV deal, Cameco signs a 
memorandum of understanding to provide the technology for conversion, and then when 
the firm requests permission to increase production, the consent is delayed, forcing the 
firm’s management to admit later that their “ability to double annual uranium production at 
Inkai will be closely tied to the success of the uranium conversion project.”
481
 But the 
pattern of exchange can also be less rigid, as in ArcelorMittal’s experience. Take, for 
example, the initial apathy and disinterest on the part of both the regional and central 
governments with regard to the tragic and repeated deaths of dozens of coal miners in the 
2000s period. While the miners were striking for increased wages and better safety 
conditions, the regional akim was praising the firm for its social contributions in the form 
of discounted coal to local towns, new ambulances, training for Kazakh Olympic athletes 
and the construction of a local football stadium. Only when the strikes began to threaten 
seriously the larger goals of the regional akim and the central government did both actors 
feel compelled to intervene, and even then it was under amicable, not confrontational, 
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conditions. Such reciprocating behavior in the context of trustworthiness has been 
described as the social “glue” that “facilitates the continuation of the relationship during 
intermittent periods of inequity.”
482
  
Trust through forbearance 
 Closely associated with the concept of reciprocity as a foundation for trust-building 
is the notion of forbearance, or the decision to refrain from opportunistic behavior.
483
 John 
Harriss, in his own investigations into the Indian business environment, notes that there is 
little need for trust when formal institutions, backed by laws, lead to a predictable set of 
behaviors, but in instances in which there is a lack of confidence in rule of law and the 
strength of formal institutions, there is an increased need for trust to ensure the firm will be 
able to operate with minimal government interference.
484
 As is most clear in Frontier’s 
case, building trusted relationships with local level inspectors and regulators is key amidst 
an ever-changing legal environment ripe with uncertainty in interpretation and 
enforcement. Here, individuals such as Yerbulat Tastanov build trust with local 
stakeholders in order to ensure that “if you do it this way, you will not have questions” with 
the inspector later on.
485
 Alternately, Cameco struggles in its ability to build trust on the 
local level, particularly in its relationship with the regional akimat, and thus remains highly 
exposed to opportunistic behavior: remember the Inkai JV’s concern that the akim is well 
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aware of the fact that a snap inspection or a withheld permit that would shut down the 
production facility would cost close to USD 500,000 a day.
486
 
 But the need to build trust in order to protect oneself from opportunistic behavior is 
not limited to the firm – local stakeholders are equally cognizant (and concerned) with their 
vulnerability to opportunistic behavior on the part of the foreign firm (stemming from the 
initial distrust as described by Vernon and Eden et al.). One way to dampen such 
sentiments is through the “going local” approach as adopted by Frontier Mining and as 
expected by the scholarship on institutional distance. This strategy clearly rests on an 
understanding of the structural influence on the way an agent will be perceived – described 
by one Frontier manager as “the other way,” in which everything is easier “if [you’re] 
Kazakh,” that is, more trustworthy. Of course, as we demonstrated earlier, the structural 
power of going local can be quickly reversed if those local agents turn to be a threat to the 
status quo. Nevertheless, Frontier’s strategy appears to be working – the fact that it was 
able to pursue and purchase Coville’s 50-percent stake in the Benkala development, despite 
the Kazakh government’s pre-emptive right to ownership, is a tremendous act of 
forbearance on the part of the government, rarely seen, for instance, in the oil sector. 
 More interesting, however, are the methods through which ArcelorMittal and 
Cameco worked to reduce local stakeholder anxiety about foreign firm opportunism. 
Recall, for instance, ArcelorMittal’s initial experience during the financial crisis in which it 
argued to Kazakh government officials that Karmet’s current levels of production and 
employment were together unsustainable given the drop in steel demand. Initially the 
stakeholder response was one of suspicion – “ArcelorMittal annually sells up to 110 million 
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ton of steel on the world market,” one deputy prime minister argued at the time, asking why 
it was not “possible to sell our five million tons?” ArcelorMittal’s response? Not hard talk, 
nor power politics, but rather a detailed presentation on how various future global scenarios 
on steel demand would specifically impact Karmet’s ability to remain financially 
sustainable. In other words, the firm as an agent actively worked to reorient its 
stakeholders’ preconceived understandings of supply and demand in the context of Karmet. 
Recall from Chapter Three that for much of Kazakhstan’s history with mining, production 
at all costs had been the predominating objective, the structural legacy of which is clear in 
the statement of the deputy prime minister above, but that the conception of supply and 
demand was then reshaped by ArcelorMittal, addressing and overcoming concerns from its 
local stakeholders that the firm might be using the financial crisis as an excuse for 
opportunistic layoffs and limiting production. Cameco implemented a similar strategy in 
overcoming concerns about high up front capital costs on rubberizing equipment and later 
on its plans to increase production (though this latter objective remains in progress) – here, 
going so far as to fly Kazakh officials out to other mine sites in the United States and 
Canada to address fears that the firm was acting opportunistically in Kazakhstan.  
 The strategy in both instances is deeply rooted in the understanding that these firms, 
as agents, can impart an impression on their corresponding stakeholders that will in turn 
transform these actors’ dominating structural influences, whether it be the decades of 
operating under a command economy or the fact that capital in the country had traditionally 
been “difficult or expensive to get”
 487
 (and thus health and safety incidents were often 
managed not through preventative measures but as operational issues).  
                                                             




 Resource complementarties and constraints, agents and structures – clearly through 
the framework of the PBM we have been able to approach the concept of “political risk” in 
a way that allows us the ontological and epistemological freedom to understand why some 
firms are successful in seemingly “risky” countries. As we have observed, an actor’s ability 
to maintain resource complementarities, or the fact that local structural constraints need not 
be so inflexible as to push the firm to wholly accept the local environment as given, 
together paints a picture of political risk management and success (or failure) that is much 
more dynamic and fluid than captured in the traditional political risk index. This 
management (or maintenance) of a web of relationships by a variety of stakeholders relies 
on concepts such as trust, reinforced by social acts such as reciprocity or forbearance. We 
now turn to our ultimate chapter, the conclusion, to consider this interaction within the 
greater context of the intersection of the the international political economy and the 






Conclusion: Where the international meets the domestic: everyday 
political risk 
Introduction 
 So what happens, exactly, when the multinational enterprise, representative of the 
internationalized structures of the world market economy, enters into the domestic political 
economy of a country in transition? On a practical level, the foreign firm views the new 
country as an opportunity to further its own goals, and thus looks to establish resource 
complementarities with those stakeholders in the country that can impact the firm’s ability 
to achieve such goals. Limiting the firm’s capacity to realize its interests are the structural 
constraints it both brings with it and takes upon itself as a condition of entering into this 
new country. And despite the fact that, as in Kazakhstan’s case, the central government 
may be actively seeking these foreign firms to come operate within its territory, the central 
government is not the only actor capable of impacting the firm’s ability to operate in the 
country, and in fact even within the central government there may be forces at work with 
their own proximate goals that at times run contradictory to the FDI-seeking behavior that 
brought the firm into the country in the first place. Further complicating the situation is that 
many of these stakeholders will treat the incoming multinational with an inherent distrust, 
fueled by the social structures in which these stakeholders have operated for decades – 
structures that, in Kazakhstan’s case, had until recently been largely untouched and 
uninfluenced by the internationalized structure that the multinational is assumed to 
represent.  
* * * 
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 A funny thing happened a week or two after I left chilly Ust-Kamenogorsk, the city 
in eastern Kazakhstan in which my heated interview with the local akim had led to a series 
of threats to leave quickly or risk arrest by the Kazakh equivalent of the KGB: Erbolat, the 
owner of the small business that had helped facilitate for me a series of meetings in the area 
– the same small business owner that called me that one night to cancel our contract and to 
warn me to leave – sent me an email with an interesting reminder. We had been in touch in 
the days following the incident, mainly because I wanted to make sure he and his staff 
members were okay. He noted that there was no article on us in the local newspaper, a good 
thing, despite the lengthy interview I had completed with the paper’s reporter in the waiting 
room of the akim’s office (before meeting with the akim, of course) and her place alongside 
the akim during my own interview. Erbolat mentioned that his office had received a series 
of calls from the local government after that night, but that otherwise the situation seemed 
to have settled.  
 And he reminded me that if possible, a formal recommendation would be 
appreciated. 
 A recommendation?  
 Yes, back when this local entrepreneur and I first touched base late one night in a 
coffee shop in downtown Ust-Kamenogorsk, working out the details of our arrangement, he 
had raised the prospect of me writing a recommendation for his business at the conclusion 
of our contract that he could then include in his promotional materials – to give his start-up 
a bit of legitimacy with the foreign investors and businesses he intended to target. Of course 
at the time I had agreed without hesitation, but I had assumed that following his experience 
with me and the accompanying government harassment that came with it, he would have 
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wanted to keep his distance. I was wrong, apparently, and I went on to write him the 
recommendation as promised.  
 The more I think about it, the more I conceptualize Erbolat and his small business as 
sitting right at that point where the international meets the domestic, and not in some sort of 
static sense, but rather the opposite – the dynamism of a situation that is always in flux, 
always changing. On the one hand, he looks outward, to the community of foreign firms, 
some of which are multinational enterprises, and their accompanying investors, where he is 
eager to win over these stakeholders as clients, eager to encourage their investment in East 
Kazakhstan. On the other hand, he looks to the domestic, where he must navigate the 
shifting structures and various agents of a city that has been mining raw materials for 
centuries and during the Soviet era was one of Kazakhstan’s secret cities, completely 
isolated from the rest of the world in the name of national security. Now Glencore is there, 
one of the largest mining multinationals in the world, and if Cameco follows through on its 
promise, it too will have a presence in Ust-Kamenogorsk under the auspices of a new 
conversion facility. And remember, when Nazarbayev praised the use of Kazakh steel in 
the first Kazakh car built by Skoda, he was doing so from the Skoda plant in Ust-
Kamenogorsk.  
 A few months later, after I had returned to St Andrews and sent Erbolat the 
recommendation, he emailed me again to let me know, with enthusiasm, that he had 
recently quit his day job in order to focus fully on his small business. He had decided to 
become, unbeknownst to him, the full-time facilitator to that nodal point where the 
international meets the domestic.  
* * * 
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 In this concluding chapter, we look beyond Kazakhstan and set our cases within the 
larger context of the study of IPE and IR and the potential research lines that can be spun 
out of this narrowly defined thesis. Thus far we have been concerned with determining the 
pathways through which three small examples of the international market economy 
incarnate have found success in Kazakhstan, pathways understood through the PBM 
framework yet rooted in an appreciation of the role of agents and structures and the 
interaction between the two, as captured in the propositions above. We focused in on 
successful cases – what in Kazakhstan we considered “deviant” cases – to explore the 
question that binds this thesis together, the question that traditional political risk analysis 
has largely ignored: why are some firms successful in politically risky countries? We began 
with ArcelorMittal, the largest publically traded steel manufacturer in the world, with 
operations in 60 countries, many of which are as risky as or riskier than Kazakhstan 
(according to political risk advisory firms), with a presence in the country that dates back to 
1995, manifested mainly in the operation of legacy Soviet mines and facilities while 
employing tens of thousands of Kazakh workers. We then turned to Cameco, a firm whose 
role in the country dates back even further, establishing a marketing agreement with the 
Kazakh government in the wake of independence before moving into production, though, 
unlike ArcelorMittal, the firm’s international exposure remains relegated to only four 
countries with Kazakhstan clearly the outlier, and with a much smaller local footprint. And 
finally Frontier Mining, the smallest of the three firms, which stands as a mining junior 
amongst the well-established international brands of ArcelorMittal and Cameco, with 
operations almost entirely limited to Kazakhstan yet nevertheless a publically traded 
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company listed on the London Stock Exchange’s AIM. These firms also separate 
themselves, of course, by their products – from steel to uranium to gold and copper. 
 If there is one observation above all others to draw from these alternating pathways, 
it is that in none of these cases did we observe the firm bending wholly to the new 
environment and its stakeholders, nor that the stakeholders and their legacy environment 
were swayed to assimilate wholly to the multinational enterprises and the international 
market economy, a clear challenge to our structure/constraints proposition and the larger 
scholarly work on institutional distance and the institution-based school of strategic 
management. Instead, it seems that we find our actors operating in a new environment 
altogether – one that they both created and are a product of, and continually reshape and 
maintain. Forget building a krisha, or political roof – instead, the process is one of building 
a doma, a new home altogether, a house that serves as the “nodal point,” as Sally calls it, 
between the international and the domestic. And because we focused entirely on seemingly 
successful firms operating within this new realm, and because we defined success as a 
situation under which the firm and its stakeholders are all able to work toward their own 
ultimate goals to a self-satisfactory degree, we can add that this nodal point represents not 
only the intersection of these two realms but a situation in which the actors within this new 
realm have managed to establish together the minimum conditions for co-existence – that 
this house was seemingly built collectively.  
 It is through this observation of co-existence – or “order” – that we can now fold the 
experiences of our cases into larger IR theory, a discipline that has always maintained as a 
core focus how international orders are established, maintained and often times, lost,
488
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though as William Walker appropriately points out, too often the concept of “order” is left 
as inadequately defined, or its definition is simply taken as “given”:
489
 
That a concern over order has lain at the heart of international politics in modern times is not in 
doubt. But what meaning should the word ‘order’ carry? For understandable reasons, most 
International Relations theorists have shied away from a definition. Instead, they agree that 
international order means many things, that its meaning is shaped by actors’ beliefs, interests and 
positions, that it is formed through an historically contingent combination of factors (structural, 
normative and instrumental), and that the presence of order is manifested by an ability to solve 
problems and manage change without upheaval. 
In this particular thesis, we would be doing a disservice to the richness of our case studies 
to characterize the form of order captured in our home-like “nodal point” as one of plain 
economic order, or alternately, security. The implications of, for instance, the largest steel 
manufacturing company in the world negotiating with a local governor in a remote city in a 
remote country on heating and hot water, or macadam for local roads, or negotiating with a 
local labor union over issues such as bar soap and the quality of threading on working 
gloves, seem deeper than state-based “economic orders” between the so-called North and 
the South or between the developed and the developing. At the same time it would seem 
inaccurate and even cynical to minimize the interests of the central government, with 
President Nazarbayev at the top, as proximately concerned with domestic security solely as 
a prerequisite for short-term personal self-enrichment, though at times it may seem this 
way.  
 Together, this is why we have embraced a broader understanding of order as one to 
be synonymous with co-existence, or the ability for alternating stakeholders to pursue their 
                                                             




own respective goals to a self-satisfactory degree. Vernon’s Sovereignty At Bay paints for 
us a very clear picture of how an established order on resource complementarities between 
a foreign firm and the country in which it operates can be obsolescing, based on a fleeting 
balance of power that ultimately (and deterministically) shifts in favor of the host country, 
leading to expropriation. But we have found that when the host country is deconstructed 
into a series of actors, each with its own goals, resources and constraints, that co-existence 
need not be so short-lived. This is not to say it is easily maintained, nor is it to say that at 
times an actor will not exercise its resources in a manner that seems more conflictual than 
cooperative, nor is it to say even that at any (and every) given point in time a particular 
stakeholder can be said to be in a self-satisfactory position with respect to its own 
particularly goals, but it does appear nevertheless to indicate the possibility of an order that 
is not obsolescing but rather more appropriately characterized as sustainable.   
 What then, as international political economists, can we learn from this particular 
nodal point of order? In this short concluding chapter, we set our investigation within the 
context of contemporary IR and IPE theory and look to draw parallels between existing 
understandings of actors and systems and our own interaction of agents and structures in 
Kazakhstan. Vernon, as will be recalled from Chapter Two, had very clear ideas on how a 
sustainable order could be established among the firm and the country in which it operates: 
through some sort of hegemonic global government, which he hypothesized as a “world 
corporation” that did not exist, he lamented. In the absence of such a trumping power, he 
remained wedded to the determinism of the bargain – that the balance of power between the 
multinational and the host government would ultimately shift in the government’s favor; 
that is to say, that the firm’s bargaining power would obsolesce. But as we have seen, this 
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need not necessarily be the case, and in fact our stakeholder proposition, which seems 
largely confirmed throughout this thesis, itself questions Vernon’s whole understanding of 
“multinational-host country relations,” as we have argued that, from the perspective of the 
foreign firm, there is no host country at all.  
 In this chapter we begin by exploring the interaction of order and stakeholder 
agency in the context of our cases and IR and IPE theory. This thesis appears to confirm 
two very powerful observations: first, that the study of the multinational enterprise’s 
interaction with the domestic economy of a country in transition is a research area primed 
for the study of politics and international relations; second, that the contemporary fields of 
IR and IPE have little to say, at the moment, on this interaction. Why is that the case? And 
where can we go from here?  
 Here we address Vernon’s conception of the “world corporation” as the hegemonic 
force over the foreign firm and the “host country” and juxtapose the notion of the “host 
country” against our own understanding of stakeholder agency – actors that may be either 
sub- or supra-national, and how the seeming necessity of the foreign firm to engage such 
stakeholders and not host countries affirms what has been recently coined as the agency of 
the “everyday actor.”
490
 If ever there was an intellectual home for the study of the MNE 
and political risk analysis outside of IB, the growing field of Everyday International 
Political Economy seems to be the place. Finally, we move beyond Kazakhstan and look to 
mining across the globe, identifying those areas within this thesis in which the theories and 
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concepts thus far developed may contribute to the study in other countries of arguably the 
most socially, environmentally and politically disruptive sector in the world.  
Stakeholder agency and the maintenance of order 
 There is a PDF on my computer desktop with the file name, “Read this article in 
case of emergency.” It is a short commentary published in 2010 in International Studies 
Quarterly and authored by Benjamin J. Cohen, with a title in the form of a question: Are 
IPE Journals Becoming Boring? The question, which Cohen notes justly as a “serious 
one,” resonates loudly with this thesis. How does the highly qualitative study of a few cases 
within the mining sector in a post-Soviet state “fit” into a field that has taken “an 
unfortunate turn” toward “formal scientific method, a hard science model resembling 
nothing so much as the epistemology of neoclassical economics with its well-known 
penchant for formal modeling and higher mathematics”? A turn that has “tended to shrink 
the horizons of scholarship”?
491
 
 And then, if we look to larger international relations, we can equally say with 
concern that we continue to live in a field of study that remains largely wedded to the 
dichotomy and parsimony of conceptualizing the relationships between states as power-
based, conflictual and placed within a system of self-help, or process-oriented, cooperative 
and facilitated through institutions.
492
 I recall participating, for instance, in a doctoral 
workshop in Washington, DC funded by the US-based Social Science Research Council in 
which one of the panelists questioned, with complete seriousness, whether this thesis was 
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actually about “international relations.” The nods of the other panelists confirmed that he 
was not the only one challenged at “fitting” my research into the greater discipline.  
 So where does the privatization of the Karaganda Metallurgical Enterprise in 
Temirtau fit into either of these two disciplines? How does Cameco’s seemingly broken 
promise to build a nuclear conversion facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk fit into these fields of 
study? Where is the value added to IPE or IR in knowing that Frontier Mining’s 
appointment of Yerbulat Tastanov as “head of government relations” alleviated the local 
permitting tensions that prevented the London-listed company from producing gold and 
copper at profitable margins?  
 From the very beginning, this thesis made two very important decisions, decisions 
made knowing full well that they would immediately separate this thesis and any potential 
findings from status quo work in both IPE and IR: that this would be a small-n study of 
deviant cases, a study that would explore through semi-structured interviews those data 
points on an otherwise tight regression of “institutional distance” that refused to cluster 
with the pack; and that those cases would take not as the unit of interest the “state” or the 
“host country,” but rather the relationships formed between the foreign firm and the various 
stakeholders that impact the firm’s ability to operate in a given location.  
 So is this thesis condemned to be an isolated series of case studies with little value 
beyond Kazakhstan and the mining sector, and thus relegated to “regional studies?” Or is 
this thesis part of a growing body of research that responds to Cohen’s question? That 
responds to our contemporary (and limited) understanding of IPE and IR? 
 As noted at the beginning of this thesis, the development of the MNE over the last 
several years has been mainly within the field of IB (international business studies), not 
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IPE, despite initial calls for the latter. Razeen Sally’s argument back in the 1990s that the 
MNE should serve as the nodal point of interface between the international and the 
domestic, a theme we have developed across this thesis, fell on largely deaf ears within IPE 
since its publication. And Lorraine Eden´s call for “bringing the firm back” into IPE was 
equally disregarded within the field. But the MNE is not alone – it is not the only unit of 
interest over the years to be ignored by traditional IPE. Leonard Seabrooke and John 
Hobson observe that traditional IPE researchers mistakenly seem to believe that “the study 
of the world economy can be gleaned by examining the actions of 10 percent of the world 
at most, while the other 90 percent are but power-takers whose actions are inconsequential 
for the making of the world economy.” They label this 10-percent as “the elite suppliers of 




 Hobson and Seabrooke go on to summarize the main point of what is now 
commonly referred to as “everyday IPE”  – that the 90-percent that traditional IPE ignores 
actually have significantly more agency than they are given credit for, an observation this 
thesis seems to affirm over and again. This is of course a key point and one that we will 
return to in a moment and in detail, but first I want to touch on this wonderful phrase of 
“the elite suppliers of order,” for we have repeatedly characterized our own nodal point of 
intersection between the international and the domestic as one of order, or co-existence, and 
yet our stakeholders are not those that traditional IPE would consider as “the elite.” Hobson 
and Seabrooke are arguing here that the field is overly focused on a single question and on 
a global scale: “who governs and how is order regulated?” They are referring mainly to 
international institutions and associated regulations, but the mistake they make is to claim 
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that everyday IPE should abandon this focus on order and instead turn to the stakeholder 
agency of the “other” 90-percent. As we have shown in this thesis, order and stakeholder 
agency are intimately tied to one another, and thus need not (and should not) be considered 
as “one or the other”: the MNE that successfully maintains order in the politically risky 
country does so because it recognizes both its own agency and the agency of its 
stakeholders, and the reverse is also true – woe is the MNE that fails to recognize its own 
agency or the ability of a local akim in a remote village to cause problems. In the mid 
1990s, ArcelorMittal actively worked to find resource complementarities with the Kazakh 
central government, the local Termirtau government, and the Karmet workers. Alternately, 
the Karmet workers later found the capacity to band together, go on strike and affect 
production levels, gaining an 80-percent raise in a two year period. Cameco took a chance 
and offered to help KATEP with uranium marketing back in the early 1990s; equally the 
foreign firm has actively slowed plans for building a uranium conversion facility and 
decided not to pay cash into the local akim’s budget, two choices negatively affecting the 
company’s ability to maintain order. And Frontier initially decided to take “short cuts” 
instead of taking the time to go through the formal and informal processes of the regulatory 
and permitting system in local East Kazakhstan, whereas later in the company’s history, 
individuals like Yerbulat Tastanov would actively sit down with local stakeholders to work 
out a compromise.  
 And while the order maintained between Yerbulat and the local inspector is surely 
not on the scale of traditional IPE or IR, this is not to say that the findings are not relevant – 
that those concerned with the 10-percent cannot learn from the 90-percent. A central 
proposition of this thesis – and one that appears to have been reaffirmed time and again 
260 
 
across our studies – is that the firm plays a critical and capable role in establishing and 
maintaining a sense of order among its various stakeholders, as do the stakeholders with the 
firm. This seems to connect directly into the classical realist argument that the balance of 
power requires constant maintenance and is subject to “considerable diplomatic and 
political skill,” and notably, that this maintenance is aided by a “degree of shared normative 
assumptions.”
494
 In Richard Ned Lebow’s interpretation of classical realism through the 
works of Thucydides and Hans Morgenthau, for instance, he submits that the success of the 
balance of power during the largely peaceful eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was “less 
a function of the distribution of capabilities than it was of the existence and strength of 
international society.” The fortitude of this international society, according to Lebow, 




 The parallels here are worth exploring between the conceptions of community and 
justice, as Lebow interprets them, and our own observation, respectively, that the firm and 
its stakeholders construct and develop a new set of structures within which these actors 
operate, and that at times this “third way” appears to be enhanced by the feeling of trust. To 
Hans Morgenthau, the main function of justice is to “keep aspirations for power within 
socially tolerable bounds,”
496
 and Lebow adds that a shared sense of justice not only 
“provides the conceptual scaffolding on which actors can intelligently construct interests,” 
specifically referencing the concept of self-restraint, but further, determines how actors 
“understand and respond” to one another. These points fit neatly with our previously 
discussed understanding of trust as represented through forbearance and reciprocity. Justice 
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and trust here serve the same purpose: to maintain the necessary conditions of co-existence, 
reinforced through acts like self-restraint (i.e. what we call forbearance) and how actors 
understand and respond to one another (i.e. what we call reciprocity), but whereas the 
classical realists simply provide the observation that in times of order there appears to be a 
community, relatively balanced in power, which encourages and influences responsible (or 
“tolerable”) behavior, in our case studies, because they begin in advance of such a 
community, we add value in that we describe the process of how such a community 
develops, is challenged and yet maintained over the years.  
 “Order” in this sense is happening on a smaller scale, everyday. 
 So then how does this sense of community, small as it may be, develop among our 
stakeholders within the existing theorizing on international relations? A community that 
inculcates trust as a method for maintaining a sense of order among its members? Here we 
can draw on liberal approaches toward order – toward co-existence – which begin by 
addressing the interests of the state “from a bottom-up perspective,”
497
 in the words of 
Diana Panke and Thomas Risse. For us, liberalism’s concern with the preferences of actors 
is critical because proponents of the theory argue at length over the importance of 
communication – only with “high quality information”
498
 on opposing actors, so goes the 
argument, can an actor assess whether or not those actors’ interests are reconcilable or 
irreconcilable with the actor’s own interests. The expectation follows that under situations 
of high quality information, conflict is less likely and cooperative behavior ensues as actors 
realize that more often than not, opposing interests are in fact reconcilable. International 
organizations facilitate this reconciliation, so goes the argument. 
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 We can now start to see how information plays a critical role in revealing (and 
reassuring) opposing stakeholders of each others’ interests, allowing for more often than 
not cooperative behavior. In Kazakhstan there is no shortage of publically available and 
promoted state policies and five year plans, all of which ultimately lead into the state’s 
“2030 plan,” the central government’s dominating socio-economic development strategy 
initially outlined by President Nazarbayev back in 1997 (and recounted in this thesis in 
Chapter Three). For doubters of the seriousness of the 2030 plan, in my own personal 
experience in the government’s various ministries and regional akimats, the plan is 
regularly referenced, particularly the “State Programme on Forced Industrial and 
Innovative Development for 2010-2014,” which itself is a five year plan set within the 
larger 2030 plan. In fact in Kazakhstan’s Investor’s Guide, for instance, the section on 
“Priority sectors of economy” for investment explicitly connects the country’s FDI 
priorities with the “industrialization map” of the Forced Industrial and Innovative 
Development plan stated above.
499
 Similar investment attraction guides exist for each 
oblast, customized for the region but nested within the larger objectives of the 2030 plan. 
As they regard the firm, these plans set out very clearly the formal interests of the central 
government. They allow a multinational like ArcelorMittal to realize the strategic value in 
ensuring the company’s steel is used to manufacture cars in East Kazakhstan or metal pipes 
on the Caspian coast; and they allow a firm like Cameco to realize the significance (and 
consequences if ignored) of the country’s goals in becoming the leading producer of 
uranium worldwide and to complete the nuclear fuel cycle.  
 Information on opposing interests is also facilitated at the central government level 
through the working groups co-led by the American Chamber of Commerce or the Foreign 
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Investors’ Council or the Association of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises and a 
corresponding ministry or the parliament. As covered in Chapter Five, these working 
groups bring together foreign investors with key government policymakers to ensure 
legislation responds appropriately to the constraints of the foreign firm while remaining 
true to the intent of the Kazakh stakeholder. While the process is by no means always 
perfect, it is a process nevertheless that increases the transparency of opposing stakeholder 
interests and often results in their reconciliation. Take, for instance, the Foreign Investors’ 
Council’s Tax Working Group, chaired by Marat Kussainov, the Vice-Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade, and Zhanna Tamenova, a partner in Ernst & Young and 
the head of the firm's Kazakhstan-based Tax and Legal practice. The members of the group 
include a handful of directors and deputies within the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade along with most of the accountants and tax specialists 
within the foreign business community, from ConocoPhilips to PwC to HSBC to Baker & 
McKenzie to ArcelorMittal and Philip Morris, among several others. While the group can 
point to a series of practical successes – such as working together to decrease reporting 
period timelines from a monthly to a quarterly basis, or to limit property taxes to only 
“immovable property,” – the structural value in these sorts of working groups is in the fact 
that ministry officials and their private sector counterparts are working together, forming 




 On a regional level, along with each akimat’s own set of strategic plans (authored 
within the context of the central government’s broader policies), the genius here is in the 
                                                             




process of the annual Memorandum on Social Cooperation. Here there exist strong 
financial incentives for both the foreign firm and the regional akimat to get together each 
year and formally discuss the akimat’s social development priorities for his area of 
responsibility and how the firm can contribute to those priorities. Even if the process falls 
apart, as it did for Cameco, at the very least neither the firm nor the akimat is under any 
illusion as to why the two stakeholders’ interests are irreconcilable. At a very minimum, 
therefore, uncertainty is reduced, but generally speaking – as has been the case for 
ArcelorMittal and Frontier Mining, for instance – the process proceeds rather smoothly and 
provides an excellent, formal opportunity for the foreign firm to demonstrate its willingness 
to contribute to the goals of an important stakeholder (who, by the way, is extracting rents 
from the foreign firm that he then plans to spread to local stakeholders). Finally, whether it 
be Cameco flying Kazakh officials out to US and Canadian operating sites, or the regular 
signing of memorandums of understanding, or ArcelorMittal providing regional and central 
government officials with presentations on future scenarios for the supply and demand of 
steel, or Frontier Mining sitting down with local inspectors to ensure each individual is 
interpreting the confusing regulations in the same way, the overall aim remains the same: 
reconcile possible opposing interests or misinterpretations by increasing the exchange of 
information. And powerfully, the strategy behind these trips, PowerPoints and local sit-
downs is premised on the belief that these local stakeholders maintain the capacity to 
influence and change the domestic structures that otherwise constrain the foreign firm. 
Everyday actor agency! 
 But there is an even more important finding here in the relationship between order 
and stakeholder agency, one both traditional IPE and everyday IPE researchers seem to 
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miss. Vernon, as we have previously noted, believed very strongly that there were 
irreconcilable tensions between a multinational and the host country in which it operated – 
tensions that could only be managed if some sort of global government was created that 
could balance the interests of the firm against those of the nation state – that is, he believed 
that what was necessary was an elite supplier of order, perhaps the 1-percent of the 10-
percent. But curiously, what we see in our community here is a system of co-existence that 
is not dominated by a single authority but rather a series of stakeholders that constantly act 
in ways to signal their own interests while equally communicating willingness to flex and 
create space for the self-interests of others. In many ways, the need for this self-created 
community is paradoxically tied to the absence of a truly dominate authority, a hegemonic 
force. Whereas Vernon grieved the fact that a higher-order supranational authority “may 
seem plausible [one day], but not at the present,”
501
 today’s successful foreign firms (and 
their corresponding stakeholders) seem to have stopped waiting for such an authority, to 
have equally recognized the lack of a consistent country-based authority, and instead have 
begun to develop within the countries in which they operate an extra-legal system founded 
not on one dominating force (national or international) but rather on the idea that the 
mutual pursuit of self-interests among a variety of stakeholders is actually quite feasible 
under conditions of trust, but that this trust must be regularly managed and maintained. 
What in the 1960s and 70s seemed to be anarchy, today seems more aligned with the idea 
that so-called anarchy is what multinationals and their corresponding stakeholders “make of 
it,” to borrow from Wendt
502
 and to underscore the significance of the firm’s and the 
stakeholders’ agency in “keeping the house” together. In our cases, the absence of a 
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hegemonic force (be it in Kazakhstan proper or on an international scale) does not push our 
stakeholders to adopt an overly power-oriented, short-sided pursuit of self-interest, but 
rather to recognize that in order to realize ultimate goals over a long period of time, 
proximate goals – and the resources and constraints within which they exist – need be 
adapted to make space for the interests of others, and those interests cannot be generalized 
at the level of the host country. In other words, the 90-percent need not rely on the 10-
percent for order, or to put it even more bluntly, the 10-percent are not necessarily the “elite 
suppliers of order” that we make them out to be. Rather, just as everyday IPE makes the 
claim that everyday actors in the international political economy have more agency than we 
tend to grant them, it seems that these everyday actors play an even greater role in 
maintaining order than has previously been assumed.  
 So why are some firms successful in politically risky countries? The answer to this 
question, which we have started to reveal in our three cases, appears to be one aptly suited 
for further exploration within everyday IPE. While critics of everyday IPE have pointed out 
that the discipline lacks a unified “research agenda” (in the way that traditional IPE focuses 
on broad, international economic orders), Hobson and Seabrooke propose that researchers 
of everyday IPE think more in terms of “puzzle-sets” that are “intellectually flexible and 
more able to capture real world changes.”
503
 What better a puzzle than the successful firm 
in the risky country? Not only does it bring into play the MNE as a unit of interest (a unit 
that traditional IPE continues to ignore), but through the PBM, which calls for 
conceptualizing bargains as between the MNE and a series of stakeholders (not a single 
host country) and specifically presents such bargains as a composite of the resources and 
constraints each actor maintains and faces as it attempts to achieve its own proximate and 
                                                             
503 Hobson, J.M. and Seabrooke, L. (2006), p. 5. 
267 
 
ultimate goals, we have an established framework suited fittingly for everyday IPE’s larger 
focus on everyday actor agency.  
Beyond Kazakhstan: mining and political risk research 
 At the tail end of my field research in Kazakhstan, I met with the Canadian 
commercial attaché in country over a steak and a beer at the popular Line Brew in Astana. 
Months before, he had introduced me to the senior management team running Cameco’s 
Inkai JV, but at this dinner we were here to talk about larger projects. Canada is a mining 
powerhouse (a high percentage of mining companies are listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange) with regular investor interest in mineral rich Kazakhstan. But as the attaché 
explained to me, no one had really taken the time to travel around the country, visit the 
different mine sites, talk with the locals and the local government, and try and understand 
why the successful companies were successful and why the unsuccessful companies have 
such a hard time in the country. He asked me if I would be interested in putting together a 
monograph for the embassy on “lessons learned” that could then be distributed to 
prospective investors back in Canada, and knowing that I had also spent significant time in 
the mining villages of neighboring Kyrgyzstan, he further asked if I would be willing to 
write not just on Kazakhstan but on the larger Central Asian investment environment for 
mining outside of oil and gas.  
 The resulting report, Political Risk Management and Mining in Kazakhstan, with an 
annex covering Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, quickly circulated around the mining 
community and with appreciated praise, but for me it confirmed something even more 
important: that the politics of mining were an undercovered topic. Severely undercovered. 
This suspicion would be further validated over the next several months as the editors of the 
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policy journal Foreign Affairs asked me to apply the Kazakh and Kyrgyz experience to 
mining in Afghanistan, which in turn led the think tank Good Governance Africa to ask me 
to apply the Afghan experience to mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana 
and Zambia. These publications, paired with the numerous private reports I was at the time 
providing for strategic advisory firms in London and increasingly on topics I knew 
admittedly less and less about, led me to take a step back, catch my breath, and think more 
deeply about why there is such interest in mining and why it pairs so neatly with both 
academic and practical research into political risk, political risk analysis and political risk 
management.  
 First, as I have said before, mining by its very nature is exceptionally disruptive in 
both a social and environmental sense. Mining also tends to be highly regulated by 
governments, meaning that the “keys to the kingdom” are at least partially controlled by 
government officials with a level of oversight and regulatory activity that a multinational 
focused on manufacturing, for instance, or implementing a set of restaurant chains, simply 
does not face. I think back to a meeting I had with a high level executive in the Kazakh 
copper miner Kazakhmys, just days after Human Rights Watch released a report on the 
company’s alleged bribery of Kazakh government officials all the way up to President 
Nazarbayev himself. There is no way, this man said to me at the time, that a mining 
multinational can be successful in a country like Kazakhstan without being extremely close 
to the government. No way.
504
 And thus while human rights activists and good governance 
advocates saw the report as particularly damning, to mining analysts it was in many ways a 
validation of what they had believed (and hoped) all along. Clearly, the combination of a 
socially and environmentally disruptive enterprise that requires a close association with 
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local governments serves as a rich area for the study of the intersection of business and 
politics, for the study of political risk. 
 But there is more to it than that.  
 One of the most in-depth case studies to implement Vernon’s obsolescing 
bargaining model directly after the publication of Sovereignty At Bay was by one of 
Vernon’s pupils, Theodore Moran. Moran wrote a book with a simple title but packed with 
detail: Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile. It was 
the book version of his doctoral thesis, and it applied the bargaining model to the 
nationalization of the copper mining sector in Chile in the early 1970s. The difference 
between Moran’s study then and political risk today is that the days of large scale 
nationalizations or expropriations are all but over. Sure, there are still examples, still 
outliers, but the concern facing the majority of mining companies operating in risky 
countries nowadays is not that the government will expropriate the mine or the greater 
sector, but rather that the central government, the local government, local and international 
activists and a variety of other stakeholders will bleed the mining operation slowly through 
a pay-to-play bureaucracy, internal or external fraud, snap inspections, new taxes, liberal 
interpretations of an amorphous law, and various other largely politically motivated acts 
that may not make it into the headlines of the Wall Street Journal but nevertheless impact 
severely the foreign firm’s ability to be successful in a given country.  
 Vernon’s bargain, as did Moran’s application of the bargain, focused on 
“multinational-host country relations,” where both Vernon and Moran understood the host 
country to be largely synonymous with the country’s national elites. While noting that 
“there are many different ways in which to describe the sources of tension generated” by a 
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foreign firm entering into a given country, Vernon wrote, viewing the tensions as rooted in 
the implications of the firm’s existence to the country’s elites “proves especially 
illuminating.”
505
 Not today. Through what is likely a combination of increased access to 
information, vastly improved ethical standards set by corporate board members 
representing better informed shareholders, and the idea that the majority of national 
governments of emerging and frontier market countries are proactively seeking out 
potential foreign investors and know full well that a high profile case of expropriation is 
sure to scare investors away, or that the local knowledge simply does not exist to develop 
the mine, we no longer talk about “multinational-host country relations” and assume that 
the “host country” and the nation’s elites can be treated as one and the same.  
 Political risk analysis today, as it exists in a practical sense in advisory firms like 
EurasiaGroup or Control Risks or the hundreds of boutiques like GPW that have sprung up 
over the last several years are not investing millions and millions of dollars in teams of 
analysts capable of predicting nationalizations by dictators; rather, they are investing in 
analysts with strong in-country experience that speak the local language and understand the 
everyday actor agencies of the local akim, the labor union boss and the customs official at 
the border. These analysts are tracking individuals like Bulat Abilov, the local Kazakh who 
paired up with the First Alpine JV and later went on to be an opposition leader, or Vladimir 
Nemchiov, the assistant steel worker interviewed on television about his change in 
perspective on Karmet over the years, or the head of the coal miners union who made a trip 
out to London to meet Mr. Mittal and was left standing at the door. These analysts are 
following Kazatomprom’s reaction to Cameco’s delay tactics, they want to know how the 
trip went when Cameco flew out some local officials to their Canadian operations, and they 
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are modeling the likely scenarios facing Cameco following its decision to snub the local 
akim on social programming. These analysts are keenly interested in knowing more about 
Frontier CEO Erlan Sagadiev’s connections to local elites, Yerbolat Tastanov’s progress in 
negotiating with regulators and inspectors, and Yerlan Aliyev’s access to Russian 
financing. And finally, when these political risk analysts cannot find the information they 
need, they rely on individuals like my friend Erbolat, for whom I wrote a recommendation, 
running his small business there in East Kazakhstan, as source of intelligence.  
 These various actors represent the 90-percent of IPE, not the 10-percent. And 
political risk analysis today is focused on the everyday, because the risk is in the everyday 
relationships formed between the firm and its stakeholders.  
Conclusion 
 How to describe the successful foreign firm in the so-called risky country? When 
this foreign firm enters into a given country, it does so (as do all firms) on the presumption 
that it will be allowed to pursue its interests to a self-satisfying degree; equally, the central 
government of the country, or perhaps the regime, allows the firm to enter on the same 
presumption but for its own interests. At that moment, however, the successful firm 
separates itself from others in that it actively begins to construct a community within which 
it and the central government, along with a series of additional stakeholders, will regularly 
promote and participate in acts that reassure the corresponding stakeholders of that initial 
entry condition: that the actors together will maintain the necessary conditions for co-
existence. Acts like reciprocity and forbearance reinforce confidence in the strength of the 
community, as do information acts which work to reduce uncertainty and the possible 
misinterpretation that a given stakeholder has deviated from the community’s norms. 
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Finally, the constraints as established within this community within which each 
stakeholder, including the firm, pursues its own ultimate and proximate goals, are not 
wholly isomorphic with the constraints of the domestic political economy of the 
stakeholders nor the international political economy of the firm; rather, the community is a 
reconciliation of the constraints of each of these realms – a reconciliation that itself is an 
active process of shaping and reshaping that is also facilitated by information, by 
transparency. As these alternating constraints approach reconciliation, stakeholder behavior 
tends to be more cooperative as the conditions for co-existence within the community 
improve; it equally follows that challenges to reconciliation may prompt conflict among 
stakeholders and result in power-oriented behaviors aimed at reestablishing a sense of 
perceived justice or trust within the community. The successful firm recognizes its role as 
agent and reagent at every step along the way in maintaining order within this community – 
this nodal point that stands at the intersection of the international market economy and the 
domestic political economy of, in our case, a former Soviet state with a deep and rich 
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Appendix: Methodology and semi-structured interview source details 
 The primary sources that inform the three cases within this thesis are as follows: 
company documents from the mining firms of interest, government documents from a 
variety of ministries within the Republic of Kazakhstan and the provincial (oblast) 
governments; archival research of primary source reporting as well as secondary source 
analyses of Kazakhstan in Russian during the Soviet Union and in English from before the 
Soviet Union; a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Kazakhstan over the 
course of 2011 with representatives from several mining multinationals, government 
officials, local NGOs, and the consultants, accountants, auditors, lawyers, trade union 
representatives, and foreign government trade officials associated with the mining industry 
(totaling 77 interviews ranging from 1 to 2 hours in length); and finally site visits to the 
various cities, towns and villages associated with the metals mining sector. Follow up visits 
to London and Almaty occurred throughout 2012 and early 2013.  
 All subjects interviewed were guaranteed anonymity. Interviews were recorded in 
all instances, unless the subject specifically requested that the interview not be recorded or 
the interview happened by chance and recording equipment was not available. In limited 
instances, an individual may have said something during the interview and then asked not 
to be specifically quoted because it would allow the individual to be identified even if the 
quote remained anonymous; such requests were always honored. Subjects were selected for 
interviews based on their access, perspective and, of course, willingness to speak. Subjects 
often would recommend other individuals to interview and would facilitate the 
introduction. In interacting with local government officials, which generally seemed the 
most suspicious and most difficult to agree to an interview, I often presented myself as a 
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researcher interested in understanding broader investment opportunities in the town or 
oblast of interest outside of oil and gas (that is to say, I would not present myself as solely 
focused on mining opportunities). This proved to be a more successful strategy in gaining 
interviews, as local akimats seemed keen to promote a variety of investment opportunities 
and not a single sector. I always presented myself as a doctoral candidate affiliated with the 
University of St Andrews in Scotland. 
 All interviews are described in the table below with the date and location of the 
interview, along with a description of the interviewee at a level of detail sufficient to allow 
the reader to appreciate the individual’s access to information and his or her perspective 
(and possible biases), but not too detailed to allow the individual to be identified. 
 The cases that this thesis is based upon – ArcelorMittal, Cameco and Frontier 
Mining – were selected for a combination of reasons. First and foremost, as our interest is 
in seemingly successful foreign firms, initial research was conducted to identify those 
mining firms that have been present in Kazakhstan for a lengthy period of time. These firms 
were then filtered by the diversity of conditions they represented, with the forethought that 
this would allow us to draw out any possible similarities and/or differences between cases. 
Practically speaking and in the interest of full disclosure, the cases were then limited by 
those mining firms that provided the necessary level of access to staff members and internal 
documents. Both Glencore and Kazakhmys, for instance, were initially considered as 
possible cases but had to be dropped during my field research because of either lack of 
cooperation or evidence of a clear intent to limit access. And further, some initially 
proposed cases were dropped simply due to space limitations. Both ENRC and Uranium 
One, for instance, were very cooperative, along with a series of smaller mining firms such 
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as Sunkar Resources, but incorporating these firms into the thesis itself with the level of 
detail desired quickly became impossible. 
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